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921.
922.
客户行为干预是建立在市场营销学理论基础上,通过对企业的客户进行细分,然后针对企业成熟或者目标客户,开展各种客户行为干预,改变客户的既定行为模式,以达到企业预定目标的一种市场营销方式。网络游戏公司可以客户应用行为干预技术来维系企业的老客户,当客户发生流失行为时,及时地对客户行为进行干预,能够为企业留住大批优质客户,并从他们身上继续获取价值。 相似文献
923.
网络游戏产业链与商业模式分析 总被引：3，自引：1，他引：3
本文详细分析了网络游戏服务流程和产业链中的七大组成部分 ,指出目前网络游戏运营的商业模式中存在的问题 ,最后给出了网络游戏运营的发展对策。 相似文献
924.
Roger?Lagunoff "mailto:lagunofr@georgetown.edu " title= "lagunofr@georgetown.edu " itemprop= "email " data-track= "click " data-track-action= "Email author " data-track-label= " ">Email author Akihiko?Matsui 《Review of Economic Design》2004,8(4):383-411
This paper studies the role of memory and communication in overlapping generations (OLG) games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces his predecessor who has the same preferences and faces the same strategic possibilities. An individual has no prior memory - that is, he does not directly witness the events that occur before his tenure. Instead, each individual relies on information about the past from his predecessor via cheap talk. This paper highlights the role of communication as a surrogate for memory.It has been shown elsewhere that Folk Theorems hold in OLG games with long enough lived individuals who can perfectly observe the past. However, the Folk Theorem fails for many games when individuals have no prior memory. We show that for OLG games without prior memory but with costly communication, a Folk Theorem holds only when there is some altruistic link between cohorts in an organization. Our main result asserts that if communication costs are sufficiently small, or if altruistic weights on successors are sufficiently large, then a strongly stationary Folk Theorem (i.e., equilibrium payoffs are time invariant) obtains if a managers message is public information. The equilibria in this Folk Theorem require a special form of intergenerational sanctions. In these sanctions, punishment is sometimes carried out long after both victim and perpetrator have left the game. Without this special structure, altruism may in fact destroy cooperation when it would otherwise be possible.Received: 18 April 2003, Accepted: 20 October 2003, JEL Classification: C72, C73, D74, D82We have benefitted from helpful comments and conversations with Luca Anderlini, Kirk Bailey, Hans Haller, Matthew Jackson, and Takashi Shimizu, and numerous seminar participants. This research is partially supported by the National Science Foundation, and by grants-in-aid for scientific research of the Ministry of Education of Japan. Of course, any remaining error is our own. 相似文献
925.
This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games, without assuming a stationary setting. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), externalities, and other-regarding preferences. As a side result, we clarify the meaning of assumptions on “continuity at infinity.” 相似文献
926.
Willemien Kets 《Journal of economic surveys》2012,26(5):865-878
Abstract This paper gives a critical account of the literature on adaptive behaviour in the minority game, a simple congestion game. The literature has proposed a model which differs markedly from many standard learning models in that players are endowed with a fixed subset of behavioural rules or response modes which map the observed history to actions. These rules need not have a behavioural interpretation or be derived from some form of optimizing behaviour. Nonetheless, this model gives rise to behaviour that is close to equilibrium behaviour at the aggregate level. The individual‐level behaviour predicted by the model seems to capture some aspects of observed experimental behaviour that are difficult to explain using standard models. 相似文献
927.
篮球运动是一项对抗性很强的运动,这项运动不仅强调身体技术的较量,更强调智与谋的较量,适时而恰当采用各种假动作可以迷惑对方,调动对方从而获得比赛的主动权。本文旨在介绍假动作在篮球运动中的作用以及假动作训练中注意的事项。 相似文献
928.
We study a multiplayer stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium exists if the price impact parameter is small enough. Compared to the corresponding open-loop Nash equilibrium, both the agents' optimal trading rates and their performance move towards the central-planner solution, in that excessive trading due to lack of coordination is reduced. However, the size of this effect is modest for plausible parameter values. 相似文献
929.
We study the problem of demand response contracts in electricity markets by quantifying the impact of considering a continuum of consumers with mean–field interaction, whose consumption is impacted by a common noise. We formulate the problem as a Principal–Agent problem with moral hazard in which the Principal—she—is an electricity producer who observes continuously the consumption of a continuum of risk‐averse consumers, and designs contracts in order to reduce her production costs. More precisely, the producer incentivizes each consumer to reduce the average and the volatility of his consumption in different usages, without observing the efforts he makes. We prove that the producer can benefit from considering the continuum of consumers by indexing contracts on the consumption of one Agent and aggregate consumption statistics from the distribution of the entire population of consumers. In the case of linear energy valuation, we provide closed‐form expression for this new type of optimal contracts that maximizes the utility of the producer. In most cases, we show that this new type of contracts allows the Principal to choose the risks she wants to bear, and to reduce the problem at hand to an uncorrelated one. 相似文献
930.
This paper aims to investigate the impact of product differentiation on the extent of conflict of interest between principal stakeholders (shareholders, employees, and consumers), which is one of the most important concerns of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. We consider a differentiated duopoly competing either in price or quantity after the wages of employees are negotiated with a labor union. We find that price competition and quantity competition have drastically different implications on whether product differentiation mitigates stakeholders' conflicts. Specifically, product differentiation can mitigate stakeholders' conflicts when firms compete in price, but not when they compete in quantity. Therefore, the product differentiation effect in mitigating stakeholders' conflicts differs across markets characterized by price competition versus quantity competition. 相似文献