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41.
Eilon Solan 《Games and Economic Behavior》2000,31(2):245
A team is a group of people having the same motives but possibly different available actions. A team game is a game where two teams face each other. An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the entries are absorbing, in the sense that once they are chosen the play terminates, and all future payoffs are equal to the payoff at the stage of termination. We prove that every absorbing team game has an equilibrium payoff and that there are -equilibrium profiles with cyclic structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73. 相似文献
42.
James W Friedman 《Information Economics and Policy》1983,1(1):37-53
This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
43.
已有的对城乡和谐发展问题的研究大多将注意力集中在城乡和谐发展的途径方面,却忽视了对城乡和谐衡量标准的研究.本文从公平与效率统一(均衡)的视角来解析城乡和谐的标准以及城乡和谐演进的机制,并构建了一个基于公平与效率均衡的城乡和谐发展模型.该模型揭示,城乡和谐是公平与效率均衡的函数,市场机制与政府制度的相互配合共同促进城乡和谐发展. 相似文献
44.
总量均衡区间与宏观调控应确立的若干新原则 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
现代市场经济条件下,供给方调整其生产规模所需的成本可称为调节成本。由于存在调节成本,传统分析中的“总量均衡中心点”两侧便分别存在着“低位临界点”与“高位临界点”,这两点界定了一个特殊的“总量均衡区间”。“总量均衡区间”的出现对宏观调控将产生诸多重要影响,使之面临一系列新问题、新挑战。为有效应对这种新情况,在宏观调控实践中有必要相应地确立“近似均衡原则”、“适度超前原则”、“临界点原则”、“供给方原则”。 相似文献
45.
Market power in the input purchase is becoming increasingly common because of growing consolidation and mergers and also due to multinational firms establishing a stronghold in buying inputs in the developing countries. In this study, we formulate a general equilibrium model consisting of a competitive sector and an oligopsony sector which exercises market power over inputs. Our results indicate that if the oligopsony sector incurs a higher marginal factor cost for the intensive factor, basic results of the standard two-sector model continue to hold. But if the marginal factor cost is higher for the non-intensive factor, then factor intensities in the physical and value sense differ and traditional trade propositions such as the Stolper–Samuelson theorem do not hold. 相似文献
46.
We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. Econ. Theory 57, 278–305) are limit Nash equilibria. Modified evolutionary stability differs from “lexicographic evolutionarily stability” (defined by extending the common characterization of evolutionary stability to lexicographic preferences) in the order in which limits in the payoff space and the space of invasion barriers are taken. 相似文献
47.
Summary. We discuss a competitive (labor) market where firms face capacity constraints and individuals differ according to their productivity.
Firms offer two-dimensional contracts like wage and task level. Then workers choose firms and contracts. Workers might be
rationed if the number of applicants exceeds the capacity of the firm.
We show that under reasonable assumptions on the distribution of capacity an equilibrium in pure strategies (by the firms)
exists. This result stands in contrast to the case of unlimited capacity. The utility level is uniquely determined in equilibrium.
No rationing occurs in equilibrium, but it does off the equilibrium path.
Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2000 相似文献
48.
Summary. We build a finite horizon model with inside and outside money, in which interest rates, price levels and commodity allocations are determinate, even though asset markets are incomplete and asset deliveries are purely nominal.Received: 2 July 2003, Revised: 1 December 2004 JEL Classification Numbers:
D50, E40, E50, E58.Correspondence to: J. Geanakoplos 相似文献
49.
Summary. We develop a method of assigning unique prices to derivative securities, including options, in the continuous-time finance model developed in Raimondo (2001). In contrast with the martingale method of valuing options, which cannot distinguish among infinitely many possible option pricing processes for a given underlying securities price process when markets are dynamically incomplete, our option prices are uniquely determined in equilibrium in closed form as a function of the underlying economic data.Received: 14 April 2003, Revised: 7 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
G13, D52.This paper is dedicated to Birgit Grodal, whose strength and character we greatly admire. We are very grateful to Darrell Duffie, Steve Evans, Botond Koszegi, Roger Purves, Jacob Sagi, Chris Shannon, Bill Zame and an anonymous refereee for very helpful discussions and comments. The work of both authors was supported by Grant SES-9710424, and Andersons work was supported by Grant SES-0214164, from the National Science Foundation. 相似文献
50.
Federico Echenique 《Games and Economic Behavior》2004,46(2):348-364
I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games. 相似文献