人员工作分配的定量优化方法研究

近年来资源优化问题受到各方面的普遍关注,作为生产要素中最具有活力的人才资源也存在资源优化分配的问题。文章以残奥会工作人员的工作岗位科学分配为例,采用模糊数学方法进行数据处理,运用运筹学方法进行优化,取得了良好的效果,达到了科学优化、节约成本的目的,为组织决策者提供了一种可供参考的方法。     

房地产市场价格博弈分析

我国房地产业发展迅速,房地产市场的发展对促进国民经济发展做出了突出贡献,房地产业已成为我国重要支柱产业之一.我国房地产市场现状是博弈得出结果的一个竞技场.文章从房地产销售过程中主要参与者的价格博弈分析,探究房地产市场交易价格形成的过程,指出中国房地产业的现状是由社会几股力量反复博弈的结果,其实质是不同社会力量之间的利益之争.     

Stackelberg leadership in a dynamic duopoly with stochastic capital accumulation

I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second, the leader invests more than the follower; as a result, in the steady state, the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower’s. Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.JEL Classification: C61, C73, D43, D92, L13Financial support within the project The post-entry performance of firms: technology, growth and survival lead by Enrico Santarelli, co-financed by the University of Bologna and MIUR, is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Uwe Cantner, Roberto Cellini, Roberto Golinelli, Helen Louri, Enrico Santarelli, Antonello Scurcu, Peter Thompson, two anonymous referees and the audience at the final workshop of the project (Bologna, November 22-23, 2002) for useful comments and discussion. The usual disclaimer applies.     

INSTITUTIONS AND (SHORT-RUN) MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Abstract. This paper reviews the growing interest in institutions. It argues that the explanation for this interest is a fresh awareness of how institutions affect economic performance. This connection arises because many economic interaction take the form of one or other of three 'classic' games (prisoners' dilemma, coordination and chicken) and the outcome in these games (and hence performance of the economy) is influenced by the institutional context of these interactions. The paper provides a detailed illustration of this argument with a survey of the literature which relates unemployment performances to the institutions of wage setting in OECD countries.     

Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988

Constitutional assemblies are a common feature of many democratic transitions. However, the goal of coordinating constitutional choice would seem nearly impossible when assemblies are comprised of highly fragmented and volatile political parties. Building on Knight’s bargaining model, this article argues that the main challenge to coordination in unstable party systems is the procedural disequilibrium that results from incomplete information over breakdown payoffs. The likelihood of compromise in such circumstances is a function of the ideologies that frame constitutional choice and inform coalition-building. Thus, unstable party systems are not chaotic, although they may be deeply conflict-laden. These issues are illustrated empirically via the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which demonstrates the possibilities for a stable constitutional order emerging from a fragmented and volatile party system.

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.     

Commitment and observability in a contracting environment

This paper examines leader-follower games where a leader must purchase an essential input from a price-setting supplier in order to take an action. We show that equilibrium outcomes when the followers perfectly observe the leaders' actions cannot be approximated by mixed equilibrium outcomes of the game where followers imperfectly observe the leaders' actions, i.e. they are not accessible. Accessibility fails since in a pure strategy equilibrium, a supplier makes positive profits; however in an equilibrium where a leader randomizes, supplier profits must be zero. Our result follows from a generalized indifference principle that mixed strategies must satisfy in economic environments. While supplier profits cannot be approximated, player action profiles are accessible. Our results also apply to games with costly observation.