National politics and bank default risk in the eurozone

We study the impact of national politics on default risk of eurozone banks as measured by the stock market-based Distance to Default. We find that national electoral cycles, the power of the government as well as the government’s party ideological alignment significantly affect the stability of banks in the eurozone member countries. Moreover, we show that the impact of national politics on bank default risk is more pronounced for large as well as weakly capitalized banks.     

农村金融综合改革试验区:瑞安之探索实践

瑞安是“温州模式”的领头雁，自温州金融综合改革试验区获批之后，积极践行农 村金融改革，为全国金融改革提供经验。本文以农村金融组织与农类企业为对象，分别深入调 查实施主体的改革成效与服务对象的金融服务现状，从三维视角研究分析当前农村金融服务 存在的问题与原因，并以此为依据提出改善农村金融服务的对策与建议。     

DETERMINANTS OF SOVEREIGN BONDS RATINGS: A ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS

Several studies have attempted to deduce the determinants of sovereign bond ratings. In this study, Extreme Bounds Analysis is applied to approximately 30 factors proposed by the literature in order to assess their robustness with a focus on the relative importance that economic and political variables receive in the shaping of the ratings. We find that policies that constrain the public sector are among the most robust. Variables such as rule of law, openness to economic flows, central bank independence, and market friendly policies are found to be more robustly correlated with the ratings than foreign reserves, fiscal deficit, sovereign bond yields, and economic growth.     

Public sector enterprise disinvestment in India: Efficiency gains in a political context

India instituted a program of state enterprise disinvestment in 1991 as part of a sweeping reform initiative. This study analyses the effect of disinvestment on enterprise performance, conditioned on political context as characterized by the ideological leanings of the parties in power at state and central levels. Using stochastic frontier analysis, measures of firm efficiency are generated for 238 central public sector enterprises for the period 1991–1992 to 2010–2011. The relationship between efficiency so measured and disinvestment is then estimated using a two-stage instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity between firm efficiency and selection for disinvestment. Initial disinvestment is associated with substantial efficiency gains, but subsequent disinvestment much less so and the proportion of shares disinvested only loosely so. This may be explained by the transformative effect of initial stock market listing on accountability and profit orientation that is not repeated with further rounds of disinvestment. The effect of disinvestment on performance is stronger if the enterprise is located in a state governed by a right leaning party or one that is ideologically aligned with the party in power at the centre.     

媒体治理、政治关联与研发投资

以深圳证券交易市场2009-2013年创业板上市公司为样本，检验了媒体治理、政治关联与研发投资之间的关系。实证分析结果显示，媒体治理作用越强，公司的研发投资就越多。这表明，媒体能够有效发挥监督治理作用，促进公司创新。进一步分析显示，政治关联对媒体治理与研发投资之间的关系具有明显的反向调节作用。这意味着，政治关联抑制了媒体的治理作用。     

政治关系“力量”与民营企业价值研究:腐败的调节效应

从社会网络理论的强弱关系视角对2012-2014年福布斯中国富豪榜的企业家及其企业进行了政治关系的度量,检验了腐败是否会调节政治关系"力量"对企业价值的影响。研究发现,企业家本身所具有的政治关系对企业价值具有明显的正向影响作用,关系的"力量"越强,对企业价值的正向影响就越大;与此同时,腐败的出现会强化政治关系"力量"对民营企业价值的影响。通过分组验证发现,这种"力量"在腐败程度较高环境下更易对企业价值产生正向影响,但在腐败程度较低的环境中,政治关系对民营企业价值的影响很多时候并不显著。     

企业政治关联对风险投资引入方式的影响

从资金需求方出发，以2009年10月至2016年12月深圳创业板和中小板首次公开上市的公司为样本，实证检验了政治关联对风险投资引入方式的影响，以及激励机制和监督机制这两种公司治理机制的调节作用，得到结论如下：政治关联企业倾向于在发展后期引入风险投资；政治关联企业倾向于选择国有性质、经验丰富以及参与程度高的风险投资机构；激励机制会加强政治关联企业在发展后期引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿；监督机制会减弱政治关联企业在发展后期阶段引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿。结论对拓展政治关联与风险投资领域的理论和实践具有重要启示意义。     

二元经济中劳动力转移理论及其对中国就业增长的启示

失业问题一直以来都是困扰我国经济和社会发展的一个重要社会问题。特别是近年来随着经济增长速度下降,如何促进就业成为一个重要问题。中国经济产业结构正在经历非农化的过程,这决定了就业具有二元经济条件下就业的典型特征,所以回顾二元经济条件下劳动力转移理论对于解决当前我国的失业问题具有重要借鉴意义。     

The influence of political risk on the scope of internationalization of regulated companies: Insights from a Spanish sample

Political risk not only constitutes a threat for multinational enterprises but can also be a source of opportunities. Exposure to and accumulated experience dealing with political risk allows firms to better implement a wide set of political actions such as negotiation of entry conditions, lobbying, litigation, campaign contributions and coalition formation, leading to preferential conditions, reduced environmental uncertainty, reduced transaction costs and increased long-term sustainability to the firm. These advantages facilitate investments in countries with higher and more diverse levels of risk and make political risk to be positively associated with the firm's scope of internationalization. This effect is not homogeneous across firms. Drawing from a sample of 164 Spanish companies with investments in 119 countries, we find that the impact is greater for companies in industrial sectors that are the object of greater governmental regulation than it is for firms in non-regulated manufacturing or service sectors, with less frequent interactions with home and host-country institutions.     

Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?

I consider a risk-sharing game with limited commitment, and study how the discount factor above which perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing in the long run depends on agents׳ risk aversion and the riskiness of their endowment. When agents face no aggregate risk, a mean-preserving spread may destroy the sustainability of perfect risk sharing if each agent׳s endowment may take more than three values. With aggregate risk the same can happen with only two possible endowment realizations. With respect to risk aversion the intuitive comparative statics result holds without aggregate risk, but it holds only under strong assumptions in the presence of aggregate risk. In simple settings with two endowment values I also show that the threshold discount factor co-moves with popular measures of risk sharing.