Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control

The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition, side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International WorkshopEconomic Aspects of International Water Resources Utilization in the Mediterranean Basin, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan, October 1993, and the Fifth Annual Conference of EAERE, Dublin, June 1994. I would like to thank Peter Berck, Charles Kolstad, Mordechai Schechter, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

一种项目采购模式的博弈分析

本文试图用经济学理论 (主要是博弈与信息经济学的理论 )来分析目前工程项目建设中采用的一种工程设备、材料的采购模式。文章首先提出这种模式的内容与特征 ,然后就制度内各参与方 (主要为业主、承包商、供货商 )之间的博弈进行分析 ,分不完全信息博弈、完全信息博弈两种情况来分析这种采购制度下达到的均衡。     

基于博弈论的二层供应链网络竞争与结盟模型

就两个制造商和一个零售商所组成的供应链模型进行研究,运用博弈论方法来研究制造商间的竞争及制造商与零售商间的竞争和协调决策问题,给出了两种决策下相应的数学模型,并比较了制造商与零售商间有无联盟关系时对各自收益的影响。     

横向互补型企业网络形成动因的博弈分析

企业网络是一种新型组织结构形式和制度安排。本文首先分析了企业网络的形成动因,然后运用博弈论建立模型论证了横向互补型企业网络得以形成的动因在于网络成员自身的利益最大化。     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

漓江水生态系统问题研究

本文分析指出，漓江水生态系统保护与修复的目标是保证桂林的水安全，核心在于对其价值的偏好和评估。同时，文章提出了修复的标准及其实现的关键技术和关键途径。     

国有资产在产权交易中的定价问题--产权交易招标转让方式下的交易价格分析及改进

本文从博弈论的角度分析了国有企业产权在招标转让交易方式下的交易价格的确定和影响交易价格的因素,分析了招标转让不能使国有企业的所有者得到实际价值的原因,并给出了在招标转让方式下提高国有企业交易价格的方法与途径。     

最优再保险的期权博弈分析

期权博弈理论把期权定价和博弈论结合起来分析在连续时间和不确定性下的动态多人决策问 题。本文运用这种方法首先分析了超额损失再保险的期权特性,用期权定价技术为其定价,然后构建一个 完全信息动态博弈模型分析了原保险人和再保险人的最优策略和均衡结果,给出了无套利条件下的最优超 额损失再保险。与传统精算及其它经济分析文献不同,在此框架下得到的最优再保险保费体现了市场因 素,并反映了利益冲突的保险主体之间顺序动态决策的事实。     

上市公司利润操纵监管的博弈分析

对上市公司利润操纵监管进行了博弈分析,对完善我国上市公司利润操纵的监管政策提出了建议。     

基于博弈理念构建和谐税收制度的基本思路

本文阐述了和谐税收制度对建设和谐社会的重要性,指出和谐的税收制度应是一种纳什均衡的制度.运用博弈理念,从税种结构博弈均衡、税收负担博弈均衡、税收征管博弈均衡及稽查监督博弈均衡四个方面给出构建和谐税收制度的基本思路.