Payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice

By using a unique data set that contains detailed information about consumer payment choice and consumers’ attitudes toward each payment method, we estimate the effects of payment card rewards on consumer choice of payment methods. Our approach allows us to control for consumer heterogeneity. We find the effects of rewards to be statistically significant across five retail types. Our policy experiments suggest that for the sub-population who hold both credit and debit cards, removing rewards would increase their share of paper-based payment methods (i.e., cash and checks), measured in terms of in-store transactions, by no more than 4 percentage points.     

The animal spirits hypothesis and the Benhabib–Farmer condition for indeterminacy

This paper provides a self-contained review of the introduction of the animal spirits hypothesis into the infinite horizon optimal‐growth model. The analysis begins with an economic discussion of Pontryagin's maximum principles. Thereafter, I develop a version of the increasing-returns Benhabib–Farmer model by showing the possible sub-optimality of the central planner solution and deriving the bifurcation condition for indeterminacy. Moreover, I give some insights on how to model intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty. Finally, analyzing the equilibrium condition of the labor market, I provide an intuitive rationale for the mechanism that in this model might lead prophecies to be self-fulfilling.     

Uncertainty averse preferences

We study uncertainty averse preferences, that is, complete and transitive preferences that are convex and monotone. We establish a representation result, which is at the same time general and rich in structure. Many objective functions commonly used in applications are special cases of this representation.     

Consumption externalities,market imperfections and optimal taxation

In a dynamic model with a keeping‐up‐with‐the Joneses preference and market imperfections, we attempt to investigate under what circumstances and for what reason the optimal tax should be state‐varying. We extend the Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) proposition to include preferences that exhibit non‐homotheticity. We show that a keeping‐up‐with‐the‐Joneses preference (a non‐intertemporally‐dependent preference) can lead the social planner to commit to a state‐contingent tax on labor income. Moreover, the optimal labor income tax can be either procyclical or countercyclical with respect to economic fluctuations, this crucially depending on whether the level of contemporaneous consumption increases or decreases the wedge between the intertemporal substitution elasticity of households and of the social planner.     

基于公司不进行正式研发投资的简要探讨

本文我们研究了正式的研发投资的频率。用实物期权和基于知识的观点去解释一个公司的知识资源是怎么影响该公司用于确定技术选择的研发投资频率。详细的说,我们得出一个公司若没有内部知识资源,很可能就总不投资研发;若有内外部知识资源,公司有时投资研发;但有内部知识资源而没有外部知识资源时,公司很可能总是投资研发。     

The (hidden) costs of political instability: Evidence from Kenya's 2007 election crisis

This paper studies the microeconomic impacts of the political crisis and civil conflict that immediately followed the December 2007 presidential election in Kenya. Income, expenditures, and consumption dramatically declined for a broad segment of the rural population for the duration of the conflict. To make up for the income shortfall, women who supply transactional sex engaged in higher risk sex both during and after the crisis. While this particular crisis was likely too short for these behavioral responses to seriously increase the risk of HIV or other STIs for these women, such responses could have long-term repercussions for health in countries with longer or more frequent crises. Overall, our results suggest that social unrest can be an important channel through which political instability can affect long-term outcomes such as health.     

The relative efficiency of king's,ecclesiastical, and lay estates in Domesday Essex, 1086

In the Domesday survey of 1086, information on the inputs and output of most production units in the English economy was carefully collected by questionnaire survey and verified in court. In this paper, Essex estate data are used to assess whether similar production functions describe production for the three major classes of production unit in the economy – king's, ecclesiastical, and lay estates. A data envelopment analysis is undertaken to determine whether production on one class of estate was more efficient than on the others. The evidence suggests that production processes and management performance were similar on the three classes of estate.     

Optimal Redistribution with Productive Social Services

Publicly‐provided private goods are conventionally considered consumer goods. Departing from this perspective, we analyze the public provision of inputs that improve household productivity (e.g., education and childcare). In a two‐class economy with distorting taxation, public provision is always welfare improving with respect to pure taxation, given that the public input directly affects household productivity. Moreover, the case for public provision strengthens as households' heterogeneity in input demand fades out, contrary to consolidated results in the literature. The features of optimal provision schemes depend on the nature of publicly provided input, namely, if it substitutes household productive capacity or just helps households to exploit it.     

Information Shocks and the Dynamics of the Housing Market*

In this paper, we analyze housing‐market reactions to the release of previously unpublished information on school quality. Using high‐quality housing data, which precisely bracket the timing of the information shock, we investigate housing‐price dynamics within school‐catchment areas. We find a robust short‐term housing‐market reaction to the publication of school‐quality indicators, suggesting that this information was new to the households, and that households are willing to pay for better schools. The publication effect does not seem to be permanent as prices revert to pre‐publication levels after two to three months.