纽约股票市场对中国A股市场的影响

首先，本文考察了纽约股市波动对中国A股市场的影响。一般认为，中国的A股市场由于严格的资本控制而免受外国影响。但是，通过月度、每周、每日的样本数据（1992年到2004年），经过季节性调整和汇率变动调整后，我们发现上海和深圳A股市场的变动与美国股票价格指数变动相一致。其次，我们考察国家贝塔值（country beta）在马尔可夫转换误差修正模型中的动态关系。对中国市场来说，国家贝塔值和错误纠正项的重要性紧密相连。在东亚金融危机之前，美国市场对中国A股市场的影响普遍存在，而东亚金融危机产生后，则是通过国家贝塔值来影响中国股市的收益。     

ALL THINGS CONSIDERED,TAXES DRIVE THE JANUARY EFFECT

The multitude of explanations for the January effect leaves the reader confused about its primary cause(s): is it tax‐loss selling, window dressing, information, bid‐ask bounce, or a combination of these causes? The confusion arises, in part, because evidence has generally been presented in support of a particular hypothesis though the same evidence may be consistent with another hypothesis. Furthermore, prior work does not adequately control for the bid‐ask bounce. In this article we try to disentangle different explanations of the January effect and identify its primary cause. We find that tax‐related selling is the most important cause, overshadowing other explanations.     

Optimality conditions¶and bubbles in sequential economies¶and bounded relative risk-aversion

We provide specific qualifications in order that Kuhn–Tucker type Euler equations and transversality conditions at infinity hold in stochastic equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and where assets are traded in sequential markets. It is not assumed that uncertainty is modeled as an event-tree structure or that preferences are necessarily bounded. We also describe an important class of preferences based on bounded relative risk aversion which yields relevant simplifications. Our results are used to establish conditions that rule out asset pricing bubbles. Specific examples of economies with bubbles are also discussed. Received: 28 January 2002 / Accepted: 19 July 2002 We are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments. This research was partially supported by MURST (Italy), National Group on “Nonlinear Dynamics and Stochastic Models in Economics and Finance”.     

The Effects of Screening and Monitoring on Credit Rationing of SMEs

In this paper, we seek to empirically assess which determinants of the capability and incentives of banks to screen and monitor firms are significant in explaining credit rationing to Italian SMEs. After testing for the presence of non‐random selection bias and the potential endogeneity of some determinants of interest, the probit model results we obtain suggest that the average banking size and the multiple banking relationship phenomenon are statistically significant factors affecting credit rationing, presumably through their impact on the aforementioned banks' capability and incentives. Other potential determinants of banks' incentives to monitor and screen, such as local banking competition and firm' capacity to collateralize, are never significant. However, when we split the sample according to the level of competition in credit markets, we find that the estimated marginal effects of all significant determinants of interest are larger in absolute value than those obtained when using the whole sample.     

Trends in British public investment

British public investment has declined sharply both as a share of GDP and as a share of government spending since the 1970s. Only part of this decline is explained by privatisation, which transferred some public investment to the private sector. More important was the very large and permanent reduction in public house‐building between the mid‐1970s and the early 1980s. Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the rate of public investment recovered somewhat, but after that time it declined again, reaching a record low in 1999. The most recent decline in public investment has affected a range of central government programmes, and it has not been significantly offset by investment under the Private Finance Initiative. The government now plans to increase investment spending, although levels look set to remain low by historical standards for some time to come.     

On the Statistical Significance of Event Effects on Unsystematic Volatility

We develop a method for determining the significance of the effect of a certain event (stock split, corporate restructuring, change in regulation, etc.) on unsystematic volatility of asset returns. Simulations show that the suggested tests reject the true null hypothesis of no effect on volatility at appropriate levels, whereas the rejection rates of a false null hypothesis increase with the magnitude of the effect. An application of the method to corporate spin‐offs reveals statistically significant and long‐lasting estimated increases in unsystematic volatility of parent companies' returns.     

Capital structure around the world: The roles of firm- and country-specific determinants

We analyze the importance of firm-specific and country-specific factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. Our analysis yields two new results. First, we find that firm-specific determinants of leverage differ across countries, while prior studies implicitly assume equal impact of these determinants. Second, although we concur with the conventional direct impact of country-specific factors on the capital structure of firms, we show that there is an indirect impact because country-specific factors also influence the roles of firm-specific determinants of leverage.     

企业并购活动中目标企业选择的层次分析评估研究

企业并购是企业进行资本扩张、促进企业间存量资源合理统流动的重要途径。对企业并购中的目标企企的选择、价值评估进行研究，构建我国企业并前过程中目标企业选择的评价指标体系，运用AHP法对目标企业选择进行定量化评估，将有利于企业通过并购后，实现资源的最优配置．保证企业经营机制协调、有效地运行。     

计件工资博弈中管理者的守诺与公平权衡——对计件工资制不流行的再解释

本文首先回顾总结了计件工资制度的发展过程和存在的问题,指出计件工资博弈陷入低效僵局的原因在于管理者的不履行事先的承诺。传统的解释是管理者事后抵挡不住自利的诱惑,本文认为管理者守诺还是不守诺是在权衡计件工资员工和计时工资员工激励效果后作出的理性的选择。管理者守诺只在一定的情形下发生所以计件工资制不流行。