Conditional interest rate risk and the cross‐section of excess stock returns

Differences in excess stock returns can be rationalized by their sensitivities to conditional interest rate risk. Value stocks are particularly sensitive to upside movements in interest rate growth, while growth stocks react strongly to downside movements in interest rate growth. Consistent with the basic asset pricing theory, the upside interest rate risk commands a negative premium which is higher than the premium associated with the downside interest rate risk. Upside beta pertains its explanatory power after controlling for exposure to regular unconditional interest rate and various sources of financial and conditional macroeconomic risk.     

Complementarity in contests

To facilitate the study of contests in general equilibrium, we examine winner-take-all contests in which the prize is complementary to the effort of the contestants, as inputs are in production functions or final goods in utility functions. We focus on the effects of technological factors and endowments on the effort and the welfare of the contestants. Most of our findings differ considerably from the standard model of contests in which prize and effort are independent. In particular, we find a critical role for the elasticity of substitution between prize and effort. For example, under low elasticities of substitution, a higher prize reduces the effort exerted by the contestants.     

利差、美元指数与跨境资本流动

一般认为跨境资本流动由利差决定,政策制定也强调利差对资本流动的指示意义。但本文发现,中国跨境资本流动历史上主要是由套汇而非套息资本决定,且套汇的显著指标是多边美元指数(DXY)而非人民币兑美元双边汇率,我们把这一现象称之为“中国的跨境资本流动之谜”。我们提出,汇率影响大于利率且多边汇率影响大于双边汇率的原因在于人民币兑美元双边汇率历史上波动幅度较小,及时和充分反映中美基本面的分化还不够。美元指数是市场指标,能够预示人民币兑美元双边汇率的走势,进而驱动资本流动。进一步研究发现,由于中国经济的外溢效应,中美经济基本面的分化不仅决定中美利差,还在很大程度上驱动美欧、美日经济基本面的分化,进而略有时滞地驱动美元指数。因此,中美利差在统计意义上是美元指数的同步甚至略微领先的指标,从这个意义上讲,政策制定仍要关注利差。随着人民币汇率弹性增强,中美利差和美元指数对中国跨境资本流动的解释力都会边际减弱。     

量化宽松货币政策的理论、实践与影响

全球金融危机已使全球经济陷入衰退,为应对危机各国央行不断降息。随着短期利率接近于零,美、日、英等主要国家的央行转而求助于"量化宽松货币政策",即通过购买长期国债等方式向经济注入巨量的流动性。全球大规模采取量化宽松政策在历史上尚属首次,对世界经济和中国经济都将产生难以估量的影响,对此有必要进行深入的分析。为此,本文在对量化宽松货币政策的理论基础进行分析的基础上,进一步研究了日本量化宽松政策实践的经验与教训及其影响,并提出相应的政策建议。     

声誉机制与证券分析师的利益冲突行为研究

理论界关于声誉机制对证券分析师利益冲突行为的影响存在两种截然不同的观点,本文通过构建证券分析师不同情况下的收益矩阵,求解其最大化的期望收益,得出了声誉机制会引发证券分析师的利益冲突行为,而且证券分析师是否选择跟风主要取决于不同情况下的收益的结论.本文认为,可通过建立声誉回报机制来影响证券分析师的收益,促使证券分析师发布独立且公正的投资建议,以消除证券分析师的利益冲突行为.     

基于贝塞尔曲线的中、美、日利率期限结构静态研究

利率期限结构曲线的静态拟合是指,使用不同类型的数学函数近似地描述整条利率期限结构曲线。当前最流行的静态拟合方法是利用B样条曲线来拟合利率曲线。然而,该方法往往受制于阶数的限制,而仅仅停留在3阶。本文通过利用B样条曲线的特殊形式——Bezier曲线拟合了中国、美国、日本国债利率的期限结构曲线,获得了一种可以升阶的拟合方法。同时,将复杂的曲线拟合计算,简化为对散点的聚类分析,取得了中国利率期限结构的模型。     

后金融危机时代信用评级机构的改革出路

美国次贷危机再次暴露信用评级机构的法律监管困境,即现行信用评级机构发行人付费收入模式存在根深蒂固的利益冲突问题。信用评级机构以声誉机制辩解,但存在重大理论缺陷和失败的经验事实证据。现行评级机构法律监管体制没能从根本上解决收入模式利益冲突的矛盾。信用评级机构未来的改革出路亟需解决利益冲突之困,可能的方案包括设立公共评级机构、恢复订购人付费模式、评级机构承担法律责任、政府付费购买评级服务等。     

Power, conflict, and cooperation: The impact of guanxi in Chinese marketing channels

This paper tests the impact of guanxi on behaviors among firms in a Chinese marketing channel. Guanxi is operationalized in this paper as emotional closeness and interactive state. We find that the emotional closeness between channel-boundary personnel of firms has a positive impact on their exercise of noncoercive power, a negative impact on their exercise of coercive power, and a negative impact on the perceived conflict between them. In addition, emotional closeness has an indirect but positive impact on perceived cooperation. Interactive state between the boundary personnel of two firms has a positive impact on a firm exercising noncoercive power and a negative impact on perceived conflict between them. At the same time, it is positively related to a firm exercising coercive power. This shows not only the significant influence of guanxi on a firm's channel behaviors but also the constructive effects of both emotional closeness and interactive state on marketing channel behaviors in China.     

知识产权密集型产业专利联盟运营模式创新研究

基于商务模式创新视角,提出了知识产权密集型产业专利联盟的6种专利运营模式,包括专利谈判模式、专利许可模式、产业合作模式、知识产权与产业发展论坛模式、专利联盟与专利运营中心协同模式以及品牌共享与合作模式。围绕传统型企业与知识产权密集型企业之间的商标诉讼案,剖析了其负面影响,提出了权利冲突的解决方案。最后,从食品产业专利联盟运营层面,提出设立淮安捆蹄地理标志品牌保护推广平台和缘文化传播公共平台。     

Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types

In this paper, we consider the possibility of identifying peaceful mechanisms such as bargaining protocols, international institutions, or norms that can enable countries to settle disputes in the absence of binding contracts. In particular, we are interested in the existence of mechanisms with zero probability of war. Here, we focus on situations where the countries’ payoffs to war are interdependent or correlated and where efficient settlements are not required but subsidies are unavailable. Most importantly, countries can choose to go to war at any time and can use information learned from the negotiation process in making this choice. We characterize the conditions under which no peaceful mechanisms exist and discuss how weakening our war consistency condition can change this result. We thank Massimo Morelli, Adam Meirowitz, Hein Goemans and two anonymous reviewers for helpful advice and comments and John Duggan and Dan Bernhardt for encouraging this direction of inquiry.