Observable restrictions of general equilibrium models with financial markets

This paper examines whether general equilibrium models of exchange economies with incomplete financial markets impose restrictions on prices of commodities and assets given the stochastic processes of dividends and aggregate endowments. We show that the assumption of time-separable expected utility implies restriction on the cross-section of asset prices as well as on spot commodity prices. However, a relaxation of the assumption of time separability will generally destroy these restriction.     

Cross-country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates’ volatility

Volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models—designed to replicate the features of individual countries’ markets—cannot account for. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross-country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks. Our model is consistent with central banks’ practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short-term interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as an exchange rate target.     

Selecting Social Goals: J. M. Keynes and the Emergence of Ontological Rationality in Economics

In this paper we discuss the fundamental inconsistency that results from employing the two traditional concepts of rationality as the basis of selecting social goals. We then consider the possibility that the selection of social goals must be based on explicitly ethical criteria. To do so a third concept of rationality namely, ontological rationality, should be adopted. Moreover, we argue that J. M. Keynes in A Tract Monetary Reform based his public policy recommendations on a modified version of ontological rationality, thereby introducing ontological rationality into economics as the basis for selecting social goals.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fifty-Eighth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 7–10, 2004. The authors are grateful to session participants for their helpful suggestions, though the authors alone are responsible for the contents of the paper.     

Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

Eurosystem monetary targeting: Lessons from U.S. data

Using a small empirical model of inflation, output, and money estimated on U.S. data, we compare the relative performance of monetary targeting and inflation targeting. The results show monetary targeting to be quite inefficient, yielding both higher inflation and output variability. This is true even with a nonstochastic money demand formulation. Our results are also robust to using a P∗ model of inflation. Therefore, in these popular frameworks, there is no support for the prominent role given to money growth in the Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy.     

B2C电子商务模式下的物流配送研究

物流配送是电子商务运作的一个重要环节,在整个商务活动中起着举足轻重的作用.目前,在线交易中的信息流已通过互联网基本实现,资金流的安全也在一定程度上得到了解决,但物流仍是电子商务开展的一大瓶颈.B2C作为电子商务的运作模式之一,存在着配送不及时、配送成本高、无法送货等问题.不解决物流配送的问题,B2C模式就难以快速发展.本文针对B2C模式的特点和对物流配送的要求,提出了B2C电子商务模式下建立物流配送系统的解决思路。     

Econometric analysis of linearized singular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models

In this paper I propose an alternative to calibration of linearized singular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Given an a-theoretical econometric model as a representative of the data generating process, I will construct an information measure which compares the conditional distribution of the econometric model variables with the corresponding singular conditional distribution of the theoretical model variables. The singularity problem will be solved by using convolutions of both distributions with a non-singular distribution. This information measure will then be maximized to the deep parameters of the theoretical model, which links these parameters to the parameters of the econometric model and provides an alternative to calibration. This approach will be illustrated by an application to a linearized version of the stochastic growth model of King, Plosser and Rebelo.     

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.     

Monetary regimes and the co-ordination of wage setting

A recent literature argues that a strict monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment by disciplining wage setters, as wage setters abstain from raising wages to avoid a monetary contraction. However, in this literature the wage setters are assumed not to co-ordinate their wage setting. The present paper argues that precisely because a strict monetary regime may discipline the unco-ordinated wage setting, thus lowering unemployment in the unco-ordinated outcome, it also reduces wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate. It is shown that an accommodating monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment, via the strengthening of the wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate.     

Testing for Seasonal Fractional Roots in German Real Output

Abstract. This paper examines the seasonal structure of German real GNP per capita by using a version of Robinson's (1994) tests which is suitable in the context of seasonality. This method has several advantages over alternative approaches when testing for seasonal unit roots. First, unlike standard tests, which are nested in AR alternatives, it is embedded in fractional alternatives. Second, it allows testing at the zero frequency and at each of the seasonal frequencies separately. Third, it makes it possible to test for different orders of integration at each of the frequencies simultaneously. The empirical analysis suggests that the real output series may have a unit root at the zero frequency, and fractional rather than unit roots at the seasonal ones. This is in contrast to the findings reported by Lutkepohl et al. (1999) in their study on German money demand, and shows the importance of modelling the seasonal features of the data in alternative ways.