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11.
Sandra Rousseau 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2007,32(1):17-36
Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this shortage of resources is targeting and
this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the
inspection policy of the environmental agency for the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium). We distinguish between three
types of inspections and use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a non-random way. Even
though the agency solves most environmental problems, it can increase compliance by using the deterrence effect of more stringent
inspections and sanctions.
相似文献
12.
Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma.
In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to
reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge
sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties.
We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also
punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease
the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly
lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation.
We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University
of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson,
Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful
comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available
from the authors. 相似文献
13.
John?K.?StranlundEmail author Christopher?Costello Carlos?A.?Chávez 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,28(2):181-204
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871. 相似文献
14.
Publishers, artists, and copyright enforcement 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates whether and to what extent there is a conflict of interest between artists and their publishers, regarding to whether and to what degree illegal distributions of their copyrighted recordings should be prevented. This conflict arises because artists also earn their profit from other market activities such as giving live performances, in addition to their share of profits from sales of their copyrighted recordings via the publishers. 相似文献
15.
In this paper, we aim to include rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of
policy instruments. We use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry. The model includes discrete
abatement functions and costly monitoring and enforcement. The case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences
in abatement costs and compliance decisions between firms. We compare combinations of regulatory instruments (emission taxes,
emission standards and technology standards) and enforcement instruments (criminal fines, civil fines and transaction offers).
We show that the inclusion of information, monitoring and enforcement costs indeed alters the relative cost efficiency of
the different instruments. 相似文献
16.
国有产权转让中的机制设计--基于企业职工的合约选择 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
在国有产权转让过程中,关键是要克服国有产权本身所具有的不利于进行市场交易的特性,使其交易更符合市场原则。市场本身就是由一个个的合约所构成,是否选择签约及合约的方式是由每个参与者自己作出的。因此,国有产权转让的机制设计就是要尽量使相关的利益主体有权作出对自己有利的合约选择,并对自己的行为负责。 相似文献
17.
陈银娥 《中南财经政法大学学报》2003,(3):6-10
在劳动力市场上 ,劳动者和厂商未来的生产率都具有不确定性。早期劳动合同或签约由于一方面可以保证劳动者被排除在劳动力市场之外 ,同时也保证了厂商被排除在事后职位市场的风险之外 ,因而厂商和劳动者具有签订早期劳动合同的激励。尽管早期劳动合同或签约存在成本 ,但只要事前利益超过事后无效率的损失 ,那么早期劳动合同或签约就会发生。对于那些不能获得完全市场保险的人来说 ,签约是一种帕累托最优。早期劳动合同或签约是市场失灵的一种证明 ,早期劳动合同是一种不完全合同 ,也是一种非正式合同 ,它是对契约理论的一个发展。 相似文献
18.
This paper investigates if the strength of the legal system impacts on the trade in insurance and financial services in the high-income OECD and developing countries. Our findings reveal a statistically significant positive correlation of rule of law and regulatory quality with the exports and imports of insurance and financial services. Our empirical findings also reveal a negative and statistically significant correlation of contract enforcement with the exports and imports of insurance and financial services. We conclude that strengthening the rule of law and contract enforcement mechanisms can facilitate higher levels of trade in insurance and financial services. 相似文献
19.
《Review of Economic Dynamics》2014,17(2):262-286
An important determinant of informality in a country is its tax enforcement capacity, which some authors argue further distorts the decisions of firms and creates inefficiency. In this paper, I assess the quantitative effect of incomplete tax enforcement on aggregate output and productivity using a dynamic general equilibrium framework. I calibrate the model using data for Mexico, where the informal sector is large. I then investigate the effects of improving enforcement. I find that under complete enforcement, Mexico's labor productivity and output would be 19% higher under perfect competition and 34% higher under monopolistic competition. The source of this gain is the removal of the distortions induced by incomplete enforcement of taxes. These distortions affect the economy in three ways: by reducing the capital–labor ratios of informal establishments; by allowing low-productive entrepreneurs to enter; and by misallocating resources towards low-productive establishments. As a result, TFP and capital accumulation are reduced, and hence output. I decompose the gains following the guidelines of five leading papers in the literature of resource misallocation across plants. I isolate the effects of pure factor misallocation, distorted occupational choices, capital accumulation, and complementarities. I also study marginal improvements in enforcement and find that there is an inverted-U relationship between the size of the informal sector and output. This reflects the fact that improving enforcement entails a tradeoff: more taxes vs. fewer distortions. 相似文献
20.
Giovanni Favara Erwan Morellec Enrique Schroth Philip Valta 《Journal of Financial Economics》2017,123(1):22-41
We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces shareholder–debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms in 41 countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics. Consistent with our model, we find that the relation between debt enforcement and firms’ investment and risk depends on the firm-specific probability of default. A differences-in-differences analysis of firms’ investment and risk taking in response to bankruptcy reforms that make debt more renegotiable confirms the cross-country evidence. 相似文献