信息不对称下的几个经济学实验

实验方法受到经济学界的重视,不对称信息条件下的实验方法研究具有重要现实意义。笔者探讨了若干在不对称信息条件下的经济学实验,包括名誉的作用、信号传递等重要实验,认为不对称信息下的实验的方法及其研究思路值得我国经济学者借鉴和深入研究。     

世界大型事件活动对旅游业的影响及对中国的启示——以历届奥运会和韩国世界杯为例

大型事件旅游活动对举办地具有深远的经济意义和社会意义。以历届奥运会和2002年韩国世界杯足球赛为实例,简要分折世界大型事件活动对举办国旅游业发展的影响及对中国的启示。     

Gradualism in free trade agreements: a theoretical justification

A notable feature of many recent trade agreements is the gradual, rather than immediate, reduction of trade barriers. In this paper we model trade liberalization as a cooperative relationship that evolves gradually in a non-cooperative environment. We show that specialization, capacity irreversibility and the development of trade-partner specific capital increase the benefit of continuing the liberalizing relationship and decrease, over time, the lowest obtainable self-enforcing tariff. By increasing the penalty of future defection, sunk costs ensure that the self-enforcing trading relationship starts slowly, but once in progress the level of cooperation continues to improve.     

旅游市场中的逆向选择和重复博弈——以海南旅游业为例

由于旅游服务产品质量的信息在游客和旅游企业之间的分布是不对称的,这就使得劣质旅游企业对优质旅游企业的逆向淘汰成为可能.本文以海南旅游业为例,分阶段对旅游市场中的逆向选择和重复博弈问题进行了探讨,系统论证了劣质市场均衡出现、维护和强化的条件和成因.     

供应链成员竞合博弈分析

根据博弈论原理,分析供应链成员间的竞合关系,认为在构建供应链的过程中,成员是基于合作博弈来选择合作伙伴的;而形成"双赢"的利益机制是供应链结构变迁和优化的动因,由此提出若干供应链成员合作策略。     

Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly with foreign penetration

We characterize the endogenous competition structure (in prices or quantities) in a differentiated duopoly between a public firm that maximizes domestic welfare and a private firm that can be owned by domestic or foreign investors. The market for which they compete can be domestic or integrated: in the first case Bertrand competition emerges endogenously and in the second case Cournot competition can emerge if the fraction of domestic consumers in the integrated market is low enough. We also determine the optimal degree of foreign penetration showing the optimality of a partial foreign ownership. Finally, we extend the model to increasing marginal cost confirming the robustness of the results.     

International duopoly with overseas production and strategic trade policies

This paper examines the strategic export policies in a reciprocal market model of an international Cournot duopoly where two firms in domestic and foreign countries reciprocally supply their products to other countries through overseas production as well as export. It also considers the fact that the firms must incur export costs in addition to production costs. Thus, this paper shows, among others, that the effects of export policies on firms' output and export choices do not depend on the slopes of firms' reaction curves. It is also shown that firms' total outputs are independent of the export policies, and the optimal domestic and foreign export subsidies are zero (laissez-faire).     

网络衔接障碍与消解——基于古诺均衡模型的现代交通产业关系研究

在我国构建以高铁为主导的新型综合交通运输体系进程中,高铁、航空与公路客运等交通网络之间的换乘衔接问题成为提高交通系统整体效率的制约点,也是影响交通服务消费者效用的主要因素。该问题一直未能获得行业管理者与相关企业重视,造成资源配置浪费。本文以价格加成的形式来量化消费者换乘障碍,借助博弈模型分析不同的交通运营商对解决换乘障碍问题的内在激励。从政府规制的角度提出鼓励运营商主动进行投资以减少换乘障碍的激励相容设计方案,并指出规制者应适当给予补贴作为引导资金,在交通基础设施增量受限的条件下盘活存量以促进综合运输网络的融合发展。     

Unfolding Social Hierarchies

Consider a large population of finitely-lived agents organized into n different hierarchical levels. Every period, all those placed at each level are randomly matched to play a given symmetric game. Based on the resulting outcome, a ρ-fraction of agents who (within their own level) attain the highest payoffs are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and choose irreversibly the strategy to be played for the rest of their life. This choice is made, with some noise, by imitating one of the strategies adopted at the highest level.  In this setup, the unique long-run behavior of the system is fully characterized for the whole class of 2×2 coordination games and two alternative variations of the model. The results crucially depend on the key “institutional” parameters ρ and n. In particular, it is shown that inefficient behavior prevails in the long run (even when risk-dominated) if promotion is only mildly selective—high ρ—and the social system is quite hierarchical—large n. In a stylized manner, these parameter conditions may be viewed as reflecting a sort of institutional deficiency that impairs economic performance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C73, D72.