农村土地承包经营权融资方式创新——基于镇江市土地流转信托实践

十八届三中全会提出要加快构建新型农业经营体系,赋予农民更多财产权利.在此背景下农村土地流转信托迅速受到各方关注.相比于农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款等融资方式,土地流转信托在坚持农村土地所有权和承包权不变的前提下,发挥了农村土地承包经营权的融资功能,找到了一种既让农民流出土地后获得稳定收益,又帮助各类主体流入土地后获得足够金融支持实现土地高效利用的模式.农民、农业经营者以及信托公司三方以土地流转信托项目为平台,产融结合,实现了农地集约化、专业化、规模化的经营,推动了农地增值、农业增效、农民增收.     

基于社会认知论的创业团队人际信任影响因素实证研究

本文将创业团队人际信任划分为认知型信任和情感型信任。然后，基于社会认知视角从成员主体特征、成员关系特征、创业团队文化和创业团队特征四个方面考察创业团队人际信任的影响因素，并运用相关分析和多重逐步回归分析法分别分析了各要素对创业团队中认知型信任和情感型信任的影响程度。研究结果表明：成员能力、成员正直、成员沟通、成员合作、成员竞争、团队行为规范、任务依赖性、角色期待性、目标明确性和成员异质性10个因素对创业团队认知型信任产生显著影响；成员善意、成员信任倾向、成员沟通、成员合作、成员竞争、团队价值观念、团队行为规范和目标明确性8个因素对创业团队情感型信任影响显著。     

Effects of agency risks and procedural justice on board processes in venture capital-backed firms

This paper builds a model of the effects of agency risk and procedural justice in the boards of directors of venture capital-backed firms. Such boards are unique in that they consist of managers and outside owners with significant power and incentive to be highly involved in venture governance. The authors integrate agency theory and procedural justice perspectives to develop propositions regarding the effects of agency risk and board processes on the responses to poor performance and conflicts of interest. This integrated perspective suggests that factors that increase perceived agency risks will increase outsiders' tendency to focus efforts on monitoring and controlling board decisions and their propensity to resort to formal means to resolve conflicts. However, the authors suggest that through their effects on trust and positive attributions, fair procedures and interactions will reduce these tendencies. A discussion of the practical and theoretical implications of the proposed model concludes the paper.     

A two-dimensional model of trust–value–loyalty in service relationships

The study examines the relationships between consumer trust (cognitive and affective), perceived value (utilitarian and hedonic), and loyalty behavioral intentions (repurchase and advocacy) in a two-dimensional (affect- and rational-based) consumer–service provider model. It provides an alternative theoretical representation of consumer behavior in service relationships and implications for service providers about consumers' loyalty intentions. A mail survey analyzed by SEM supports the model of loyalty as a function of consumers' expressive and instrumental responses resulting from intrinsic and extrinsic perceptions of trust and heuristic and rational-based perceived value. Implications for designing loyalty programs are explored and future research opportunities recommended.     

When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both “intentions” and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees, request a return on this investment and, in some treatments, can threaten sanctions to enforce their requests. Decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by investors are compared to decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive amount less than the investor requested. When threatened this decision becomes least common. If the request is large relative to the sanction then most trustees return nothing. If the request is small, trustees typically return the requested amount. These results do not vary with investors' intentions.     

Incremental approaches to establishing trust

We investigate cooperation using an incremental investment game in which the first-mover has the ability to make small, but increasing incremental investments in their counterpart. Our experiment is designed to test whether establishing trust in small increments is more effective than alternatives, including a one-shot investment game, a decrease only condition where the amount the first-mover sends to the second-mover must be less than the amount previously sent, and an unrestricted condition where the first-mover is not restricted by the amount previously sent. Although results were mixed, broadly, iteration affords greater cooperation than one-shot games and, when given the choice, participants seem to prefer to build trust gradually. Implications for institutional design are discussed.      

Public and private sector auditors and accruals quality in English NHS hospital Trusts

To promote auditor independence and audit quality in English NHS Trusts the Audit Commission regulates auditor rotation, fees and the appointment of its own and private sector auditors. NHS sanctioned departures from GAAP, some of which allow the financial breakeven target to be achieved, have been criticised by the Audit Commission as detrimental to financial discipline. In this paper, we investigate the association between abnormal accruals and the achievement of financial breakeven in NHS hospital Trusts over the period 1998–2005. We also investigate the association between abnormal accruals, audit fees and the Trusts audited by public and private sector auditors. We find evidence that abnormal accruals are used to achieve financial breakeven and they differ across different types of auditor. We also identify a negative relationship between abnormal accruals and NHS Trust star ratings. These findings raise questions about the ‘quality’ of NHS audit where compliance with NHS-specific regulations overrides the wider GAAP-based requirement for financial statements to show a true and fair view and they warrant reconsideration of the nature of audit in NHS Trusts.     

我国房地产开发企业信托融资研究

房地产业是典型的资金密集型行业,相对于投资项目所需资金而言,房地产企业普遍存在自有资金不足的问题,因此必然要依赖于金融体系的资金支持。然而,现阶段我国房地产开发企业融资模式相对单一,主要依赖银行贷款。本文从房地产开发企业的角度出发,以美国为例分析REITs的发展状况及特点,并在此基础上研究和探讨我国房地产企业信托融资问题。     

When do formal control and trust matter? A context-based analysis of the effects on marketing channel relationships in China

Formal control and trust are two typical governance mechanisms employed to safeguard business transactions. Yet the effectiveness of each mechanism for firm relationship outcomes remains unclear. Some relevant literature suggests that formal control and trust simultaneously can help secure transactions, whereas other research argues the two control mechanisms can substitute for each other. This study applies social embeddedness theory and differentiates strong tie from weak tie relationships. In so doing, it reveals the role of strong versus weak social ties in leading to parallel conclusions about the relationship between formal control and trust and their effects on relationship outcomes. On the basis of empirical tests in a Chinese marketing channels context, this study finds that the joint effects of formal control and trust on governing transactions depends on the relational tie that the focal partners share. Specifically, formal control and trust complement each other only in weak tie relations. On the basis of this new perspective, the authors offer theoretical and managerial implications for managing interfirm governance mechanisms in transitional economies such as China.     

The impact of trust and contract on innovation performance: The moderating role of environmental uncertainty

Research into two important control mechanisms for managing the supply chain relationship - contracts and trust - is on the rise. However, our understanding of how they influence innovation in a firm remains rather unclear. Thus, the primary objective of this study is to examine the individual and interactive effects of contracts and trust on firms' innovation performance and the contingent effects of environmental uncertainty on those relationships in China. The empirical results from a survey of Chinese manufacturing firms indicate that there is a positive relationship between trust and firms' innovation performance, an inverted U-shaped relationship between the use of contracts and firms' innovation performance, and that contracts and trust are substitutes. Moreover, we find that environmental uncertainty enhances the effects of trust, but does not influence the impact of contracts on innovation performance.