Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions

McKelvey and Page [McKelvey, R., Page, T., 1986. Common knowledge, consensus and aggregate information. Econometrica 54, 109–127] generalized Aumann's [Aumann, R.J., 1976. Agreeing to disagree. Ann. Statist. 4, 1236–1239] agreement theorem to the case where agents have common knowledge of a statistic of their posterior probabilities of some event. They showed that if individuals have the same prior, and if the statistic satisfies a stochastic regularity condition, then common knowledge of it implies equality of all posteriors. We show a similar result in a more general setting where agents have common knowledge of a statistic of their individual decisions. Decisions can be posteriors as well as discrete actions such as buy or sell. We show that if the decision rule followed by individuals is balanced union consistent, and if the statistic of individual decisions is exhaustive, then common knowledge of it implies equality of all decisions. We give an example showing that neither Cave's [Cave, J., 1983. Learning to agree. Econ. Letters 12, 147–152] union consistency condition nor Parikh and Krasucki's [Parikh, R., Krasucki, P., 1990. Communication, consensus and knowledge. J. Econ. Theory 52, 178–189] convexity condition is sufficient to guarantee the result.     

Current validity of the Delphi method in social sciences

The Delphi method is a popular technique for forecasting and an aid in decision-making based on the opinions of experts, which has been in existence for over half a century. This work evaluates its methodology and reviews its validity in the present day, especially in the area of Social Sciences. Three recent applications in this field are also explained, professional in nature, which have some characteristics that are not frequent with respect to other Delphi studies published. The main aim of two of these studies was to provide input for economic or statistical quantitative models, using the judgement of expert groups, while the third study aimed to analyse a complex social reality by means of a Policy Delphi in order to obtain reliable information before taking a policy decision. These applications highlight how this technique may be adapted to different social realities and requirements, making a positive contribution to social progress, provided it is applied with the necessary methodological rigour and with a good knowledge of the social medium in which it is being applied. Finally, there is an explanation of a number of lessons learned from the theory and aforementioned experiences, which may contribute to the successful outcome of a Delphi exercise.     

Redefining Beijing Consensus: ten economic principles

We argue that, owing to the conspicuous failure of Washington Consensus-guided reforms in most parts of the developing world in the 1990s and the outbreak of the current global financial crisis, the Washington Consensus, as a general term of neoliberal free market economic thinking, has been withering. In the meantime, the Chinese economic model has gained wide recognition and praise worldwide. Joshua C. Ramo coined the term ‘Beijing Consensus’ as an alternative approach to economic development for developing nations. There has been hot debate on the notion of a Beijing Consensus. We argue that even though there are some problems in Ramo's original definition of Beijing Consensus, we should not reject this notion altogether. Instead, we should try to come up with better conceptualizations of this term. In this paper, we sum up 10 general principles of the Chinese development model as our new definition of the Beijing Consensus.     

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERM 'WASHINGTON CONSENSUS'

Abstract.  The term 'Washington Consensus', as Williamson conceived it, was the lowest common denominator of the reforms that he judged 'Washington' could agree were required in Latin America. The term has evolved to denote a different set of policies from those initially conceived. This paper investigates the different versions and interpretations of this controversial term and assesses whether the term itself is suitable and viable or slowly becoming irrelevant and obsolete. Most importantly, the evolution of the term mirrors the evolution of economic thought on economic development for nearly the last two decades.     

Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away from the proposer to the rest of the players. Moreover, an alternative informational structure where these solution concepts can be implemented without imposing any conditions of the transferable utility game is discussed as well. The authors thank Yukihiko Funaki, Andreu Mas-Colell, David Pérez-Castrillo and Jana Vyrastekova for helpful discussions. We also appreciate the comments from the seminar and conference participants at Keele University, Tilburg University, University of Haifa, University of Warwick, CORE at Louvain-la-Neuve, Catholic University Leuven, Pablo de Olavide University in Seville, University of Vigo, the 2006 Annual Conference of the Israeli Mathematical Union in Neve Ilan, Israel, and the 61st European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Vienna, Austria in 2006. In particular, we are grateful to the associate editor and an anonymous referee. Their valuable comments and constructive suggestions contributed to a significant improvement of the paper. Wettstein acknowledges the financial support of the Pinchas Sapir Center for Development in Tel Aviv University.     

WTO的规则形成机制及其改革

规则的形成机制是世界贸易组织运作的基础。目前WTO的规则形成机制没有公正的反映发展中国家对公平制度的要求,具体表现在WTO的决策机制和谈判程序上。公正规则的缺失使权力渗透在WTO规则形成机制中。随着对规则形成机制的越来越关注,WTO也在内部建立起相应的原则和实践。虽然WTO的规则形成机制趋于成熟,但到目前的运作经验证明本质上它仍然是基于权力的。在全球化不可逆转的深入背景下,必须要进一步完善有关协商一致原则的适用程序、提高其透明度,在此基础上建立成熟的谈判执行机构,同时将对发展中国家的技术援助和能力建设制度化。     

不同宪政秩序下的转轨路径与转轨绩效--"北京共识"的内涵与应用

文章从对"北京共识"的认识出发,认为对于发展中的转轨经济国家,转轨中的制度选择对转轨的绩效至关重要,各国应该结合各自的国情,走适合自己的发展道路.文章设计了一个公共选择模型以解释各国间转轨效益的差异.转轨的成本不仅取决于经济考虑,更取决于政治的因素.政治选择影响新制度安排的效率,因此与转轨成本正相关.中国在转轨中选择了宪政平滑变迁的方式,这可在短期内化解转轨的经济体制成本和政治体制成本问题.     

Aggregating Incomplete Lists of Journal Rankings: An Application to Academic Accounting Journals*

We introduce a branch‐and‐cut algorithm to aggregate published journal rankings based on subsets of the accounting literature in order to create a consensus ranking. The aggregate ranking allows specialist and regional journals, which may only be ranked in a limited number of studies, to be placed with respect to each other and with respect to the generalist journals that are usually included in ranking studies. The approach we develop is a significant advance over ad hoc approaches to aggregating journal rankings that have appeared in the literature and may provide a theoretically sound and replicable basis for further exploration of the concept of journal quality and the stability of journal rankings over time and ranking methods.     

Risk premium or irrational expectations? An investigation into the causes of forward discount bias across 27 developed and developing economies forward rates

This study investigates the causes of forward discount bias in 27 forward rates for the period 2007–2016. First, it analyzes the forward discount bias across two horizons: 3-month and 12-month; across two sub-periods: financial crisis and non-crisis; and across two country groups: developed and developing. The regression results show that forward discount bias is present and significant, but has become smaller compared to many earlier studies. In general, 12-month forward discount is less biased compared to the 3-month. The study confirms that during the non-crisis period, developing country forward discount is less biased compared to the developed country across both the horizons. The crisis period has impacted the magnitude of the bias. For the developed country, the bias is higher during the crisis period compared to the non-crisis period at the 3-month horizon but lower at the 12-month horizon. Developing country forward discount is less biased during the crisis period compared to the non-crisis period at the 3-month horizon, but slightly more biased at the 12-month horizon. Second, the study decomposes the bias into two components: irrational expectations and risk premium. The results show that both irrationality and time varying risk premium are present in the bias. However, the irrationality component plays a minor role in the 3-month forward discount bias, but plays a major role in the 12-month forward discount bias. Irrationality is high during the crisis period for both the country groups. The risk premium component of the bias is highly significant across both the periods, country groups and horizons, and thus, plays a major role in the overall bias. Further, the non-parametric tests of comparison of statistical significance of the beta coefficient values between country groups, periods and horizons indicate that many differences are statistically significant supporting our conclusions.     

The 2018 Clarence Ayres Scholar An Institutional Riposte to the “After the Washington Consensus”

The Washington Consensus as conceived in 1989 by John Williamson, the initiator of the term, was the foundation of the mainstream perspective on international development. The Washington Consensus consisted of a set of ten policies to be imposed through conditionality by international financial institutions on distressed developing countries. The vast criticism that ensued brought a set of policies in the form of the After the Washington Consensus (hereafter the AWC) in 2003, which designated a “new” set of policy reforms and conditionalities for developing countries. The aim of this article is to contrast the two sets of controversial policies, the original Washington Consensus and AWC, to an alternative perspective of international development based on an institutionalist approach.