Buyer power and supplier incentives

This paper analyzes the origins and welfare consequences of buyer power. We show that if suppliers are capacity constrained or have strictly convex costs, there are two different channels through which large buyers can obtain more favorable terms from their suppliers. In particular, we show how the presence of large buyers can then erode the value of suppliers’ outside option. Somewhat surprisingly, we show how this can induce suppliers to undertake strategies that lead to higher output and potentially higher welfare.     

Rent-seeking distortions and fiscal procyclicality

Recent research has demonstrated that while government expenditures are countercyclical in most industrialized countries, they tend to be procyclical in developing countries. We develop a dynamic political-economy model to explain this phenomenon. In the model, public expenditures provide insurance to uninsured households, and optimal fiscal policy is countercyclical. The introduction of a political friction, in which successive governments disagree on the desired distribution of public spending, can lead to procyclical fiscal policies. Numerical simulations of the model allow us to compare quantitatively the relative role of common explanations for fiscal procyclicality. We conclude that political distortions in the fiscal process can explain fiscal procyclicality better than other common explanations, such as borrowing constraints and macroeconomic volatility.     

On the Effects of Wage Pressure on the Unemployment Rate and Capital Share

Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to understand the behaviour of the capital share and the unemployment rate in Europe over the past quarter of a century. We consider a model with monopolistic competition, increasing returns and an imperfect labour market, assuming that the elasticity between capital and labour is less than unity. Previous works have generally assumed constant returns to scale. Our results offer an important conclusion, namely that increased wage pressure will increase the unemployment rate and the capital share even though the latter initially decreases, which fits the stylized facts about the studied economies.     

Governance structures in R&D networks: An analysis in the European context

This paper analyses governance structures used to organize partnerships in R&D networks using two approaches: transaction costs theory and social capital theory. We argue that these theories are complementary; this explains forms of governance through the degrees of administrative (structural and safeguard mechanism) and social factors (cohesion and openness) they embody. Data was obtained from European R&D networks created through Framework Programmes which include a great number of universities, non profit institutions and firms. Findings show the variables that characterize and explain the governance forms based on the applicability of R&D networks. This study not only provides a theoretical model for analysing governance structures of these networks, but is also useful for both improving the management of networks and for fostering collaboration at an international level.     

Mobility of Top Incomes in Germany

I analyze German top income mobility using micro‐level panel data of personal income tax returns which are highly representative for top income taxpayers for the years 2001–06. Top income mobility is assessed in three dimensions: (i) persistence in top income fractiles and its stability over time, (ii) measures of individual mobility that are not dependent on the fractile size: the degree of mobility between equally sized groups and mobility in ranks, and (iii) mobility's impact on top income shares. Persistence in top income fractiles is comparatively high and fairly stable across the analyzed period. Top income recipients are less prone to downward mobility and see less variation in annual ranks than less rich tax units. Mobility's impact on income concentration is moderate. The top percentile's share is reduced by roughly 5 percent over six years.     

Shifting Taxes from Labor to Consumption: More Employment and more Inequality?

This paper investigates the effect of shifting taxes from labor income to consumption on labor supply and the distribution of income in Germany. We simulate stepwise increases in the value‐added tax (VAT) rate, which are compensated by revenue‐neutral reductions in income‐related taxes. We differentiate between the personal income tax (PIT) and social security contributions (SSC). Based on a dual data base and a microsimulation model of household labor supply behavior, we find a regressive impact of such a tax shift in the short run. When accounting for labor supply adjustments, the adverse distributional impact persists for PIT reductions, while the overall effects on inequality and progressivity become lower when payroll taxes are reduced. This is partly due to increases in aggregate labor supply, resulting from higher work incentives.     

Islamist terrorism and the status of women

We investigate the effect of Islamist terrorist activity on women's legal position in society, using data for 171 countries between 1970 and 2016. To identify causal effects, we exploit the prevalence of Islamist terrorism in neighboring countries as an exogenous source of variation, arguing that regional terrorism affects local terrorism through contagion effects. We show that increased activity by Islamist terrorist groups is linked to lower legal status of women. By contrast, we find that neither Islam per se nor other types of terrorism have comparable effects. This reinforces the notion that Islamist terrorism is singularly interested and effective in weakening women's rights. Our results are consistent with a rational-economic model of terrorism, where Islamist terrorists purposefully use violence to maximize political utility, while governments make concessions that constrain the role of women because the costs of compliance are lower than the harm from continued Islamist terrorism.     

Multiplicity in general financial equilibrium with portfolio constraints

This paper explores the role of portfolio constraints in generating multiplicity of equilibrium. We present a simple financial market economy with two goods and two households, households who face constraints on their ability to take unbounded positions in risky stocks. Absent such constraints, equilibrium allocation is unique and is Pareto efficient. With one portfolio constraint in place, the efficient equilibrium is still possible; however, additional inefficient equilibria in which the constraint is binding may emerge. We show further that with portfolio constraints cum incomplete markets, there may be a continuum of equilibria; adding incomplete markets may lead to real indeterminacy.     

The “Business Climate” and Economic Inequality

“Business climate indexes” characterize state economic policies, and are often used to try to influence economic policy debate. However, they are also useful in research as summaries of a large number of state policies that cannot be studied simultaneously. Prior research found that business climate indexes focused on productivity and quality of life do not predict economic growth, while indexes emphasizing taxes and costs of doing business indicate that low‐tax, low‐cost states have faster growth of employment, wages, and output. In this paper, we study the relationship between these two categories of business climate indexes and the promotion of equality or inequality. We do not find that the productivity/quality‐of‐life indexes predict more equitable outcomes, although some of the policies underlying them suggest they might. We do find, however, that the same tax‐and‐cost‐related indexes that are associated with higher economic growth are also associated with increases in inequality.     

Non‐linear geographics and the economics of transition and democratization1

The purpose of this study is to analyse the effects of geography on the transition process in authoritarian political regimes, and to investigate the nature of the links between political change, economic reforms and geographical location. A simple model of transition and democratization is presented wherein we show that the effectiveness of repression by the incumbent elite is a negative function of the distance to the ‘free world’. In consequence, geography has conflicting effects on shifts in political power. This article provides a rationale for the counterintuitive fact that the first authoritarian country to start a transition process towards democratization is not necessarily the one nearest to the free world.