Lost in intervention. The Harrod–Balassa–Samuelson effect on the peseta/dollar real exchange rate (1870–1998)

We have decomposed the peseta/dollar real exchange rate (1870–1998) into its trend and cyclical components and used the former to proxy its time-varying equilibrium. Then, we have compared changes in the equilibrium with changes in the Spanish and the USA productivity differentials to identify years that do not fit with the Harrod–Balassa–Samuelson (HBS) hypothesis. The greatest maladjustment is found in the 1940s and 1950s, decades of strong exchange rate intervention in Spain. Conversely, the link between equilibrium and differentials adjusts to the hypothesis when using the non-intervened peseta/dollar exchange rate on the Tangier black market. These contrasting results back up the idea that exchange rate intervention, so common in developing countries, might explain their scanter evidence in favour of the HBS effect.     

Welfare under friction and uncertainty: General equilibrium evaluation of temporary employment in the U.S.

Temporary contracts usually fall outside of employee protection litigation, thus they are often cheaper than permanent contracts and are offered on-demand by firms. In the last two decades, there has been a sharp growth in such contracts in the U.S. labor market. This paper investigates the welfare consequences of offering temporary contracts in the U.S., an environment with low employee protection litigation and high production risk for firms. Employee protection litigation creates firing rigidity in regular labor markets. Pairing firing rigidity with high production risk, firms reduce employment and output, which generates welfare loss. The inexpensive and flexible nature of temporary contracts offers firms a buffer strategy in making employment decisions under risk and navigating the firing rigidity of the regular labor sector, thereby reducing welfare loss. However, temporary contracts cannot fully compensate for the efficiency cost from rising firing rigidity and risk.     

Intertemporal production and intertemporal substitution in output supply and input demand

This article presents an intertemporal model of production with multiple inputs to investigate substitution opportunities facing firms over time. The firm’s intertemporal profit maximization problem is characterized with the familiar cost function, and various intertemporal substitution elasticities are delineated for output supply and input demand. The absence of intertemporal substitution in production can imply production smoothing, and allowance for intertemporal substitution in labour demand reinforces the prediction of the real business cycle model. For aggregate US manufacturing, we find substantial substitution in output supply and labour demand over time due to intertemporal changes in output price and wage rates.     

A review of recent developments and applications of partial equilibrium models of the forest sector

Recent history has seen an increase in the utilization of partial equilibrium based forest sector models to identify potential impacts of various policies or timber market shocks. These models are particularly useful in that they employ economic theory to capture the interaction of supply and demand in a framework where commodity prices are endogenous to the policy or shock simulated. We present recent developments and linkages between models and review applications of these models to forest policy questions over the previous decade. We conclude with a discussion of potential future directions for such research.     

简化一般均衡模型中一般均衡点的确定

经济学教材在讨论一般均衡的时候,往往以两个人、两种生产要素、两种产品这种最简单的社会作为研究对象,它们通常只阐述了一般均衡的存在,但都没有说明这种最简单的社会一般均衡点的确定即以此作为研究对象。     

地方政府与污染企业动态博弈分析

近年来,中央和地方政府相继出台了一系列保护环境的激励政策和相关措施,但效果并不理想。人口的压力,资源的短缺,环境的胁迫,生态的危机,这一系列的世界性问题,已经成为21世纪中国乃至世界急需考虑并解决的问题。为了实现经济与环境的可持续发展,近年来,中央和地方政府相继出台了一系列保护环境的激励政策和相关措施,但由于外部性和公共产品属性等因素的存在,环境治理过程中存在市场失灵。为了探求这一现象背后的原因,本文利用博弈论的分析方法进一步考虑财政补贴、税收、罚金等系数对企业支付函效的影响,在更为一般的条件下分别建立政府监管部门和企业的完全信息条件下静态博弈模型和无限阶段重复博弈模型,并且讨论了多种因素对局中人的影响,并导出企业的最优策略和纳什均衡解,以揭示环境治理政策设计的经济机理和提出优化我国节能减排政府政策设计的一系列政策建议,旨在为提高我国节能减排政府政策设计的效果提供理论论证和现实见解。     

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.JEL Classification: C73, D62, Q28 Corresponding author : Santiago J. RubioThis paper is based on chapter four of Begoña Casinos Ph. Dissertation. Financial support from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under grant BEC2000-1432 and Fundación BBVAis gratefully acknowledged. We also appreciate the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, whose suggestions improved the paper. Regarding any remaining inadequacies, the usual caveat applies.     

COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY ANALYSIS IN LDCs

Abstract. The use of CGE models has gained much popularity among policy analysts in LDCs and there is a fast growing body of literature on this area of economics. In this survey, the advantages of general equilibrium approach over partial equilibrium approach in analysing a wide range of policy issues are highlighted. The evolution of CGE modelling is discussed and more than 60 CGE applications related to different policy issues in LDCs are surveyed. This comprehensive survey shows that the CGE models have become quite popular analytical tools among policy analysts in LDCs over the last decade or so. The debate in the economic profession regarding the value and appropriateness of using CGE models for policy analysis is examined in the final section of this paper. Some of the criticisms levelled at CGE models are discussed and it is argued that despite this criticism such models are capable of providing insight into important policy problems.     

Limit-pricing as Bertrand equilibrium

Summary. We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with increasing returns to scale where one of the firms have a cost advantage and prices vary over a grid. We find that typically more than one equilibria exist. However, there are only two perfect equilibria. Moreover, as the size of the grid becomes small, both these equilibria converge to the limit-pricing outcome. Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: January 9, 2001     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.