Failed bank takeovers and financial stability

Current discussion about the design of bank resolution frameworks suggests that the takeover of a failed bank by an incumbent one has two effects on financial stability. First, the incumbent takeover may boost financial stability by providing bankers with incentives to be solvent so as to profit from their competitors’ failure. Second, the incumbent takeover may spoil financial stability by creating “Systemically Important Financial Institutions”. The innovation of this paper is to capture these two effects in a theoretical model. We show that when incumbent bankers are impatient enough (i.e., they have high discount rates), the second effect prevails over the first one. We discuss the implications of this result for the design of bank resolution policies.     

Risky bank lending and countercyclical capital buffers

We study the properties of a monetary economy with an essential role for risky bank lending. Banks issue deposits and lend to entrepreneurs. Because banks׳ lending rate cannot be made contingent on aggregate shocks, and because banks face capital adequacy regulations, they require a capital buffer against loan losses. Capital adequacy regulations are modeled on the Basel-III rules, including a minimum capital adequacy ratio, an endogenous capital conservation buffer, and a countercyclical capital buffer. We find that a countercyclical capital buffer leads to a significant increase in welfare. It also reduces the need for countercyclical adjustments in policy interest rates.     

Bank regulation and international financial stability: A case against the 2006 Basel framework for controlling tail risk in trading books

In attempting to promote international financial stability, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) provided a framework that sought to control the amount of tail risk that large banks around the world would take in their trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements. However, many of these banks suffered significant trading losses during the recent financial crisis. Our paper examines whether the Basel framework allowed banks to take substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty. We find that it allowed banks to do so and that its minimum capital requirements can be notably procyclical. Hence, focusing on the way the Basel framework sought to control the amount of tail risk in trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements, our paper supports the view that it was not properly designed to promote financial stability. We also discuss alternative regulatory frameworks that would potentially be more effective than the Basel framework in preventing banks from taking substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty.     

Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.     

Wishful thinking or effective threat? Tightening bank resolution regimes and bank risk-taking

We propose a framework for testing the effects of changes in bank resolution regimes on bank behavior. By exploiting the differential relevance of recent changes in U.S. bank resolution (i.e., the introduction of the Orderly Liquidation Authority, OLA) for different types of banks, we are able to simulate a quasi-natural experiment using a difference-in-difference framework. We find that banks that are more affected by the introduction of the OLA (1) significantly decrease their overall risk-taking and (2) shift their loan origination toward lower risk, indicating the general effectiveness of the regime change. This effect, however, does (3) not hold for the largest and most systemically important banks. Hence, the introduction of the OLA in the U.S. alone does not appear to have solved the too-big-to-fail problem and might need to be complemented with other measures to limit financial institutions’ risk-taking.     

How important can bank lending shocks be for economic fluctuations?

We analyze the quantitative importance of bank lending shocks on real activity fluctuations in Norway and the UK, using structural VARs estimated on quarterly data from 1988 to 2010. We find that an adverse bank lending shock causes output to contract, and that such shocks can account for a substantial share of output volatility. This suggests that financial intermediation is an important source of shocks. The empirical analysis comprises the Norwegian banking crisis (1988–1992) and the recent period of banking failures in the UK. However, the results are also non-trivial when omitting periods of systemic banking distress from the sample.     

An intertemporal capital asset pricing model with bank credit growth as a state variable

An ICAPM which includes bank credit growth as a state variable explains 94% of the cross-sectional variation in the average returns on the 25 Fama–French portfolios. We find compelling evidence that bank credit growth is priced in the cross-section of expected stock returns, even after controlling for well-documented asset pricing factors. These results are robust to the inclusion of industry portfolios in the set of test assets. They are also robust to the addition of firm characteristics and lagged instruments in the factor model. Bank credit growth is important because of its ability to predict business cycle variables as well as future labor income growth. These findings underscore the relevance of bank credit growth in stock pricing.     

Dealing with cross-firm heterogeneity in bank efficiency estimates: Some evidence from Latin America

This paper contributes to the bank efficiency literature through an application of recently developed random parameters models for stochastic frontier analysis. We estimate standard fixed and random effects models, and alternative specifications of random parameters models that accommodate cross-sectional parameter heterogeneity. A Monte Carlo simulations exercise is used to investigate the implications for the accuracy of the estimated inefficiency scores of estimation using either an under-parameterized, over-parameterized or correctly specified cost function. On average, the estimated mean efficiencies obtained from random parameters models tend to be higher than those obtained using fixed or random effects, because random parameters models do not confound parameter heterogeneity with inefficiency. Using a random parameters model, we analyse the evolution of the average rank cost efficiency for Latin American banks between 1985 and 2010. Cost efficiency deteriorated during the 1990s, particularly for state-owned banks, before improving during the 2000s but prior to the sub-prime crisis. The effects of the latter varied between countries and bank ownership types.     

The Politics of Canadian Monetary Policy: Reassessing Canadian Inflation,Part II

This is the second installment of a two-part article on Canadian inflation. This article builds on the traditional conflict theory of inflation by applying insights from the post-Keynesian and micro-politics theories of money and central bank policy. It argues that the Bank of Canada’s inflation targets — not just inflation itself — have to be understood in terms of social conflict and power. This analysis extends the evidence on the distributive implications of Canadian inflation offered in Part I.     

Credit crunch in a model of financial intermediation and occupational choice

In this paper, we introduce a dynamic general equilibrium model with numerous and heterogeneous investment projects and endogenous occupational choice to study a credit crunch. Asset accumulation of assets by households as they face various employment and return risks over a long lifetime determines whether they are entrepreneurs or workers. The origin of a credit crunch may be found in the conservative lending by banks during periods of financial duress and reduced profitability because of capital requirements. Using an example from Canada, monetary policy is shown to be largely ineffective in alleviating the credit crunch, while flexible loan regulation can erase it.