Proportionally adjusted marginal pricing method to share joint costs

We consider the cost sharing problem with divisible demands of heterogeneous goods. We propose a cost sharing method called Proportionally Adjusted Marginal Pricing (PAMP) method. PAMP is a nonadditive (in the cost function) extension of average cost pricing. We introduce an axiom called Local Independence (LI) and use LI together with Continuity, Proportionality, and Scale Invariance to characterize PAMP. Received: 23 March 2001 / Accepted: 16 November 2001 I thank Yves Sprumont, Hervé Moulin, and Ahmet Alkan for discussions, comments and suggestions. Thanks also go to the associate editor and the referees, whose comments and suggestions greatly improve the paper.     

Industry evolution and R&D externalities

R&D externalities can imply ranges of aggregate increasing returns to scale in R&D. As a consequence several equilibria can exist involving different numbers of firms and different R&D investment levels. In a theoretical model the equilibrium dynamics are analyzed, showing that cyclical fluctuations of the number of firms and R&D investment may be expected, and that the long-run equilibrium is highly sensitive to investors' initial beliefs. The model is tested empirically using a unique database comprising competing firms in various R&D races.     

Sources of Sectoral Growth in an Economy Wide Context: The Case of U.S. Agriculture

Growth in U.S. agriculture is linked to the non-farm economy through domestic terms of trade and factor market adjustments. With almost stable input growth, the relatively large contributions from growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) are passed on to intermediate and final consumers in the form of declining real prices for primary farm products. The resulting net growth in the real value of farm output (GDP) is relatively low (0.25% per annum). The decomposition of TFP suggests that public agricultural stock of knowledge and infrastructure are robustly associated with TFP growth, while spill-overs from private agricultural and economy wide research and development (R and D) are positive but, relatively small.     

4D技术在工程项目管理中的应用和发展趋势

现代建设工程日趋复杂，传统的工程项目管理思想和手段已经无法满足项目业主越来越高的要求，进度、成本和质量管理彼此独立的传统模式导致许多弊端，主要表现在各专业生成的软件信息不能共享、项目参与各方所拥有的知识和经验不能很好地提供项目决策支持。随着管理思想、管理理论、IT技术的飞速发展，运用产品数据建模、软件集成(3D 成本／进度)的思想和方法，对传统管理工具进行变革成为可能。本文引进工程项目集成化管理思想，分析国内外4D技术研究的情况，提出4D建模技术辅助工程项目管理的发展方向和趋势。     

基于实物期权法对R&D项目价值评估的研究——对布莱克-舒尔斯定价模型的改进

针对R&D项目投资的特点,探讨了采用布莱克一舒尔斯期权定价模型对R&D项目价值评估可能存在的缺陷,并提出一种改进方法,即将决策树和布莱克一舒尔斯定价模型结合运用,因为决策树能够模拟研发项目的阶段性决策过程,考虑到多个离散型不确定性因素的相关性,模拟并计算出对决策路径依赖的现金流,因此能克服纯粹使用布莱克一舒尔斯公式的不足,在考虑多个不确定性因素的影响下,实现对多阶段R&D项目价值的评估,作出正确的投资决策。     

产业组织角度的合作R＆D研究述评

合作R＆D是企业整合研发资源的有效组织形式。本文对产业组织角度的合作R＆D研究进行了较为细致的综述。首先列举了对合作R＆D理论具有一定影响的经验研究；然后梳理了产业组织角度的合作R＆D主流理论；之后介绍了较有代表性的非主流理论研究；最后是全文结论和留待进一步研究的论题。     

开放条件下R＆D政策的福利分析

本文在引入国外企业竞争压力和本国政府政策的情形下,构建一个三阶段的博弈模型。在该模型中,我们对不同R&D政策下的社会福利水平进行比较分析,进而选择最优福利水平的R&D政策。文章最终的结论是:政府应该鼓励企业进行R&D的合作,但禁止企业在研发合作阶段之后的产品市场进行共谋,这种政策行为是最优的。     

“长三角”加强与跨国公司投资及研发合作的对策建议

建立上海多极型研发中心是十分重要而紧迫的战略任务。为此，应加快长三角开放式研发信息中心的建设，加快建设与跨国公司对接的科技中介服务体系；选择在全球跨国公司产业链中具有相对竞争优势和发展潜力的企业及项目，作为优先支持的重点领域，并制定与国际惯例接轨的阶段性优惠政策。     

Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty

Abstract. I evaluate a new German regulation that requires retail discounters to guarantee the availability of their products in bargain sales. The regulation is meant to prevent loss leaders. Retailers undermine the regulation's rationale by claiming that rationing is due to demand uncertainty. This paper shows that under demand uncertainty the regulation has ambiguous welfare effects. Effectively, it raises production, which, under imperfect competition, tends to be beneficial. However, the regulation overshoots and decreases welfare if it requires availability for a state of high demand that is relatively unlikely. In this case more sophisticated regulation is required.     

Buyer power and supplier incentives

This paper analyzes the origins and welfare consequences of buyer power. We show that if suppliers are capacity constrained or have strictly convex costs, there are two different channels through which large buyers can obtain more favorable terms from their suppliers. In particular, we show how the presence of large buyers can then erode the value of suppliers’ outside option. Somewhat surprisingly, we show how this can induce suppliers to undertake strategies that lead to higher output and potentially higher welfare.