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101.
Chris M. Alaouze 《Empirical Economics》2003,28(3):599-613
The modified logit model (Amemiya and Nold, 1975) is generalised to the case where the error term is autocorrelated. The
asymptotic distribution (as n →∞ and T →∞) of a feasible GLS estimator of β is derived. Tests of linear restrictions on β and the significance of ρ are presented.
The results of the applied work suggest that the factors which explain the pricing behaviour of manufacturing firms, as reported
in the tendency survey conducted by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Westpac Banking Corporation, include
historical inflation rates of up to 7 quarters and capacity utilisation.
First version received: March 2001/Final version received: July 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The first draft of this paper was written while the author was on study leave at the Department of Econometrics, University
of Sydney, Australia. 相似文献
102.
Shurojit Chatterji 《Economic Theory》2002,20(4):837-847
Summary. This paper provides conditions for the almost sure convergence of the least squares learning rule in a stochastic temporary
equilibrium model, where regressions are performed on the past values of the endogenous state variable. In contrast to earlier
studies, (Evans and Honkapohja, 1998; Marcent and Sargent, 1989), which were local analyses, the dynamics are studied from
a global viewpoint, which allows one to obtain an almost sure convergence result without employing projection facilities.
Received: April 7, 2001; revised version: September 5, 2001 相似文献
103.
Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even
when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending
on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No
individual can manipulate with respect to a wide family of preferences over sets. The only restriction on the domain of true and revealed
individual preferences is that the selection rule is always well defined.
Received: 1 November 1999 / Accepted: 7 May 2001
We thank two anonymous referees for suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to l'Université
de Caen for sponsoring a Workshop on Social Choice Theory, where a first draft of this paper was presented in May, 1999, and
to the workshop participants for helpful observations. Work on the final version of the paper was done while one of the authors
was a guest of the Project on Intergenerational Equity supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of
Japan. We are grateful to the Ministry and to the project leader, Professor Kotaro Suzumura, for their support. 相似文献
104.
Simple models of local government behavior predict equal effects of private income and unconditional federal grants on local
government expenditures. Numerous empirical analyses, however, find that the effect of grants is larger than the income effect.
We argue that this flypaper effect may be a result of weak political leaderships in multi–issue and multi–party decision–making
environments. In multi–issue institutions, a strong political leadership may reduce inefficiency due to interest group influence
and inter–party bargaining in the local council. Utilizing data for Norwegian local governments in the 1930s, we find that
political strength reduces the size of the flypaper effect. When the local council consists of only one political party, we
cannot reject absence of a flypaper effect, while the flypaper effect is large in fragmented local councils.
Received: June 2000 / accepted: February 2001 相似文献
105.
Tadeusz Bednarski 《Metrika》2002,55(1-2):27-36
An estimation method is presented which compromises robust efficiency with computational feasibility in the case of the generalized
Poisson model. The formal setup is built on flexible nonparametric extensions of the underlying model. The estimation efficiency
is expressed via minimax properties of tests resulting from expansions of estimators. The nonparametric neighborhoods related
to the proposed score function are exemplified and a real data case is analysed. The resulting method balances several qualitative
features of statistical inference: strong differentiability (asymptotic derivations are more accurate), efficiency and natural
model extension (quality of formal basic assumptions). 相似文献
106.
107.
Wolfram F. Richter 《Journal of urban economics》2004,55(3):597
Delayed integration (DI) is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the host country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Home-Country Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor. The latter is a close substitute for the Nationality Principle, on which US tax law is based. The paper studies DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation and of wasteful government. 相似文献
108.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献
109.
Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion
of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents
are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard
infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those
found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences
that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets.
We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under
both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution,
up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is
non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are
increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation.
We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin
Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando
Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC,
IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu
Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society
for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic
support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja
de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first
author). 相似文献
110.
Joaquim Silvestre 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):413-425
Summary. Starr (1973) showed that, if people have different subjective probabilities, ex ante and ex post efficiency conflict. Conversely, under the simple preferences that he considered, the discrepancy between ex ante and ex post efficiency disappears when subjective probabilities are identical. Here I consider identical subjective probabilities, but
more general preferences. First, risk attraction is admitted. Second, I dispense with the double requirement (dubbed IZU)
of additive separability and state-independence of the utility of zero-date consumption, an unrealistic requirement when modeling
the investment in durable goods. I find that, under IZU, and as long as ex post preferences satisfy the natural assumption of quasiconcavity (and satisfy some technical qualifications), an ex ante efficient allocation is indeed ex post efficient, but the converse is not necessarily true under risk attraction. If, on the other hand, IZU is violated, then one
can have ex ante efficient allocations that are not ex post efficient, and vice-versa, even under risk aversion.
Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: March 2001 相似文献