对当代国际私法学说的再认识——兼论我国国际私法学说的创立

对当代国际私法学说及其实践情况的研究表明,我国的"国际交往互利说"缺乏国际互动的条件,无法运作。"利益增进说"才是合乎我们需要的国际私法学说。     

元代和买法律制度考论

和买,泛指官府向民间购买物品的行为。其核心便是“和”,即蕴含着自愿交易、买卖的官民双方地位平等、官府购买民间物品应以货币的形式支付对价等含义。为了规范和买行为和保障和买秩序,元继于宋,确立起了一整套包括均平摊派、时估、法定程序、和买钱货两清的支付原则、税课管理制度等在内的和买法律制度体系。然而,和买法律制度在“商品化/赋税化”“和/不和”的博弈中,最终滑向了政府主导、赋税化的境地,而随意的摊派与吏治的败坏在其中起到了催化剂的作用。和买法律制度只能在一定程度上起到减缓其由“和”向“不和”的赋税化性质蜕化的作用。     

我国公司法定类型的反思及逻辑建构

自公司诞生以来,公司这一组织形式就受到各国商业实践和立法的特别重视。各国商事立法均对公司类型加以规定,并分门别类地对公司设立、股东权利、公司治理等进行相应规范。虽然商事逻辑的共通性拉近了各国立法上的公司类型,但各国在公司法定类型及相应公司规制上的差异仍旧鲜明。这也反映在我国学界对公司法定类型的争议上。我国公司法定类型改革应坚持本土商业实践逻辑,并确保改革成本最小化。由此,保留有限责任公司和股份有限公司,并按公司规模大小进一步区分出大型公司与小型公司,就成为理性选择的结果。具体而言,在有限责任公司中,增设大型公司,明确大型公司认定标准,并在公司机关设置、财务会计制度等方面给予相对严格的例外规定;在股份有限公司中,增设小型公司,对其赋予更加灵活、便捷的自治,并将上市公司扩增为公众公司。     

Does Gibrat's Law hold among young,small firms?

According to Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the examined period. Aimed at extending this line of investigation, the present paper uses quantile regression techniques to test whether Gibrat's Law holds for new entrants in a given industry: that is for new small firms in the early stage of their life cycle. The main finding is that for some selected industries in Italian manufacturing Gibrat's Law fails to hold in the years immediately following start-up, when smaller firms have to rush in order to achieve a size large enough to enhance their likelihood of survival. Conversely, in subsequent years the patterns of growth of new smaller firms do not differ significantly from those of larger entrants, and the Law therefore cannot be rejected.JEL Classification: L11, L60Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 27th Annual EARIE Conference (Lausanne, 7-10 September 2000) and at seminars held between 2000 and 2003 at the Economics Department of Harvard University, the Catholic University of Milan, the University of Ferrara, the University of Bologna, the Bank of Italy, and Athens University of Economics & Business. We would like to thank Carlo Bianchi, Giuseppe Colangelo, Giovanni Dosi, Steven Klepper (Editor), Stephen Martin, Ariel Pakes, Aman Ullah and, in particular, Helen Louri and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from MIUR (Year 2000; protocol #MM13038538_001; project leader: E. Santarelli) is gratefully acknowledged.Correspondence to: E. Santarelly     

Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?

This paper assesses empirically two theories of why legal origin influences financial development. The political channel stresses that legal traditions differ in the priority they give to the rights of individual investors vis-à-vis the state and this has repercussions for financial development. The adaptability channel holds that legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust to changing commercial circumstances and legal systems that adapt quickly will foster financial development more effectively. We use historical comparisons and cross-country regressions to assess the validity of these two channels. We find that legal origin matters for financial development because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 653–675.     

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly

This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies.     

垄断与产权:我国利率市场化的制度性障碍

在缺乏竞争的金融体系下，借贷价格偏离均衡价格，消费剩余减少，资源配置扭曲，金融运行效率降低。在我国，资金供应依然主要由居于垄断地位的国有商业银行及其变种组成和资金需求依然主要由国有企业及其变种组成的情况下，利率市场化会使得资金价格扭曲和变形，理论上推演的利率市场化预期效果在很大程度上无法实现。我国利率市场化的时间表只能视微观经济主体市场化的进程而定。     

Pure joint production and international trade: a note

This paper applies the principles of the neo-Ricardian (or Sraffian)theory of international trade to certain joint production systems.It is shown that, in contrast with single-product systems, (i)there is not always a pattern of international specialisation,which would entail the increase of the real wage rate in botheconomies, and (ii) the ‘law of comparative advantage’has no general validity. Furthermore, not only the existenceof such a pattern of specialisation but also the validity ofthis law depend on the values of the variables of distributionof income. The analysis is wholly based on two of the numericalexamples formulated by Bidard in 1997, and further generalisedin an elementary way only when this is considered necessary.     

The micro-foundations of intertemporal price discrimination

Summary. This paper investigates the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination for a durable-good monopoly in a model where infinitely-lived households face an intertemporal budget constraint, and consume both durable goods and non-durable goods. We prove that the optimal price of the durable good is not constant, and may decrease or increase over time. Some households may choose to purchase the durable good at a later date, and pay lower or higher prices, since the gain in discounted utility of consuming more of the non-durable good more than compensates for the loss in utility from delaying the consumption of the durable good.Received: 12 March 2004, Revised: 7 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D40, D42, D91.I would like to thank C.D. Aliprantis, the Editor, and an anonymous referee for their generous advice, and constructive comments and suggestions. I have also enjoyed discussions with John Quah on the subject. Research support from the Wharton-SMU Research Centre, Singapore Management University, is gratefully acknowledged.     

我国传统典权制度的存废之辨

典权制度是我国特有的一项古老制度,与其它类似制度相比,其融资安全性更高,能够对社会资源进行更有效的利用,满足融资者保留不动产所有权的愿望,并在保护弱者、平衡各方利益上具有得天独厚的优势。在充分认识典权制度内涵及价值的基础上,可以发现典权是一种具有独特作用的特殊他物权,应在立法中作出使其独立于用益物权和担保物权的规定,并在我国民事立法中科学地确立典权制度。