Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: Silence is not golden

I study the effect of cheap talk between bidders on the outcome of a first-price procurement auction in which participation is costly. Although no side payments or commitments are allowed, there exists a family of equilibria in which sellers use communication to collude on a subset of participants and/or reveal information about their cost. Cheap talk matters in the sense that it strictly enlarges the set of Nash equilibria (symmetric and asymmetric) and the set of public correlated equilibria of the game. I show that the buyer may benefit from cheap talk between sellers and that the surplus increases in the amount of information revealed in equilibrium under one fairly general condition. This is because when communication is cheap, sellers cannot directly collude on higher prices. Rather, communication leads to competition between fewer, but more aggressive bidders, which entails greater allocative efficiency and a decrease in the total wasteful entry cost.     

Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on players' preferences for a verifiable message game to possess a separating equilibrium and/or a pooling equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be pooling. We also characterize all nonseparating equilibria, and use this property to show that less information might be conveyed in any equilibrium of a verifiable message game than in some equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the same parameters.     

A GOOD ADVISOR

Effective education requires strategic consideration. If students doubt the motives of teachers and advisors, then students rationally ignore the advice they receive. Valuable information is lost in such bad communication outcomes and, consequently, the quality of education suffers. In this paper, we argue that an advisor's sacrifice is an essential virtue of a good advisor for efficient communication between an advisor and a student. We model the relation between them as a signaling game. We find a separating equilibrium in which a good advisor (whose objective function truly coincides with the student's own objective function) makes a costly sacrifice that causes the student to believe what the advisor says, while a non‐good advisor (whose objective does not coincide with the student's) chooses not to make the costly sacrifice and, consequently, the student completely ignores the advisor. In fact, it turns out to be the unique equilibrium that survives the Intuitive Criterion. The model demonstrates the importance of making students aware of those aspects of the advisor's objectives that students may not realize are closely aligned with their own (e.g., the extent to which an advisor cares about students' academic and professional trajectories as evaluated by students themselves).     

电视财经类脱口秀节目之"TV2.0"特征解析——以第一财经频道《上班这点事》为例

互联网＂Web2.0＂已尘埃落定,与传统电视相对应的＂TV2.0＂也随之而来。在中国电视业这个深刻变革的过程当中,＂交互、体验、对等、即时＂成为各电视栏目关注的重点。本文用个案分析的方法对中国第一档以＂TV2.0＂为制作理念的电视财经类脱口秀节目《上班这点事》进行了深入解剖,从栏目定位和风格、谈话场、内容和结构模式、镜头语言与包装等诸方面,解读电视财经脱口秀节目的＂TV2.0＂特征。     

我国电视谈话类节目现实境遇与发展策略--以《锵锵三人行》为例

自谈话类节目引进国内以来便得到了突飞猛进的发展与提升。随着市场经济的飞速发展与电视节目类型的不断变化,谈话类节目也存在着不可回避的现实困境。基于此,对我国电视谈话类节目现实境遇进行梳理,结合凤凰卫视《锵锵三人行》差异化传播策略成功之处,可以寻求我国电视谈话类节目的发展图景。     

中法电视谈话节目结构的话语分析

电视谈话节目一直都是语言学家研究的重点,在运用话语分析基本原理基础上,以Sacks、Schegloff和Jefferson为代表的会话分析理论对收集的语料进行对比分析,针对电视谈话节目的定义及其特点,探讨中法电视谈话节目开端、主体和结尾整体结构的异同。     

广播谈话节目发展的思索

本文简要介绍了广播谈话节目的形式及现状,从三个方面对广播谈话节目的发展进行了探讨。一是广播谈话节目要坚持创新,突显"个性化";二是广播谈话节目要坚持"品牌化";三是广播谈话节目要积极融合新媒体。