Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

Institutional failure or market failure?

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.     

基于银行流动性管理视角的宏观审慎与货币政策协调研究

本文从商业银行流动性管理视角出发,探究银行微观主体行为如何影响宏观审慎与货币政策的协调。我们借鉴净稳定资金比例的设计理念,将商业银行的流动性管理行为纳入传统理论模型,刻画出两种流动性管理行为对货币政策信贷传导渠道效率的潜在影响及传导路径。在此基础上,采用我国50家商业银行2012年第1季度—2018年第2季度面板数据进行实证检验。我们发现,银行为提升长期流动性水平而进行的优化信贷资产结构的行为,能够显著提高货币政策传导效率。但是,部分净稳定资金比例较低的股份制银行和城市商业银行调整非信贷资产结构的行为则有可能降低货币政策传导效率。因此,在执行既有流动性监管措施的同时,关注与引导银行资产结构调整方式,对增强宏观审慎与货币政策的协调大有裨益。     

Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and the Potential Competitive Impact of Basel II in the Market for Residential Mortgages

U.S. banking regulators have proposed a bifurcated system of capital regulation where the largest, internationally active banking organizations would be subject to significantly more risk sensitive regulatory capital requirements than are currently in place, while most others would remain subject to the current rules. The proposed new capital regime has the potential to affect the competitive landscape among banking institutions, particularly in the area of residential mortgage lending. We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed, bifurcated regulatory capital system on competition in the residential mortgage market from the perspective of the theory of regulatory capital arbitrage. We then apply the theory and available evidence to perform some benchmark calculations that suggest a significant, potential shift of market share and income to the largest banking institutions in the mortgage market.

The effect of capital requirement regulation on the transmission of monetary policy: evidence from Austria

This paper analyzes the role of banks’ regulatory capitalization in the transmission of monetary policy. We use a confidential dataset for Austrian banks spanning from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2003. We find evidence that Austrian banks react in an asymmetric way to monetary policy depending on their regulatory excess capitalization, i.e. low capitalized banks react more restrictively to a monetary tightening than their highly capitalized peers.

Connecting National Safety Nets: The Dialectics of the Basel II Contracting Process

Basel II consists of supervisory guidelines negotiated by representatives of central banks and national regulatory commissions that were members of the Basel committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The BCBS is itself a regulatory response to globalization, which is connecting national safety nets in market-driven ways. A country’s financial safety net is a social contract established by short-lived agents for principals in long-lived economic sectors. Restraints placed on the authority of the BCBS members to contract for their principals by domestic politics explains: why Basel II authorizes individual countries to implement the agreement in markedly different ways; why US implementation of Basel II ran into so much doubt, controversy, and delay; and how the implementation debate set small and large banks and the Federal Reserve and other federal regulators against one another.

我国房地产泡沫与银行信贷规模的相关性研究

本文首先从理论上深刻剖析了房地产泡沫与银行信贷规模相互之间的作用与传导机制,在此基础上选取2006年-2018年相关指标的年度数据,对房地产泡沫与银行信贷规模进行了图形拟合与周期性波动规律分析,分析发现二者存在极高的契合度。建立房地产泡沫的函数,构建协整方程实证发现银行信贷规模对房地产泡沫的长期弹性系数为0.51,从长期来看银行信贷规模每增加1%,房地产泡沫也相应增加0.51%,进一步建立VAR模型实证发现房地产泡沫与银行信贷规模互为格兰杰因果关系,二者相互影响、相互促进。通过方差分解实证发现银行信贷规模对房地产泡沫的变动具有重要的影响,另一方面,房地产泡沫是影响银行信贷规模变动最主要的因素。     

商业银行市场营销体制依赖及理论模型——基于不同体制条件下的我国商业银行市场营销研究

银行市场营销活动总是在一定的体制背景下并依赖于一定的体制运行的,体制（或制度）是解释商业银行市场营销行为的重要变量。本文首先阐述了体制与制度的内涵及二者间的逻辑联系,阐明体制是制度的一部分;论证了市场营销对体制的依赖,体制要素结构为市场营销提供了资源配置的机制或方式;分析了体制或制度对银行市场营销的重要作用,指出体制是确保银行市场营销活动规范有序并持续获得高效益的根本保障;其后建立了商业银行市场营销的一般理论模型;最后分别以不同体制条件下商业银行市场营销的市场营销目标、营销变量特征、营销体制约束与激励条件的分析为依托,构建并比对了相应的经济转轨时期、市场体制下以及开放经济下商业银行市场营销的理论模型。     

商业行业产权结构调整及其对企业效率影响的实证研究

产权结构的差异影响企业激励约束机制的发挥,影响资源的有效配置及利用程度,并作用于资本和劳动力的投入、生产和管理成本、产出水平、技术进步、规模经济等方面,带来企业投入产出效率的分化。商业行业上市公司的基本趋势是国有型产权结构逐渐转向法人控股型产权结构,其10多年的效率变化实证分析表明,不同产权结构的企业之间存在显著的效率差异;产权结构的调整导致了企业效率的提升。     

《商用车驾驶室乘员保护》试验要求与方法研究

商用车驾驶室乘员保护作为商用车的一项重要安全性能要求越来越受到重视。本文主要介绍了我国正在制修订中的商用车驾驶室乘员保护标准,以及对欧洲现行法规及其修订案、美国法规和瑞典法规的试验要求及方法的对比分析,并对商用车驾驶室乘员保护标准的制订提出了一些参考建议。