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121.
In network industry under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we examine a model when owners of firms hire biased managers who have incorrect market demand. Contrast to previous studies, we show that (i) regardless of the strength of network externalities when consumers form the responsive and passive expectations, owners realize strategic advantage by hiring biased managers to be more aggressive under Cournot and Bertrand competition, (ii) firms prefer facing passive expectations for the weak network externalities and vice versa for the strong network exteranlities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, (iii) if the network size is sufficiently large, then the prisoner's dilemma that firms hire aggressive managers no longer exists under both competition modes. As with no delegation case, we obtain the different rankings of firms' profit depending on both network externalities and forming of expectations under Cournot and Bertrand competition. 相似文献
122.
论述法制环境与奥运的密切关系。良好的法制环境能促进奥运会的成功与发展,成功的奥运呼唤法制环境的保护和支持。法制建设是国家政治文明程度的表现,是依法治国的基础。在法制建设中要紧紧围绕“绿色奥运、科技奥运、人文奥运”的三个理念。奥运会是一场大型的体育盛会,同时又是一项庞大的系统工程。通过举办2008年奥运会。增强国人的法制意识,完善中国法律制度,制定与之相配套的法律法规是成功举办奥运会不容回避的问题。法制环境建设既是北京新奥运的有机组成部分,又是北京新奥运的重要保障。 相似文献
123.
G. Kossioris M. Plexousakis A. Xepapadeas A. de Zeeuw 《Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control》2011,35(11):1868-1879
Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state-dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes. 相似文献
124.
125.
This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms—institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy‐making authority at the time. A rule‐of‐succession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t + 1 are, themselves, chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t. Two sources of conflict—class conflict, arising from differences in wealth, and ideological conflict, arising from differences in preferences—are examined. In each case, we characterize the unique Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the associated dynamic political game, and show that public decision‐making authority evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward the public good. We then examine rules‐of‐succession when ideology and wealth exhibit correlation. 相似文献
126.
Julide Yazar 《Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination》2006,1(2):171-187
Many cases of strategic interaction between agents involve a continuous set of choices. It is natural to model these problems as continuous space games. Consequently, the population of agents playing the game will be represented with a density function defined over the continuous set of strategy choices. Simulating evolutionary dynamics on continuous strategy spaces is a challenging problem. The classic approach of discretizing the strategy space is ineffective for multidimensional strategy spaces. We present a principled approach to simulation of adaptive dynamics in continuous space games using sequential Monte Carlo methods. Sequential Monte Carlo methods use a set of weighted random samples, also named particles to represent density functions over multidimensional spaces. Sequential Monte Carlo methods provide computationally efficient ways of computing the evolution of probability density functions. We employ resampling and smoothing steps to prevent particle degeneration problem associated with particle estimates. The resulting algorithm can be interpreted as an agent based simulation with elements of natural selection, regression to mean and mutation. We illustrate the performance of the proposed simulation technique using two examples: continuous version of the repeated prisoner dilemma game and evolution of bidding functions in first-price closed-bid auctions. 相似文献
127.
In this paper we construct a simple model of global warming which captures a number of key features of the global warming
problem: (i) environmental damages are related to the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; (ii) the global commons
nature of the problem means that these are strategic interactions between the emissions policies of the governments of individual
nation states; (iii) there is uncertainty about the extent of the future damages that will be incurred by each country from
any given level of concentration of greenhouse gases but there is the possibility that at a future date better information
about the true extent of environmental damages may become available; an important aspect of the problem is the extent to which
damages in different countries may be correlated. In the first part of the paper we consider a simple model with two symmetric
countries and show that the value of perfect information is an increasing function of the correlation between damages in the
two countries in both the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. However, while the value of perfect information is always
non-negative in the cooperative equilibrium, in the non-cooperative equilibrium there is a critical value of the correlation
coefficient below which the value of perfect information will be negative. In the second part of the paper we construct an
empirical model of global warming distinguishing between OECD and non-OECD countries and show that in the non-cooperative
equilibrium the value of perfect information for OECD countries is negative when the correlation coefficient between environmental
damages for OECD and non-OECD countries is negative. The implications of these results for international agreements are discussed. 相似文献
128.
Luca Lambertini 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2005,15(4):443-465
I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second, the leader invests more than the follower; as a result, in the steady state, the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower’s. Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.JEL Classification:
C61, C73, D43, D92, L13Financial support within the project The post-entry performance of firms: technology, growth and survival lead by Enrico Santarelli, co-financed by the University of Bologna and MIUR, is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Uwe Cantner, Roberto Cellini, Roberto Golinelli, Helen Louri, Enrico Santarelli, Antonello Scurcu, Peter Thompson, two anonymous referees and the audience at the final workshop of the project (Bologna, November 22-23, 2002) for useful comments and discussion. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
129.
The formula given by McLennan [The mean number of real roots of a multihomogeneous system of polynomial equations, Amer. J. Math. 124 (2002) 49–73] is applied to the mean number of Nash equilibria of random two-player normal form games in which the two players have M and N pure strategies respectively. Holding M fixed while N→∞, the expected number of Nash equilibria is approximately . Letting M=N→∞, the expected number of Nash equilibria is , where is a constant, and almost all equilibria have each player assigning positive probability to approximately 31.5915 percent of her pure strategies. 相似文献
130.
不完全信息下跨国兼并模型分析 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
本文主要通过对不完全信息跨国兼并模型的分析,发现如果没有政府干预,外国企业只要具有成本上的优势,跨国兼并的发生是不可避免的。其中不完全信息并不是市场实现兼并的障碍,而政府在维护、平衡市场兼并效率和社会福利的关系方面中扮演着重要角色。 相似文献