Polish experience from first-ever spectrum auction

The Polish 4G spectrum auction was a watershed event for the Polish telecommunications market. For the first time in history, the Office of Electronic Communications decided to award spectrum by using an auction process. Polish regulators implemented a simultaneous multiple-round ascending-bid auction, which was widely used worldwide for selling spectrum. The process leading to the auction and the auction itself was lengthy and eventful. Due to the wrong auction design, the auction dragged on indefinitely, causing a delay in spectrum distribution. The auction ended only as a result of the government's intervention, after 8 months (513 rounds) of bidding that raised revenue of over PLN 9 billion (over EUR 2 billion). This paper describes in detail the rules of the Polish 4G auction, analyses bidding behaviour and auction dynamics of the crucial phases of auctions, and presents the final outcomes. It also draws lessons that could help policy makers in Poland and other countries in auction design.     

一种基于无线携能通信的MEC与用户匹配算法

多接入边缘计算（Multi-access Edge Computing,MEC）和无线携能通信可有效提高用户的服务质量和体验。在计算、通信和能量等资源的约束条件下，用户匹配是优化MEC任务卸载时系统效用的重要方法。针对无线携能通信的MEC网络结构，综合考虑用户的需求差异性和多元化能量供给，建立了基于计算资源、传输资源和能量资源的系统效用函数；以系统效用最大化为目标，采用基于多维背包理论的多轮拍卖，提出了一种适用于多用户和多网络边缘服务器的用户匹配算法。仿真验证了所提用户匹配算法的有效性与可靠性，结果表明所提匹配算法可优化系统资源配置，有效提高整体性能。     

Environmental services auctions under regulatory threat

This paper examines how strategic responses of bidders and efficiency properties are impacted in auctions for the procurement of environmental services when a threat of regulation is levied. Laboratory experiments reveal characteristics of bidder behavior in different regulatory environments. Experimental results provide insight into efficiency and equity tradeoffs inherent in regulatory policy applications with respect to environmental services auctions. While it is possible to reduce the amount of public funds necessary to purchase a given level of environmental services, adverse selection costs and equity considerations may outstrip the benefits gained from threat implementation.     

More on phantom bidding

Summary. A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases. Received: November 4, 1998; revised version: February 8, 1999     

自主创新激励下企业政府采购最优出价行为研究

在政府采购过程中,促进自主创新的政策与公开招标经济目标之间存在着一定冲突。本文在一价密封模型的基础上,通过改变供应商的效用函数,考察了政府鼓励自主创新条件下企业（供应商）的最优报价。结果表明：政府扶持自主创新的政策会改变供应商的出价机制,获得优惠较多的供应商会提高报价,并且随着竞标人数的增多最优价格将接近中标企业的成本。     

Deadlines in stochastic contests

We consider a two-player contest model in which breakthroughs arrive according to privately observed Poisson processes. Each player’s process continues as long as she exerts costly effort. The player who collects the most breakthroughs until a predetermined deadline wins a prize.We derive Nash equilibria of the game depending on the deadline. For short deadlines, there is a unique equilibrium in which players use identical cutoff strategies, i.e., they continue until they have a certain number of successes. If the deadline is long enough, the symmetric equilibrium distribution of an all-pay auction is an equilibrium distribution over successes in the contest. Expected efforts may be maximal for a short or intermediate deadline.     

拍卖交易机制研究

探讨了常用的拍卖方式之间的联系以及他们各自适用的经济环境，研究了拍卖交易机制的特征     

不同一口价组合拍卖机制下的卖方收益比较研究

随着电子商务的发展,作为网上拍卖方式之一的一口价拍卖逐渐盛行起来。网上一口价拍卖打破了时间和空间的限制,因而被广泛应用于组合拍卖中。笔者针对目前拍卖网站所采用的两种不同拍卖规则:固定一口价和持久一口价,在独立私人估价模型下分析比较了上述两种规则下的卖方期望收益。