Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.     

Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist

Complementary slackness of a pair of dual linear programming problems implies the remark of Sotomayor (2003) that assignment games have singleton cores only when multiple optimal matchings exist.The author thanks Marilda Sotomayor, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. This paper was finished when the author was visiting University of Rochester. JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D58     

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly

This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies.     

府谷治污怪招的理论分析

地方保护主义严重存在于我国环境保护过程中，造成这一状况的原因主要是环境保护法律制度不健全、环境保护机构设置不科学和国民的环境保护意识不强。本文就此指出了改变现状的措施：强化国民环境意识、完善环境立法和改革环境保护体制。     

公路施工企业复合标底投标报价博弈模型的研究

通过对公路工程复合标底投标报价的分析,研究了复合标底的评分办法的博弈规则,建立了基于博弈论的投标报价模型,分析了模型的假设条件及适用范围,并对模型进行了全面评述。     

物流联盟稳定性的博弈分析

基于博弈理论分析了物流联盟成员之间关系的稳定性,建立了重复博弈模型,研究了物流联盟稳定性的条件。     

一种逆向物流Stackelberg博弈下的库存契约研究

供应链中的库存协调是供应链管理的一项重要工作，而如何针对不同的供应链设计有效而合理的契约是其中的关键。本文分析研究了由一个供应商和一个生产商组成的供应链在集成条件下和分散条件下的最优库存，并研究了stackelberg主从博弈下如何通过设计契约使供应链库存达到最优。     

基于博弈论的建设工程投标报价研究

为使建设工程投标者能够中标并获得较高收益，就要讲究投标报价的策略和技巧。在与传统投标报价模型的比较之下，文章把博弈论运用到投标报价的决策中，建立了非合作性博弈模型和静态贝叶斯博弈模型，提出了投标者应采取的最优报价水平，进而得出了博弈思想的运用使报价更具动态性，更符合招投标实际操作的结论。     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.