How Verifiable Cheap-Talk Can Communicate Unverifiable Information

This study describes a “cheap-talk” model in which sellers can credibly convey unverifiable information by choosing whether or not to exaggerate verifiable information. We find that unexaggerated claims can communicate favorable unverifiable information if buyers are not too likely to verify claims, and sellers with better information care more about future prices than sellers with worse information. However, there is always another equilibrium in which sellers exaggerate all verifiable claims. Laboratory tests show that when buyers infrequently verify the sellers' claims, players converge to the equilibria close to the example provided in instructions. When buyers are very likely to verify claims, players fail to converge to any equilibrium. Both of these results are consistent with an evolutionary learning model, but inconsistent with the intuitive criteria of Cho and Kreps (1987). We discuss the implications of our results for both consumer and financial markets. Helpful comments were received by an anonymous reviewer, Mark Nelson, many doctoral students at Cornell University, and Accounting workshop participants at the University of Texas at Austin. JEL Classification: C73, C92, G14, M3     

The estimated ex ante economic impact of Bt cowpea in Niger,Benin and Northern Nigeria

Genetically modified (GM) crops could increase economic growth and enhance living standards in Africa, but political issues have slowed the use of biotechnology. This is the first study that assesses the potential impact of GM crops in Africa while considering the preferences of producers and consumers towards GMOs as well as the income and price risks they face. The study uses a choice experiment to estimate the ex ante economic impact of a novel technology, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cowpea, on producers and consumers in Benin, Niger and northern Nigeria. The experiment involves the simulation of a market transaction similar to those in open air markets in West Africa. During the market simulation, respondents are informed about the advantages and disadvantages, including health risks, of Bt cowpea. The results from the study suggest that cowpea growers and consumers in Benin and northern Nigeria prefer Bt to conventional cowpea for health safety reasons. The results estimate that social welfare in Benin, Niger and northern Nigeria would increase by at least US$11.82 per capita annually with Bt cowpea, if seed sectors are operating smoothly. With inefficiencies in seed sectors and the potential for cowpea acreage increase, the estimated social welfare increase in the region would be about US$1.26 per capita annually.     

Ritual legitimation, de-coupling and the budgetary process: managing organizational hypocrisies in a multinational company

The study of participation in the budgetary cycle has formed a prominent part of the research literature concerned with the budgetary process. More recently there has emerged a body of literature concerned with exploring the political and symbolic nature of the budgetary process. The paper reports upon the outcomes of an empirical study of the introduction of `budgetary participation' in a division of a European subsidiary of a large North American car manufacturer. We detail the long process of consultation and negotiation within the subsidiary, and between it and the European Headquarters. The study provides a revealing instance of the roles of formal budget participation as a ritual of control and legitimation without the substantive involvement of middle managers and suggested to us the introduction of de-coupling and organizational hypocrisy alongside the introduction of budget participation. The study pays close attention to the contingent effects of the wider political context of the division and the relationships between the division, its organizational context and organizational environment, and how this context played upon the budgetary process in the division. The outcomes that we analyse at `Delta' reflect the de-coupling strategies and organizational hypocrisies commonly found in public sector organizations. In this wider setting the corporation persists with the ritual of `tight' budget negotiation and target setting and apparent underachievement in performance. Yet we conclude that the complex technological and political context to the formation and siting of Delta continued and may continue to support its existence.$g0     

Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games

It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C6, C7, D8.     

外籍教师口语课堂调查研究--以广西财经学院一名美籍教师为例

通过对一位口语课教学经验丰富的美籍教师语言课的观察、研究,从该外教的话语量、提问类型、反馈方式、话轮结构等方面进行分析,结果表明,该外教的口语课堂呈现出传统的以教师为中心的课堂特征。     

廉价交谈文献综述

廉价交谈指的是没有直接支付后果的言论,它与经济理论的协调问题密切相关。本文概述了廉价交谈在协调问题中的作用,它起作用的关键在于言论是否“自我信号显示”和“自我执行”;综述了相关实验研究的成果;梳理了廉价交谈在共谋理论中的作用,即对达成共谋协议与卡特尔的作用和影响;最后对廉价交谈与机制设计、默契共谋等的关系以及反垄断法实践等问题进行了简要评述。     

信息不对称下的技术贸易:理论分析和经验检验

迄今发展中国家未能有效地利用国际技术贸易从发达国家获得自己想要的技术。原因在于,由于要素禀赋的不一致,发达国家企业具有策略性传递技术质量信息以获取卖者剩余的倾向;发展中国家的企业则对发达国家企业传递的信息持不信任态度。筛选机制使得我国的技术贸易参与者集中在外资企业、资本密集型的行业和发达地区。我国技术贸易的这种格局在短期内无法有大的改变。     

大学英语课堂教师话语分析

教师话语具有双重作用,一方面它是教师传授知识的媒介,另外一方面它作为目的语起着示范作用。因而,国内外今年来有越来越多的学者开始关注教师的话语,分析其数量和质量与课堂教学效果的关系。针对大学英语课堂这一特殊而又关键的场所,对教师的话语从语言的调整、教师提问、学生的反馈作了介绍。除此以外,针对教师话语存在的问题,提出应当从课堂,语言能力的角度提升话语质量从而有效利用好课堂的宝贵时间。     

Harmful signaling in matching markets

Several labor markets, including the job market for new Ph.D. economists, have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms. We show that such mechanisms are harmful for some environments. While signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. In particular, we consider a two-sided matching game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Each worker has either the same “typical” known preferences with probability close to one or “atypical” idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have known preferences over workers. We show that under some technical condition if at least three firms are responsive to some workerʼs signal, the introduction of signaling strictly decreases the expected number of matches.