行为资产组合理论：理论基础、内容及对异象的解释

行为金融理论于20世纪80年代兴起，它通过将行为因素引入决策过程从而对传统的金融理论做出补充。谢夫林(Shefrin)和斯特曼(Statman)在现代资产组合理论的基础上提出了行为资产组合理论，该理论是行为金融的理论基础之一。行为资产组合理论的基础包括安全第一组合理论和安全、潜力和期望理论。内容分为单一账户资产组合理论和多重账户资产组合理论。行为资产组合理论能够对市场中的一些异象做出合理的解释。     

Governance or reputation? Flexible tax enforcement and excess goodwill: Evidence from the taxpaying credit rating system in China

This study investigates the effect of flexible tax enforcement on firms’ excess goodwill using unique manually collected data on taxpaying credit rating in China from 2014 to 2021. We document that A-rated taxpayer firms have less excess goodwill; A-rated firms reduce excess goodwill by 0.005 vis-a-vis non-A-rated firms, which accounts for 100% of the mean value of excess goodwill. This finding holds after multiple robustness tests and an endogeneity analysis. Moreover, this negative effect is more pronounced in firms with low information transparency, that are non-state-owned and that are located in regions with low tax enforcement intensity. The channel test results suggest that taxpaying credit rating system as flexible tax enforcement reduces firms’ excess goodwill through a reputation-based effect and not a governance-based effect. This study reveals that the taxpaying credit rating system in China as flexible tax enforcement can bring halo effect to A rating firms, thereby limiting irrational M&As and breaking goodwill bubble.     

Farsighted network formation

This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks. We then provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium process will yield efficient outcomes.     

Endogenous lifetime and economic growth

Endogenous mortality is introduced in a two-period overlapping generations model: probability of surviving from the first period to the next depends upon health capital that is augmented through public investment. High mortality societies do not grow fast since shorter lifespans discourage savings; development traps are possible. Productivity differences across nations result in persistent differences in capital-output ratios and relatively larger gaps in income and mortality. High mortality also reduces returns on education, where risks are undiversifiable. When human capital drives economic growth, countries differing in health capital do not converge to similar living standards, ‘threshold effects’ may also result.     

Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?

We analyze two cross-country data sets that contain information on attitudes toward trade as well as a broad range of socio-demographic and other indicators. We find that pro-trade preferences are significantly and robustly correlated with an individual's level of human capital, in the manner predicted by the factor endowments model. Preferences over trade are also correlated with the trade exposure of the sector in which an individual is employed: individuals in non-traded sectors tend to be the most pro-trade, while individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage are the most protectionist. Third, an individual's relative economic status has a very strong positive association with pro-trade attitudes. Finally, non-economic determinants, in the form of values, identities, and attachments, play an important role in explaining the variation in preferences over trade. High degrees of neighborhood attachment and nationalism/patriotism are associated with protectionist tendencies.     

Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: Evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union

Tax competition arguments suggest that governments that operate in an open economy (such as local governments) should not and will not rely on non-benefit taxes, such as the income tax. Yet we observe reliance on income taxes by local governments in many countries, and such reliance changes over time. Evidence from a panel data set of 13 OECD countries over the period 1975-1984 suggests that competition between levels of government (resulting in a vertical fiscal externality) and between governments at the same level (resulting in a horizontal fiscal externality) provide some economic rationale for these changes. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities interact. These results have some interesting implications for fiscal policy in the European Union, particularly as the EU continues to evolve. One implication for the EU is that enlargement that increases tax base disparities within the EU (and is not accompanied by an EU-level income tax) will tend to lower national income tax rates, although this must be qualified because it also depends on the mobility of the population. A second implication is that fiscal expansion of the EU to include an EU-level income tax may tend to lower the reliance of national governments on income taxes through the vertical externality, but may also tend to equalize tax bases across countries, and so increase reliance on national income taxes through the horizontal externality.     

On exact D-optimal designs with 2 two-level factors and n autocorrelated observations

In this paper we consider the exact D-optimal designs for estimation of the unknown parameters in the two factors, each at only two-level, main effects model with autocorrelated errors. The vector of the n random errors in the observed responses is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive model (AR(1)). The exact D-optimal designs seek the optimal combinations of the design levels as well as the optimal run orders, so that the determinant of the information matrix of BLUEs for the unknown parameters is maximized. Bora-Senta and Moyssiadis (1999) gave some conjectures about the exact D-optimal designs based on their experience of several exhaustive searches. In this paper their conjectures are partially proved to be true.Received: January 2003 / Accepted: October 2003Partially supported by the National Science Council of Taiwan, R.O.C. under grant NSC 91-2115-M-008-013.Supported in part by the National Science Council of Taiwan, R.O.C. under grant NSC 89-2118-M-110-003.     

The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen

Strategic rationality is subjected here to natural selection. In a zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information, one long-run individual is informed of the state of the world, and plays against a sequence of short-run opponents who are not. Strategies are noisy and have bounded recall. An equilibrium in these is shown to exist. Relative to any such equilibrium, sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is not decreasing in the original level of recall, thus capturing the Red Queen effect. The selection pressure to reduce a small amount of noise is less than that to increase recall.     

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM EXIT ROUTES

ABSTRACT

Our study presents empirical evidence about the role of ownership structure for firm exit probability by explicitly differentiating between distinct exit routes (bankruptcy and forced liquidation, voluntary liquidation, mergers and acquisitions – M&A, and removal from the court register). Based on the population of Slovenian firms in the 2006–2012 period and using multinomial probit, our findings support the predictions of agency theory. Ownership concentration, share of the largest owner, and the difference in shares between two largest owners all decrease the likelihood of exit for all studied exit routes but M&A. The magnitude of their impact is largest for exits, in which owners play a decisive role, i.e. voluntary liquidation and removal. The link between the number of primary owners and exit likelihood is U-shaped with the lowest exit probability for firms with around two owners.     

应用电法新装置勘探二维与三维地电体

本文通过对新装置条件下位场特征的分析,应用边界单元法及解析法的计算结果,发现当二维或三维电性不均匀体与测量电极位于背景场同一等位面时,视电阻率异常反映最明显。从而提出了圆弧交会法确定二维或三维地电体中心理深的方法,并给出了若干计算实例。结果表明,此方法简便有效且精度较高。