Harmful Procompetitive Effects of Trade in Presence of Credit Market Frictions

We explore the consequences of international trade in an economy that encompasses technology choice and an endogenous distribution of mark-ups due to credit market frictions. We show that in such an environment a gradual opening of trade may—but not necessarily must—have a negative impact on productivity and overall output. The reason is that the procompetitive effects of trade reduce mark-ups and hence make access to credit more difficult for smaller firms. As a result, smaller firms—while not driven out of the market—may be forced to switch to less productive technologies.     

The federal funds market,excess reserves,and unconventional monetary policy

Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, interbank borrowing and lending dropped, whereas reserve holdings of depository institutions skyrocketed, as the Fed injected liquidity into the U.S. banking sector. This paper introduces bank liquidity risk and limited market participation into a real business cycle model with ex ante identical financial intermediaries and shows, in an analytically tractable way, how interbank trade and excess reserves emerge in general equilibrium. Investigating the role of the federal funds market and unconventional monetary policy for the propagation of aggregate real and financial shocks, I find that federal funds market participation is irrelevant in response to standard supply and demand shocks, whereas it matters for “uncertainty shocks”, i.e. mean-preserving spreads in the cross-section of liquidity risk. Liquidity injections by the central bank can absorb the effects of financial shocks on the real economy, although excess reserves might increase and federal funds might be crowded out, as a side effect.     

Credit market imperfections,labor markets,and leverage dynamics in emerging economies

Emerging economies (EMEs) have different credit and labor market structures relative to advanced economies. We document that economies with larger self-employment shares tend to exhibit less countercyclical leverage dynamics. We build a model where formal credit markets, input credit relationships, and the structure of labor markets interact that (1) captures a comprehensive set of EME business cycle regularities and (2) rationalizes our new fact. The interaction between firms’ net worth, interfirm input credit, and self-employment underlying our framework is critical for explaining our fact and is supported by the data.     

On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations*

Should workers be provided with insurance against search‐induced wage fluctuations? To answer this question, I rely on the numerical simulations of a model of on‐the‐job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low‐skilled workers in the United States. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non‐linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade‐off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better‐paying jobs, which increases the cost of providing insurance. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed workers, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which reduces the output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non‐linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide little insurance up to a monthly income level of $1350, so as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and nearly full insurance above $1450. This policy reduces the standard deviation of labor income net of transfers by 34 per cent and generates a consumption‐equivalent welfare gain of 0.7 per cent. The absence of private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance, at the expense of a less efficient allocation of workers across jobs.     

On‐the‐Job Learning and News‐Driven Business Cycles

This paper proposes a new channel of on‐the‐job learning to explain the positive comovement between consumption and employment following good news about future productivity. The new recruits can generate an additional stream of output production in all future periods, and the firm's labor demand is thus characterized by the forward‐looking property. Therefore, the firm is motivated to hire more new recruits in advance in response to good news about future productivity. Once the increase in labor demand is greater than the decrease in labor supply caused by the income effect, the coincident rise in consumption and employment can be driven by the news shock. When such a channel is paired with investment adjustment costs and the endogenous capacity utilization rate, this paper provides a plausible explanation for simultaneous booms in current consumption, investment, output, and employment to match the empirical evidence under the news shock.     

Financial Frictions,Investment Delay,and Asset Market Interventions

We construct a dynamic macro model to incorporate financial frictions and investment delay. Investment is undertaken by entrepreneurs who face liquidity frictions in the equity market and a collateral constraint in the debt market. After calibrating the model to the U.S. data, we quantitatively examine how aggregate activity is affected by a shock to equity liquidity and a shock to entrepreneurs' borrowing capacity. We then analyze the effectiveness of government interventions in the asset market after such financial shocks. In particular, we compare the effects of government purchases of private equity and of private debt in the open market. In addition, we examine how these effects of government interventions depend on the option to delay investment.     

Employment and hours of work

This paper develops a dynamic model of the labor market in which the degree of substitution between employment and hours of work is determined as part of a search equilibrium. Each firm chooses its demand for working hours and number of vacancies, and the earnings profile is determined by Nash bargaining. The earnings profile is generally nonlinear in hours of work, and defines the trade-off between employment and hours of work. Concave production technology induces firms to overemploy and, as a result, hours of work are below their optimal level. The Hosios condition is not sufficient for efficiency. When there are two industries, workers employed by firms with higher recruitment costs work longer and earn more. That is, “good jobs” require longer hours of work. Interestingly, technology differentials cannot account for working hours differentials.     

Stock listing and financial flexibility

A stock listing usually reflects easy access to external equity financing. Although scant empirical evidence exists on the matter, the literature suggests that the enhanced standing towards creditors - which would result in easier access to debt financing - is an extra advantage of being publicly quoted. This paper tests whether a stock listing leads to more flexibility of debt financing, using a data set of listed and comparably large unlisted companies. The data reveals that listing mainly increases the flexible use of debt financing. The difference between listed and unlisted firms is most apparent when investment opportunities tend to arrive in low-cash-flow states. Furthermore, as the unlisted firms in the dataset are all large consolidating business groups, the results indicate that a group structure does not substitute for listing. The results are robust to different estimation methods.     

Beveridge's analysis of unemployment in 1909: the reserve of labour

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide a rational reconstruction of Beveridge's theory of unemployment published in 1909. First and foremost, it shows that his theory of unemployment is coherent – what Beveridge refers to as ‘the reserve of labour’ represents ‘unemployment’ as a whole; unemployment is due to the imperfection of the labour market and associated friction and the organisation of the labour market is necessary. Second, it suggests that as early as 1909, a negative relationship already existed between unemployment and job vacancies and that the segmentation of the labour market and imperfect information are key factors of friction. The first part of the paper provides a reconstruction of Beveridge's theory of the reserve of labour (1909) including causes and factors of unemployment and unemployment policies. The second part shows that certain founding principles of the ‘Beveridge curve’ (Beveridge 1944 Beveridge, W. H. 1944 [1953]. Full Employment in a Free Society, London: George Allen and Unwin.  [Google Scholar] [1953]) were already to be found in his 1909 book and that links can be established between Beveridge (1909 Beveridge, W. H. 1909. Unemployment: A Problem of Industry, London: Longmans, Green and Co.  [Google Scholar]), Phelps (1970 Phelps, E. S. 1970. The new microeconomic in inflation and employment theory. The American Economic Review, 59(2): 147–60. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and Pissarides (2000 Pissarides, C. A. 2000. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  [Google Scholar]).     

Asymmetric Labor Market Institutions in the EMU and the Volatility of Inflation and Unemployment Differentials

How does the asymmetry of labor market institutions affect the adjustment of a currency union to shocks? To answer this question, this paper sets up a dynamic currency union model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices, hiring frictions, and real wage rigidities. In our analysis, we focus on the differentials in inflation and unemployment between countries, as they directly reflect how the currency union responds to shocks. We highlight the following three results. First, we show that it is important to distinguish between different labor market rigidities as they have opposite effects on inflation and unemployment differentials. Second, we find that asymmetries in labor market structures tend to increase the volatility of both inflation and unemployment differentials. Finally, we show that it is important to take into account the interaction between different types of labor market rigidities. Overall, our results suggest that asymmetries in labor market structures worsen the adjustment of a currency union to shocks.