未来金融业发展趋势与商业银行社会责任新挑战

积极承担社会责任与企业的长久竞争力和股东的长期利润最大化是一致的.积极承担社会责任已经成为许多知名国外商业银行的共同价值观取向,也同样应该成为我国商业银行的基本价值观.与国外相比,我国商业银行在社会责任表现方面尚存在问题,金融行业正在面临的重大发展趋势及其可能对商业银行实践社会责任价值观带来重要影响.     

The Determinants of Corporate Trade Credit Policies in a Bank‐dominated Financial Environment: the Case of Finnish Small Firms

This paper examines trade credit policies of small firms operating in a bank‐dominated environment (Finland). We find that creditworthiness and access to capital markets are important determinants of trade credit extended by sellers. The level of purchases is positively correlated with the level of accounts payable. Larger and older firms and firms with strong internal financing are less likely to use trade credit, whereas firms with a high ratio of current assets to total assets, and firms subject to loan restructurings use it more. Negative loan decisions by financial intermediaries increase and a close bank‐borrower relationship decreases the probability that a firm does not take advantage of trade credit discounts.     

中央银行再贷款：泛化、反稳定性与道德风险

中央银行再贷款是中国人民银行投放基础货币的重要渠道,是我国特有的一种货币政策工具。基于对新形势下中央银行再贷款制度变迁的分析,现行再贷款政策存在泛化、准财政化、反稳定性、衍生道德风险等问题,必须从制度上规范再贷款的运用,并适时建立金融稳定机制。     

The Informational Efficiency of the Equity Market As Compared to the Syndicated Bank Loan Market

The loan market is a hybrid between a public and a private market, comprised of financial institutions with access to private information about borrowing firms. We test whether this is reflected in informationally efficient price formation in the loan market vis-a-vis the equity markets, and reject this private information hypothesis. We also reject a liquidity hypothesis which suggests that equity markets always lead loan markets, despite bank lenders' access to private information, because of greater liquidity in equity markets. We further test, and reject, an asymmetric price reaction hypothesis that states that loan returns are more sensitive to negative information whereas equity returns respond symmetrically to both positive and negative information. We find evidence most consistent with an integrated markets hypothesis that suggests that both the equity and syndicated bank loan markets are highly integrated such that information flows freely across markets. This is particularly true when the equity market makers are also loan syndicate members.      

武汉担当中部崛起“龙头”的金融对策研究

党中央从统筹区域发展的高度，提出了“中部地区崛起”战略。武汉作为中部地区的特大型城市，担当中部崛起“龙头”既得天时，也有地利，更具人和。银行作为金融部门，支持武汉担当中部崛起“龙头”责无旁贷，其主要措施是：集合金融资源，积极支持武汉实施城市联动战略；加快金融体制创新和业务创新，积极探索和设立基金管理公司，成立中部开发银行和中部发展银行，支持国有商业银行在武汉市进行信贷资产和住房抵押贷款证券化试点，尝试资产管理公司与政府合作处理不良资产，大力发展投资银行业务等；改善金融生态环境，提高信贷政策对产业政策的敏感度和金融资源配置效率，引导金融支持的方向和力度。     

存款保险法律制度利弊之研究

存款保险法律制度是直接针对银行挤兑和破产倒闭而设计的,目的在于保护存款人的利益,增强公众对银行体系的信心,减少挤兑的可能性。我国建立该制度,将有利于维护金融安全,营造公平竞争的市场环境,完善银行的退出机制,从而提高金融业的效率。     

利差演进、利差层次与我国利差结构分析

本文从金融学视角揭示了商业银行存贷款利差、中央银行与商业银行利差和国内与国际金融市场利差三个层次,并指出利差三个层次构成了有机的统一体.作者对建国以来历次利率调整进行了综合系统分析,勾画出我国利差变化的轨迹,得出以下基本结论:中国人民银行对利差管理从无序逐步过渡到有序,利差体系从扭曲逐步得到矫正,在金融管制环境下实现了利率总体水平的国际化"磨合".存在的主要问题是:存贷款利差考虑商业银行收益因素较多,兼顾国际化竞争不足;邮政储蓄转存利差在体现政策性的同时负效应越来越大;再贷款利差调整频繁和扩张太快,透视出金融宏观调控手段相对单一.     

房地产融资渠道分析

由于国家银根收缩，房地产融资难度增大，加上中国房地产金融体系尚未完善，融资渠道狭窄，在一定程度上限制了我国房地产业的发展。房地产业需要新的融资渠道，如信托、基金、债券等取代传统的银行贷款融资模式。针对新的市场现状，各房地产企业必须加强资本运作能力，扩大融资渠道，创新金融产品。     

Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements

We characterize welfare maximizing capital requirement policies in a quantitative macrobanking model with household, firm, and bank defaults calibrated to Euro Area data. We optimize on the level of the capital requirements applied to each loan class and their sensitivity to changes in default risk. We find that getting the level right (so that bank failure risk remains contained) is of foremost importance, while the optimal sensitivity to default risk is positive but typically smaller than under Basel internal ratings based (IRB) formulas. Starting from low levels, savers and borrowers benefit from higher capital requirements. At higher levels, only savers prefer tighter requirements.     

银保协作、风险自留与银行信用风险补偿——基于银保信贷系统的分析视角

在分析风险自留的内生逻辑基础上,进一步分析风险自留实现银行信用风险补偿的内在机理。研究表明：银保信贷系统通过对贷款企业个体风险与事先设定的平均代偿风险的匹配性甄别,实现对银行信用风险的分级补偿功能。针对银行超预期信用风险,先行实施银行风险拨备机制对银行平均代偿风险进行补偿,然后实施超额风险自留机制对超过平均代偿风险的银行超额风险部分再次进行补偿,超额风险自留补偿基金将由银行与担保机构依据各自的风险均衡配置阈值占比共同筹集,以此来实现银行信用风险分级补偿目标。并以此为依据,设计了银保信贷系统风险自留机制。