Who benefits from partial tax coordination?

In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states. This is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is Pareto improving. When a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union, we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries. Moreover, both the high‐tax and low‐tax countries can be worse off. This conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high‐tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound.     

The social process of internet appropriation: Living in a digitally advanced country benefits less well-educated Europeans

We generalize and extend the sequential model proposed by the resources and appropriation theory to explain the digital divide in the European Union plus the United Kingdom (EU27+UK). We measure the theoretical constructs of the model with data provided by the EU and test the theoretical predictions using a partial least squares structural equation model. We find support for the hypothesized relationships but find that the effects vary depending on the digital development level of countries. While education overall is the primary determinant of the social production of digital inequalities, a country's digital development level is crucial for less well-educated Europeans. These findings have theoretical and practical implications: (1) they call into question the homogeneity of the effect of causal relationships and the assumption that individuals differ only in terms of motivation, access, and digital skills, and (2) they indicate that socially disadvantaged Europeans benefit from living in more digitally developed countries.     

Discussion on the Benefits Distributing Structure in Village Land Deal

According to everyone average welfare value of land resources; this paper constitutes the base line of glebe usufruct deal value by analyzing the factors, which are affecting glebe usufruct deal value. Having adopted share＇s quotient of ownership and contracting power, the paper erects assigning mechanism to the income of glebe deal. Because of the share dynarnicity being adopted which shows the flexible strong points, the shares of ownership and contracting power avoid many unnecessary otiose disputes on income of glebe deal, adding the stability to the glebe usufruct deal. It is beneficial to the freedom flow and validity manufacture factor installment and also to the nonagricultural changing course.     

重庆市城市土地经济效益评价

从产出和投入两方面构建城市土地经济效益评价的指标体系,采用层次分析法对重庆城市土地的经济效益进行评价,可知:重庆城市土地的经济效益总体水平较低、波动较大,重庆城市近年来投入偏高影响了土地经济效益,而且重庆城市土地利用的集约化水平不高.     

Labour use efficiency in the Indian and Pakistani commercial banks

The Indian and Pakistani banking industry is said to have an excessive use of labour due to the significant market share of government owned banks. Both countries have undertaken a process of regulatory reform to bring about market discipline in the usage of inputs and to increase the labour use efficiency and productivity. The focus of this paper is the estimation of productivity and efficiency of labour use in the banking sectors of the Indian sub-continent. The results show that the efficiency of labour use across the Indian sub-continent is improving over time and that foreign banks are more efficient compared to domestically owned banks in their usage of labour.     

建立铁路公益性运输补偿机制的探讨

铁路公益性运输超越了企业的职能范围,企业应当得到国家补偿。为此,建议按照依法、据实补偿原则,以税收抵扣方式进行补偿,以利于铁路运输企业的积累和发展。     

城乡结合部用地矛盾成因分析--以北京市为例

特殊的土地利用和管理特点使得城乡结合部用地矛盾尤为凸现.人口、城市发展、集体经济发展是造成土地供求紧张的直接原因,但是管理制度的不健全则是导致和加剧矛盾激化的深层次原因.在对北京市城乡结合部土地利用与房地产市场调查的基础上,对北京市城乡结合部的用地矛盾进行分析,并从深层次揭示问题的根源和变化规律.     

Environmental Valuation with Imperfect Information The Case of the Random Utility Model

This paper considers welfare analysis with therandom utility model (RUM) when perceptions ofenvironmental quality differ from objectivemeasures of environmental quality. Environmental quality is assumed to be anexperience good, so that while perceptions ofquality determine choices, ex postutility is determined by objective quality. Given this assumption, I derive a measure ofthe welfare impact of changes in environmentalquality, and I show how this new welfaremeasure differs from the traditional welfaremeasure developed by Hanemann (1982). This newwelfare measure provides an approach tomeasuring the value of information aboutenvironmental quality within the framework ofthe random utility model.     

Domestic Support and Border Measures for Processed Horticultural Products

In horticultural markets, trade barriers often apply to the processed products whereas domestic support applies to farm-produced raw commodities. Here we assess the effects of such trade barriers and domestic support by simulating the effects of policy reform on global processing tomato markets, which are faced with modest processed product tariffs and high domestic support in the European Union (EU). Both protection and EU subsidy drive down world welfare, but we find that reducing import tariffs for tomato products would yield greater effects on markets and larger welfare impacts outside Europe than would reductions in EU domestic support.     

Valuing Food Store Access: Policy Implications for the Food Stamp Program

Food stamp recipients may lack access to larger stores, reducing the availability of nutritious food. Reliance on smaller stores may have undesirable impacts. Policy alternatives include limiting food stamp redemption to larger stores and subsidizing store development. I estimate that limiting redemption to supermarkets and grocery stores, or supermarkets alone, results in losses ranging from $499.2 million to $1.05 billion, or $1.17 billion to $2.44 billion (respectively) annual loss in food stamp recipient welfare nationwide. The impact of improving access is also significant, ranging from $333.6 million to $931.2 million.