Trading income and bank charter value during the financial crisis: Does derivatives dealer designation matter?

Derivative markets have exploded over the last decade, remained active in the midst of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and continue to be dominated by a small group of bank holding companies (BHC). BHC motives for derivative usage are usually tied to hedging purposes (balance sheet risk management), trading purposes (profit motives) or some combination thereof. This paper examines the relationship between derivative trading income and bank charter value for 27 BHC between 2001Q1 and 2011Q3. We find that the impact of derivative trading income on bank charter value, using Tobin's Q, is very small and seems to be tied to BHCs derivatives dealer trading designation. We also find that trading incomes are a modest fraction of net operating revenue, highly volatile, and did not contribute to overall BHC income during the crisis.     

Shadow Banking,Chinese Style

Shadow banks are broadly defined as entities which conduct credit intermediation outside the formal banking system. Poorly regulated, engaging in opaque forms of intermediation, deeply interconnected with the official banking system, and operating with implicit government guarantees, they pose a major source of systemic risk. Yet shadow banks provide an important service by channeling credit to excluded investors, and can complement the formal banking sector. What explains the rapid proliferation of shadow banks in China? How large are they and what forms do they take? What types of risks do they pose to the financial system? And how best can China utilise the services of shadow banks while at the same time ensuring that they do not create systemic risks for the financial system?     

Enhanced Debt Management: Solving the eurozone crisis by linking debt management with fiscal and monetary policy

Unconventional approaches to suit unusual circumstances have become acceptable in monetary policy, a formerly highly conservative discipline. In this paper it is argued that unconventional approaches should also be considered in sovereign debt management, in order to contribute to resolving the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. First, the Troika crisis lending to indebted sovereign borrowers in the eurozone is reviewed and compared with standard IMF post-crisis lending. The main difference and shortcoming is the unsustainable character of the eurozone approach, due to the omission of demand stimulation components. To address this and other shortcomings, the features of an ideal alternative funding tool are identified. It would solve the funding problems of affected sovereigns, help stabilise the banking system, but most of all stimulate domestic demand and hence end the vicious downward spiral. It is found that this funding method can be implemented as part of enhanced public debt management by each nation's debt management office.     

Assessing competition in the banking industry: A multi-product approach

This paper investigates the competitive aspects of multi-product banking operations. Extending Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) model to the case of a multi-product banking firm, we show that higher economies of scope in multi-product banking are associated with lower Panzar–Rosse measures of competition in the banking sector. To test this empirical implication and determine the impact of multi-production on market power, we use a new dataset on the Brazilian banking industry. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that banks that offer classic banking products (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other banking products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than banks that offer only classic products. These results suggest a positive bias in the traditional estimates of competition in which multi-output actions are not considered.     

Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.     

Non-interest income,profitability, and risk in banking industry: A cross-country analysis

Using bank accounting data for 22 countries in Asia over the period 1995–2009, this article applies the dynamic panel generalized method of moments technique to investigate the impacts of non-interest income on profitability and risk for 967 individual banks. We find that non-interest activities of Asian banks reduce risk, but do not increase profitability on a broad sample basis. Specifically, when considering bank specialization and a country's income level, the results become complicated. Non-interest activities decrease profitability as well as increases risk for savings banks. The impact is also different for commercial, cooperative, and investment banks either by increasing profitability or reducing risk. On the other hand, non-interest activities raise risk for banks in high income countries, while increasing profitability or reducing risk for banks in middle and low income countries. Finally, our results reveal that the persistence of risk is greatly affected by bank specialization and a country's income level, as all risk variables present persistence from one year to the next. Our findings suggest that the type of bank specialization matters for the effect of diversifying revenue sources.     

The credit crunch and fall in employment during the Great Recession

We study how a bank credit crunch—a dramatic worsening of firm and consumer access to bank credit, such as the one observed over the Great Recession—translates into job losses in U.S. manufacturing industries. To identify the impact of the recent credit crunch, we rely on differences in the degree of dependence on external finance and of tangibility of assets across manufacturing industries and in the sensitivity of these industries׳ output to changes in the supply of consumer credit. We find that, for employment, household access to bank loans matters more than firm access to bank loans. In addition, we show that, over the recent financial crisis, tightening access to commercial and industrial loans and, in particular, consumer installment loans may have contributed significantly to the drop in employment in the manufacturing sector.     

The sovereign-bank rating channel and rating agencies' downgrades during the European debt crisis

We investigate the rating channel for the transmission of changes in sovereign risk to the banking sector, analysing data from Moody's, S&P and Fitch before and during the European debt crisis. Sovereign rating downgrades and negative watch signals have strong effects on bank rating downgrades in the crisis period. The impact is stronger for multiple-notch sovereign rating downgrades, and more pronounced in PIIGS countries. Secondly, we investigate rating agencies' competition in the banking sector during the same periods, finding significant differences in rating policies across the agencies. S&P credit actions tend to be the more independent ones, while Moody's appears to be more cautious, although it is by far the most likely to assign multiple-notch downgrades. In the pre-crisis period, we find no evidence that bank rating actions are linked to sovereign rating signals (nor vice versa) nor to prior bank rating changes by a competing agency.     

In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.     

Are European banks too big? Evidence on economies of scale

In light of the policy debate on too-big-to-fail we investigate evidence of economies of scale for 103 European listed banks over 2000–2011. Using the Stochastic Frontier Approach, the results show that economies of scale are widespread across different size classes of banks and are especially large for the biggest banks. At the country level, banks operating in the smallest financial systems and the countries most affected by the financial crises realize the lowest scale economies (including diseconomies) due to the reduction in production capacity. As for the determinants of scale economies, these mainly emanate from banks oriented toward investment banking, with higher liquidity, lower Tier 1 capital, those that contributed less to systemic risk during the crises, and those with too-big-to-fail status.