Sources of gains from international portfolio diversification

This paper looks at the determinants of country and industry specific factors in international portfolio returns using a sample of forty eight countries and thirty nine industries over the last three decades. Country factors have remained relatively stable over the sample period while industry factors have significantly increased during the last decade and dropped again since 2000. The importance of industry and country factors is correlated with measures of economic and financial international integration and development. We find that financial market globalization is the main driving force behind the changes in relative magnitude of the different shocks. Country factors are smaller for countries integrated in world financial markets and have declined as the degree of financial integration and the number of countries pursuing financial liberalization has increased. Higher international financial integration within an industry increases the importance of industry factors in explaining returns. Economic integration of production also helps in explaining returns. Countries with a more specialized production activity have higher country shocks.     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

Technological diversity,related diversification,and firm performance

Previous findings that related diversification creates value have been called into question over concerns about methodology and measures. Reviewing existing theory to consider how a firm's knowledge base interacts with its product market activity, I address several of these concerns by creating a measure of technological diversity based on citation‐weighted patents. The measure indicates a firm's opportunity for corporate diversification based on economies of scope in valuable knowledge assets, is defined for both single‐ and multibusiness firms, and is not correlated with more fundamental aspects of diversification, such as the number of businesses in the corporate portfolio. Evidence from a large sample of firms shows the positive relationship between diversification based on technological diversity and market‐based measures of performance, controlling for R&D intensity and capital intensity as further indicators of the type of assets underlying diversification. Results hold when controlling for the endogeneity of diversification and performance in a cross‐sectional sample or when controlling for unobserved factors using panel data. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board Members and Company Value

This essay surveys research about the value of individual members of boards of directors. When directors join or exit corporate boards, company stock prices respond, often in magnitudes of 1% of firm value or more. Related research shows that when a significant event impacts the stock price of one company, the effects are transmitted to other companies that share board members in common with the primary company. Share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a director’s occupation, independence, and professional qualifications. Together, this evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-productive.     

Inter‐temporal economies of scope,organizational modularity,and the dynamics of diversification

The question of whether corporations add value beyond that created by individual businesses has engendered much debate in recent years. Some of this debate has focused on the pros and cons of related vs. unrelated diversification. A standard explanation of the benefits of related diversification has to do with the ability to obtain intra‐temporal economies of scope from contemporaneous sharing of resources by related businesses within the firm. In contrast, this paper deals with inter‐temporal economies of scope that firms achieve by redeploying resources and capabilities between related businesses over time, as firms exit some markets while entering others. The transfer of resources due to market exit distinguishes our treatment of inter‐temporal economies of scope from standard intra‐temporal economies of scope. In addition, these inter‐temporal economies can benefit from a decentralized and modular organizational structure. This ability to obtain inter‐temporal economies of scope via organizational modularity and recombination suggests that corporations do not necessarily need a high degree of coordination between business units in order to benefit from a strategy of related diversification. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Diversification and Capital Structure: Some International Evidence

This study examines the effects of international and product diversification on capital structure with 232 firms from 30 countries. Results for the full sample show that international diversification is negatively related to financial leverage, but further analyses indicate that this is mainly attributable to US firms. For non-US firms, we fail to find a significant relationship. Results also show that product diversification is positively related to financial leverage, indicating that such diversification allows firms to reduce their risks, thereby enabling firms to carry higher debt levels.     

Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany

Recent empirical work shows evidence for higher valuation of firms in countries with a better legal environment. We investigate whether differences in the quality of firm‐level corporate governance also help to explain firm performance in a cross‐section of companies within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for German public firms, we document a positive relationship between governance practices and firm valuation. There is also evidence that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with firm‐level corporate governance, if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of capital. An investment strategy that bought high‐CGR firms and shorted low‐CGR firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample period.     

Industry aspects of takeovers and divestitures: Evidence from the UK

This paper examines takeover and divestiture activity at the industry level for the population of UK firms over the period 1986–2000. Consistent with US research, takeovers in the UK cluster both across industries and over time. The evidence for divestitures indicates clustering across industries only. The paper further investigates whether broad and specific industry shocks (e.g., growth, free cash flow, concentration, deregulation, foreign competition, technology, stock market performance) explain takeover and divestiture clustering at the industry level. The results suggest that broad shocks increase (decrease) the likelihood of takeovers (divestitures), although not significantly for takeovers. Specific industry shocks that increase the likelihood of takeover activity include low growth, the threat of foreign competition and high stock market performance. For divestitures, high industry concentration and deregulation increase activity. Little evidence is found for deregulation as a significant factor in explaining takeover activity.     

Accounting development in Pakistan

This paper examines the origins, growth, and the development of accounting practices and disclosures in Pakistan and the factors that influenced them. We trace the early days of accounting in the Indian subcontinent and discuss the British colonial influence. We examine the development of accounting in Pakistan through three eras: Independence through 1971, Post 1971-1984, and 1984 to present. We describe how the colonial past and later the international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund played key roles in shaping accounting and reporting practices of the country. Pakistan's adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards as national standards has not led to improvement in the quality of financial reporting. We argue that Pakistan, even though classified as a common law country in literature, exhibits most of the properties of code law countries. We conclude that lack of investor protection (e.g., minority rights protection, insider-trading protection), judicial inefficiencies, and weak enforcement mechanisms are more critical to explaining the state of financial reporting in Pakistan than are cultural factors. This insight has policy implications for developing countries that are making efforts to improve the quality of the financial reporting of their business entities.     

Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls,culture and tail risk

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.