自由软件开发的模块化理论解释与启示

本文以GNU/Linux为例讨论了源代码的内部结构在自由软件开发中所起的重要作用。为此,我们考虑了源代码的模块化属性。源代码的模块化将直接影响开发者是否参与对自由软件的开发。基于模块化的自由软件开发不仅实现了劳动的分工,同时也实现了劳动价值的分割,在自由软件的开发过程中较好地解决了搭便车问题。同时,模块化理论对我国发展软件产业也有一定的借鉴作用。     

建筑业内寻租活动分析及其对策

在中国市场经济转轨时期，建筑业内寻租活动止以不同形式在不同的方面不断发生，给社会和公众带来了巨大损失，给政府的形象和威信带来负面影响，导致寻租的成因是多方面的，如何从根本上抑制打击寻租行为值得深入研究。     

再谈环境保护税设置——基于两类竞争制造企业环保技术创新策略的演化博弈

利用演化博弈模型分析处在竞争的两类制造企业(在位企业和进入企业)的环保技术创新策略问题,考量以环境保护税为主体的环保规制如何科学设置才能更好地促进制造业企业的环保创新.研究发现:创新效应和市场需求均影响企业创新策略演化的均衡结果,并在两阶段博弈分析的基础上,得出市场需求和创新效应共同作用下两类制造企业的生产策略选择方案.因此,环境保护税的改革与实施应注意掌握好时点,税率的设置应充分考虑不同行业环保创新效应和产品市场需求,进行区别化的、动态的税率设置,并加大其他税种对环境保护税的支持.     

供应链金融利益主体的多阶段博弈研究

现代经济中,金融在资源配置方面发挥的作用明显不足,出现严重的资源浪费和供需错配现象,加剧了中小企业面临的融资难问题.本文从供应链金融的内涵切入,建立以利益相关者为主体的融资量化模型,利用多阶段博弈理论对企业不同模式下的成本收益进行检验,结果表明:供应链金融在实现上、下游各利益相关者个体的最优化的同时,也可有效促使供应链整体的利益最大化、实现高效运作和价值增值,全面实现链上企业间的资源共享、互利共赢.     

Optimizing the credit term decisions in supply chain finance

We study a credit term determination problem in the context of a supplier-buyer supply chain. The supplier's credit term decision is simultaneously made with its production and inventory decisions, and most importantly, it is impacted by the buyer's order quantity. We present a new game-theoretic framework to model this problem, which captures the interaction between the supplier's credit term decision and the buyer's order decision in a multi-period setting. An exact method based on nonlinear programming is implemented to obtain the optimal solutions. We apply our methodologies on a real world case. The computational results show that our approach significantly outperforms the heuristics with fixed credit terms, and either a short or a long credit term can be sub-optimal for the supplier in profitability. Our work offers the first data-driven model and solution approach that assists purchasing and supply managers to make optimal dynamic credit term decision in conjunction with production, ordering and inventory decisions in a game-theoretic setting.     

基于协议代理模式下IT外包项目博弈研究

互联网经济的出现致使全球信息化水平向更高级的智能化延伸。IT外包项目对现代企业的作用毋需置疑。本文通过建立了IT外包公司与地方系统集成商间单委托—代理博弈模型,分析了双方间的IT外包项目分包费率和努力程度取值范围,并讨论了IT外包公司和地方系统集成商的行为选择。对IT外包项目的博弈分析结果对于信息化建设企业未来在外包决策时进行风险控制具有一定的借鉴意义。     

金融机构集聚过程的动态博弈分析

在理性行为人收益最大化原则条件下得出了行为人空间博弈的结果——在均衡状态,限制性条件(如运输技术等)能够产生一个收敛的空间区位调整过程,最终实现空间集聚。在这个博弈集聚的过程中,外部因素存在发生作用的空间,从而说明了政策制定者可以通过制定相关的政策来影响金融机构的集聚过程,进而促进金融市场的深化发展和金融中心的形成。这一空间集聚过程也可用于分析城镇化的形成和发展过程。     

Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities

A rather general class of strategic games is described where the coalitional improvements are acyclic and hence strong Nash equilibria exist: The players derive their utilities from the use of certain facilities; all players using a facility extract the same amount of local utility therefrom, which amount depends both on the set of users and on their actions, and is decreasing in the set of users; the ultimate utility of each player is the minimum of the local utilities at all relevant facilities. Two important subclasses are “games with structured utilities,” basic properties of which were discovered in 1970s and 1980s, and “bottleneck congestion games,” which attracted researchers’ attention quite recently. The former games are representative in the sense that every game from the whole class is isomorphic to one of them. The necessity of the minimum aggregation for the existence of strong Nash equilibria, actually, just Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, in all games of this type is established.     

REAL OPTIONS WITH COMPETITION AND REGIME SWITCHING

In this paper, we examine irreversible investment decisions in duopoly games with a variable economic climate. Integrating timing flexibility, competition, and changes in the economic environment in the form of a cash flow process with regime switching, the problem is formulated as a stopping‐time game under Stackelberg leader‐follower competition, in which both players determine their respective optimal market entry time. By extending the variational inequality approach, we solve for the free boundaries and obtain optimal investment strategies for each player. Despite the lack of regularity in the leader's obstacle and the cash flow regime uncertainty, the regime‐dependent optimal policies for both the leader and the follower are obtained. In addition, we perform comprehensive numerical experiments to demonstrate the properties of solutions and to gain insights into the implications of regime switching.     

Rural development and the role of game farming in the Eastern Cape,South Africa

The analysis of game farming is set in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. Game farming reorders the use, meaning and value of land and animal species. However, what it means for rural development processes in the immediate region and beyond is not well accounted for. We perceive game farming as an assemblage that brings together new actors, new forms of land use and new discourses. We argue that although game farming has generated new opportunities and new forms of added value to the available resources (e.g. eco-tourism, trophy hunting, game-meat production), situated in the history and contemporary context of the Eastern Cape, it is a contested, and from a development point of view, problematic land-use practice. We argue that game farming constrains land and agrarian reforms: the distribution of land and income remains skewed; ‘poaching’ occurs and game farms do not, or only minimally, generate new and badly needed employment opportunities. The game farm has emerged as an exclusive, globally well-connected space. The nature of the relationships this space maintains with the surrounding communities is, however, such that the overall contribution to rural development in South Africa is questionable.