Impact of spectrum management policy on the penetration of 3G technology

Diffusion of 3G cellular technology varies widely across countries and regions. Past studies have shown that lower levels of diffusion of previous technologies and higher levels of income are significant factors in accelerating the take up of 1st and 2nd generation of mobile telephony. In addition, spectrum management policy plays a significant role in shaping 3G diffusion. Regulatory policies regarding spectrum management include mandating band and technology and decisions to hold spectrum auctions. An econometric analysis over a multi-country panel dataset shows that these spectrum management policies do have significant influence on the take-up of 3G. Findings suggest that the presence of multiple technologies for the previous generation is associated with rollout delay. The estimations indicate that countries that mandated a specific frequency band for 3G saw faster roll out, but in the long run those countries experienced a slower growth rate. Also estimations find that 3G diffusion is not significantly affected by the choice of auctions vs. alternative license award processes. Insights gained from this study of the 2G to 3G transition can provide guidance to regulators now contemplating the transition to newer generations.     

中国认购权证市场价格偏差的实证研究

随着股权分置改革,中国的A股权证被再次推出,它的诞生丰富了投资者的交易品种,对建立多层次多维度的资本市场发挥了积极的作用.但是中国的A股权证市场仍存在诸多问题,实际价格偏离理论价格的现象司空见惯,其交易品种与交易规模不对称的现象也一直伴随着A股权证市场的发展.基于业内与学术界对A股权证价格偏差的困惑,本文利用混合回归模型和面板数据模型的实证方法,对认购权证市场价格偏差的研究发现,投资者对认购权证的频繁操作和投机炒作是导致价格偏差的重要原因,并且认购权证的创设制度对于抑制价格偏差的作用非常有限.此外,本文结合研究的实证结果,从创新A股权证产品和完善市场交易制度的角度,提出了完善和发展中国A股权证市场的政策建议.     

The tug-of-war in the laboratory

The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, contrary to the prediction, bids tend to increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, extending the margin necessary to win the tug-of-war causes a greater reduction in bidding than either a decrease in the prize or greater impatience despite all three having the same predicted effect. These findings have implications both for theorists and practitioners.     

Are high–frequency traders informed?

Are high–frequency traders (HFTs) informed? To address this question, we examine HFTs' activity in the call auction environment, where speed-related trading is limited and signal processing capacity becomes more relevant. To model the call market, we consider the Kyle (1989) rational expectations framework for strategic trading. The test we propose for detecting informed HFTs in this market assesses potential deviations of the informativeness of HFTs' aggregate (net) demand, from the informativeness of the aggregate demand submitted by the rest of the traders. Data from the Euronext Paris preopening phase indicate that informed HFTs are present in the market just before the opening. Our results provide useful guidance for the assessment of the influence of HFTs’ quotes on price quality, an important issue for market regulators and policy makers.     

西部公共资源招标拍卖监管的规制

加入WTO与西部大开发的深入使西部公共资源招标拍卖监管的改革不可避免.面对维护民族经济利益与兼顾WTO规则、"超国民待遇"和"非国民待遇"并存、程序不规范、土地规划科学性不足和腐败滋生等监管中的问题,提出以政府职能转型为监管更新契机,以土地资本和地域空间为监管核心,以城市管理为监管重点,以遏制腐败行为为监管保障.     

深交所收盘集合竞价制度的实施效果研究

作为交易制度创新的收盘集合竞价制度于2006年7月在深交所主板实施,本文应用事件研究的方法和EGARCH模型,对沪深股价指数及个股在收盘集合竞价制度实施前后的相对成交量和波动性特征进行比较研究,考察该制度的实施对市场微观结构的影响,结果认为收盘集合竞价的实施基本达到预期政策目标。     

Using call-back to demonstrate the discriminatory nature of the proportionate return rule

The paper shows that the impact of a call-back service on the financial position of the monopolists in the countries where call-back service is offered, will in many cases be positive. The explanation for this result is found by observing cost and revenue streams, and by taking note of the various elasticities and feedback effects when ever there is an increase in traffic. For carriers selling call-back minutes to service providers, it is the proportionate return rule that provides then with a major, and perhaps the main source of profit on the call-back minutes they sell. The rule provides for the transfer of incoming IDD minutes and the associated hugely profitable settlement credits, from the other competing carriers, to the carrier selling call-back minutes. In this regard, the rule is not even-handed. The higher the market share of the carrier selling call-back minutes, the less well they do under the rule, so much so that under some circumstances a carrier selling call-back minutes at an apparent profit, would actually suffer losses on those minutes.     

The multiple unit auction with variable supply

Summary. The theory of multiple unit auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity is fixed. I argue that this assumption is not appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to adjust the supply as a function of the bidding. In this paper I address this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit auction game between a monopolistic seller who can produce arbitrary quantities at constant unit cost, and oligopolistic bidders. I establish the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium for price discriminating and for uniform price auctions. I also show that bidders have an incentive to misreport their true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for different reasons. Furthermore, both auction formats are inefficient, but there is no unambiguous ordering among them. Finally, the more competitive the bidders are, the more likely the seller is to prefer uniform pricing over price discrimination, yet increased competition among bidders may or may not enhance efficiency. Received: June 18, 1998; revised version: January 13, 1999     

排污权拍卖方式比较研究

排污权交易是基于市场的经济政策.排污权拍卖方式的选择是决定排污权交易市场效率的关键问题.文章首先阐述了排污权拍卖的意义和特点,然后提出了排污权拍卖三种不同方式,并从期望收益、有效性、公平性和简便性等方面进行了比较,最后得出我国排污权的拍卖应采用单一价格拍卖方式。