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131.
Marco Slikker 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):493-511
In this paper we study non-cooperative foundations of network allocation rules. We focus on three allocation rules: the Myerson value, the position value and the component-wise egalitarian solution. For any of these three rules we provide a characterization based on component efficiency and some balanced contribution property. Additionally, we present three mechanisms whose equilibrium payoffs are well defined and coincide with the three rules under consideration if the underlying value function is monotonic. Non-monotonic value functions are shown to deal with allocation rules applied to monotonic covers. The mechanisms are inspired by the implementation of the Shapley value by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value, J. Econ. Theory 100 (2) (2001) 274-294]. 相似文献
132.
P.Jean-Jacques Herings Ronald Peeters Maarten Pieter Schinkel 《European Economic Review》2005,49(5):1207-1223
In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists - despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium - as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented. 相似文献
133.
Federico Revelli 《Journal of public economics》2006,90(3):459-475
This paper investigates whether national evaluation of decentralised government performance tends, by lessening local information spill-overs, to reduce the scope for local performance comparisons and consequently to lower the extent of spatial auto-correlation among local government expenditures. It analyses local government expenditures on personal social services in the UK before and after the introduction of a national performance assessment system (SSPR, Social Services Performance Rating) that would attribute a rating to each local authority. The empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the SSPR has reduced local yardstick competition. 相似文献
134.
Abstract. This paper examines the seasonal structure of German real GNP per capita by using a version of Robinson's (1994) tests which is suitable in the context of seasonality. This method has several advantages over alternative approaches when testing for seasonal unit roots. First, unlike standard tests, which are nested in AR alternatives, it is embedded in fractional alternatives. Second, it allows testing at the zero frequency and at each of the seasonal frequencies separately. Third, it makes it possible to test for different orders of integration at each of the frequencies simultaneously. The empirical analysis suggests that the real output series may have a unit root at the zero frequency, and fractional rather than unit roots at the seasonal ones. This is in contrast to the findings reported by Lutkepohl et al. (1999) in their study on German money demand, and shows the importance of modelling the seasonal features of the data in alternative ways. 相似文献
135.
Dino Gerardi 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,114(1):104-131
We study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and incomplete information. We characterize SU(G), the set of outcomes of a game G, that are induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions. A cheap talk extension of G is an extensive-form game in which players communicate before playing G. A reliable mediator is not available and players exchange private or public messages that do not affect directly their payoffs. We first show that if G is a game of complete information with five or more players and rational parameters, then SU(G) coincides with the set of correlated equilibria of G. Next, we demonstrate that if G is a game of incomplete information with at least five players, rational parameters and full support (i.e., all profiles of types have positive probability), then SU(G) is equal to the set of communication equilibria of G. 相似文献
136.
Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's behavior affects individuals’ ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous informational spillovers lead to either a unique “good news” equilibrium that ameliorates behavior, a unique “bad news equilibrium” that worsens it, or to the coexistence of both. A welfare analysis shows that people will find social interactions valuable only when they have enough confidence in their own and others’ ability to resist temptation. The ideal partner, however, is someone with a slightly worse self-control problem than one's own: this makes his successes more encouraging, and his failures less discouraging. 相似文献
137.
Frank H. Page Jr. 《Economic Theory》1997,9(1):151-159
Summary We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable insider trading be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.I thank Dan Arce, Erik Balder, Myrna Wooders, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments. This paper is a greatly revised version of my paper entitled. A Variational Problem Arising in Market Games with Differential Information, written in August of 1991. 相似文献
138.
Technological substitution in the United States pulp and paper industry: The sulfate pulping process
This paper presents an econometric analysis of the diffusion of the sulfate pulping process throughout the U.S. pulp and paper industry. A dynamic equilibrium, Gompertz diffusion function is employed to derive a multivariate estimation model which incorporates more information than the traditional approach of estimating the growth rate function alone. The empirical results suggest that the econometric approach provides a useful integration of the technological diffusion process and the comparative static theory of demand. The sulfate pulping process is projected to continue capturing market share at a relatively rapid rate, and could account for 90% or more of total U.S. woodpulp production by the year 2000. 相似文献
139.
知识经济的发展源自于以信息技术、网络技术等高科技及其产业为发展标志的科技革命。中小企业应用Intranet技术,构建企业现代管理信息系统,对提高中小型企业的管理水平和经济效益是十分有益的。 相似文献
140.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND PUBLIC FUNDING 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Dirk Czarnitzki 《Scottish journal of political economy》2006,53(3):335-357
This paper presents microeconometric evidence on financing constraints for research and development activities in German small‐ and medium‐sized firms (SME). Special attention is paid to the role of public research and development (R&D) subsidies. For this purpose SMEs in West and East Germany are compared because these regions are very different in their supply of public R&D funding. The empirical evidence suggests that West German SMEs are financially constrained in their R&D activities by both internal and external resources. In East Germany, firms are not sensitive to external constraints, possibly due to high public R&D subsidies. The results show that R&D in East Germany is to a large extent driven by public subsidies and that the usual financial market mechanisms are dysfunctional with respect to R&D in this region. 相似文献