降低公共危机防控成本刍议

公共危机防控这一非常态下特殊公共服务所面临的多方面需求与供给能力相对较低的矛盾,是导致公共危机防控成本高昂、难以控制和难以衡量的主要原因.当前,要降低公共危机的防控成本,需要着力于观念形塑、完善政府问责制、实现复合治理和能力建设等方面.     

中国信用体系建设中的个人信用模糊评估

个人信用体系建设是中国信用制度建设的主要内容之一，个人信用评估是个人信用体系建设的主要应用领域。在信用评分模型和基于先验审批规则法基础上建立起来的模糊推理系统，充分利用了业内人员多年积累的从业经验，是适合我国实际情况的个人信用评估方式。在我国个人信用数据积累到一定程度和一定时期之后，这些数据既可以与专家经验互相补充用于生成模糊推理规则，也可以对模糊推理系统进行检验和修正。     

转贷政策下政府信用异化研究

表面上看,中央财政实行国债转贷,似乎仅仅是国债投资资金运作方式的改变,但是,只要对这一政策作理论和实践上的深入分析,就会发现:转贷政策在改变政府信用资金运作方式的同时,还引发了一些值得深入研究和讨论的制度性异化问题。     

农村信用合作社经营性风险因素探究

农村信用合作所具有的资金规模小、专业特色强、地域性经营等特点，使农信社面临着资本保障不足、融资能力不强、运营成本高等经营性风险因素，要防范和化解这些风险因素，就必须改革农村信用社的经营管理体制，加强业务监管，并给予必要的政策扶持。     

谈企业集团财务竞争优势的建立

本文针对国际上出现的安然等破产事件和国内近期的德隆国际企业集团的财务危机，探讨财务风险价值管理在企业集团可持续发展过程中的功能与角色定位，并从以创造价值为导向的财务战略思想来构建企业集团财务竞争优势。     

资产价格波动与银行体系稳定

由资产价格剧烈波动引发的银行危机乃至金融危机会对一国银行体系稳定造成不良影响、这种不良影响表现为资产价格波动对经济总体变量有一定影响，并可能引起银行危机、银行风险、货币政策波动等方面的问题．最终影响到银行体系的稳定。     

The impact of opacity on bank valuation during the global financial crisis: A channel analysis

Prior literature suggests that opacity in the banking industry is mainly caused by a lack of informativeness in the assessment of the quality of bank assets. Examining a sample of bank holding companies in the United States, we find that there is a negative relationship between opacity and bank valuation during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. We further attempt to identify two potential channels through which opacity negatively affects bank valuation during the financial crisis: a cash flow channel and an expected return channel. We show that one channel flows from bank profitability, measured by return on equity and return on assets, confirming a cash flow channel, whereas an expected return channel, proxied by the implied cost of capital, only works for small banks. Overall, this study sheds light on the relationship between in-transparency and bank value discount during a global recession.     

Forecasting recovery rates on non-performing loans with machine learning

We compare the performance of a wide set of regression techniques and machine-learning algorithms for predicting recovery rates on non-performing loans, using a private database from a European debt collection agency. We find that rule-based algorithms such as Cubist, boosted trees, and random forests perform significantly better than other approaches. In addition to loan contract specificities, predictors that refer to the bank recovery process — prior to the portfolio’s sale to a debt collector — are also shown to enhance forecasting performance. These variables, derived from the time series of contacts to defaulted clients and client reimbursements to the bank, help all algorithms better identify debtors with different repayment ability and/or commitment, and in general those with different recovery potential.     

Strategic freedom, constraint, and symmetry in one-period markets with cash and credit payment

Summary. In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these strategic market games well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.Received: 5 June 2003, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, G10, G20, L10, D40, D50. Correspondence to: Eric SmithEric Smith, Martin Shubik: We are grateful to Lloyd Shapley, Duncan Foley, and Doyne Farmer for discussions in the course of this work.     

Inter-enterprise arrears in economies in transition

In the context of economies in transition, the paper argues that an excessive liquidity squeeze could throw the economy into a persistent state of low economic activity. In such bad equilibrium, enterprise transactions become largely demonetized, with a chain of arrears, a form of involuntary credit, spreading over the entire system. The empirical analysis of the Romanian experience seems to support the view advanced in the paper.