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111.
Ya‐chin Wang Leonard F.s. Wang 《The South African journal of economics. Suid-afrikaanse tydskrif vir ekonomie》2009,77(4):577-590
This paper aims to examine the equivalence of competition mode in a vertically differentiated product market with the relative performance delegation. It demonstrates the equivalence of product quality and social welfare in this delegation game, irrespective of modes of product competition. In addition, in a three‐stage game of quality‐delegation‐quantity (or price), it shows that the delegation coefficient is different between high‐quality and low‐quality firms in an asymmetric vertical differentiated model, and a high‐quality firm makes better use of the delegation than a low‐quality firm. 相似文献
112.
Grammar should be studied by examining living speech rather than by analyzing written documents.By providing grammar in context,in an implicit manner. 相似文献
113.
This article argues that lessons on how to achieve a sustainable financial system can be learnt from the work done on sustainable commons (on common‐pool resources – CPRs – where there is no ‘tragedy of the commons’). Existing approaches to financial regulation may not give proper attention to available solutions. The article proposes that innovative solutions could be tested using experimental methods commonly used in CPRs: repeat run, feedback driven games. 相似文献
114.
本文采用结构访谈法,以3-6岁的120名幼儿为研究被试,探讨了幼儿自我保护能力的现状。结果表明,从总体上来看,幼儿自我保护能力良好,从各维度上来看,幼儿的游戏活动自护、意外防护能力较好,生活活动自护能力次之,心理自护能力较差,城乡差异和年级差异在某些维度上也是存在差异的;中班是进行幼儿自我保护教育的关键时期。 相似文献
115.
Seung Han Yoo 《Economic Theory》2008,37(2):267-280
This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur’s type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat,
no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.
I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar for valuable guidance and encouragement. I am also grateful to Kaushik Basu, Fernando
Vega-Redondo, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the international meeting for public economic theory (PET07) and
especially Ani Guerdjikova and Roy Radner for helpful comments. Thanks are due to Hideaki Goto and Eunkyeong Lee for useful
conversation. 相似文献
116.
A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division. 相似文献
117.
This paper tests a learning-based model of strategic teaching in repeated games with incomplete information. The repeated game has a long-run player whose type is unknown to a group of short-run players. The proposed model assumes a fraction of ‘short-run’ players follow a one-parameter learning model (self-tuning EWA). In addition, some ‘long-run’ players are myopic while others are sophisticated and rationally anticipate how short-run players adjust their actions over time and “teach” the short-run players to maximize their long-run payoffs. All players optimize noisily. The proposed model nests an agent-based quantal-response equilibrium (AQRE) and the standard equilibrium models as special cases. Using data from 28 experimental sessions of trust and entry repeated games, including 8 previously unpublished sessions, the model fits substantially better than chance and much better than standard equilibrium models. Estimates show that most of the long-run players are sophisticated, and short-run players become more sophisticated with experience. 相似文献
118.
International monetary policy cooperation in economies with centralized wage setting 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Henrik Jensen 《Open Economies Review》1993,4(3):269-285
We consider a standard two-country monetary policy game with fixed nominal wage contracts. The policy regime is either non-cooperative or cooperative. We extend conventional analyses by deriving the natural rate of employment endogenously through monopoly union decision-making. As unions attempt to affect the real exchange rate, wages are set inefficiently high. Such attempts are shown to be strongest under monetary cooperation. Therefore, in comparison with non-cooperation, employment is lowest, and, in effect, consumer price inflation is highest, under monetary cooperation, i.e., international monetary cooperation is disadvantageous. 相似文献
119.
The Department of Justice recent case against Microsoft is that it should not be allowed to aggressively maintain control over the internet browser market with the objective of preventing the internet from becoming the platform that could ultimately destroy Microsoft's operating system market. The aim of this paper is not to attack the Department of Justice case. Rather, it is to argue that for consumers one monopoly dominating both the operating system and applications is better than two separate monopolies. In our model we integrate Cournot's theory of two goods that are jointly used in the production of a third composite good with the fixed-proportion model. Utilizing our model we develop a possible explanation for Microsoft's actions – protection of its monopoly profits in the operating systems package market. Additionally we show that the price of the final product is lower if one firm monopolizes all markets. Consequently, the ordered split-up of Microsoft by Judge Thomas P. Jackson, aiming at creating two separate companies, one that will produce the windows and the other the operating systems, will harm consumers. 相似文献
120.
In network industry under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we examine a model when owners of firms hire biased managers who have incorrect market demand. Contrast to previous studies, we show that (i) regardless of the strength of network externalities when consumers form the responsive and passive expectations, owners realize strategic advantage by hiring biased managers to be more aggressive under Cournot and Bertrand competition, (ii) firms prefer facing passive expectations for the weak network externalities and vice versa for the strong network exteranlities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, (iii) if the network size is sufficiently large, then the prisoner's dilemma that firms hire aggressive managers no longer exists under both competition modes. As with no delegation case, we obtain the different rankings of firms' profit depending on both network externalities and forming of expectations under Cournot and Bertrand competition. 相似文献