企业竞争中的博弈分析

竞争对消费者有利,对企业不利;竞争者越多对消费者越有利,对企业来说则相反.同时,竞争对消费者和企业的影响程度可以量化.     

固定资产动态折旧的分类模型与通用模型构建

文章参照固定资产静态折旧的几种典型模型,构建了直线动态折旧模型、折旧基数变化情况下的加速动态折旧模型、折旧率变化情况下的加速动态折旧模型,分别根据各种折旧模型各自折旧额的内在规律性进行建模,比较好地实现了从静态折旧模型向动态折旧模型的转化.在此基础上,本文试图去寻找各种动态折旧模型中各期折旧额的共同规律,进而建立起固定资产动态折旧的通用模型,以供企业根据自己的实际情况代入相应初始条件直接套用固定资产动态折旧的通用模型,方便地计算固定资产各期的动态折旧金额.     

基于动态多元代理关系网络的企业资本结构安排

随着代理理论和治理理论的发展,使得企业中产生了一个动态的多元代理关系网络。在解释和预测企业的资本结构方面,新制度经济学的代理理论提供了典范。基于现代企业多样化的动态多元代理关系网络,本文运用代理理论初步分析了现代企业的资本结构安排问题。     

我国资产管理公司的资本运营及其发展趋势

资产管理公司是我国处理不良资产的一项重要举措，运行两年多来，取得了可喜的成绩，但从资本运营的角度来分析资产管理公司的运作，仍值得我们深思和探讨。     

中国GDP最终消费的长期均衡与短期波动的协整分析

本文依据协整理论和误差修正模型 ,测定了我国GDP最终消费与国内生产总值、价格水平及利率之间的长期均衡关系和短期波动效应 ,并对当前消费需求疲软做出了新的解释     

On a clear day you might see an environmental Kuznets curve

We shed some new light on the Environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) and show how it can be viewed as a particular form of equilibrium relationship, where technology and preference parameters determine the shape of the curve. In contrast to most of the literature on the EKC, we estimate a theoretically consistent model on long-run data (Swedish sulfur emission, covering the period 1900–2002). Furthermore, we test and date structural change. The model suggests four regimes, 1900–1918, 1919–1933, 1934–1967 and 1968–2002, generating four rather different patterns for pollution over time. The policy-conclusions are consonant with Pearce’s general view about the EKC: there is no theoretical presumption that it has an inverted U shape, nor should any country try to “grow out of the environmental problems” without analyzing the benefits and costs of so doing.     

Innovation, Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights: A Note on Helpman's Model

This note analyses the effect of the policy of tightening Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) on the rate of innovation in the North and on the welfare in both North and South in a model which is otherwise identical to Helpman (1993) except in the concept of knowledge capital. We assume that the South based imitated products do not contribute to the knowledge capital in the North. It is shown that the tightening of IPR raises the rate of innovation in the North and may improve the welfare of both North and South. These results are significantly different from those in Helpman (1993).     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

Competitive equilibrium when preferences change over time

Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand correspondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand correspondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.Received: 29 July 2004, Revised: 17 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D91, C73. Correspondence to: Thomas MariottiWe thank Michele Piccione for useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Learning for Innovation and the Skill Premium

The computer revolution took very long to pay off in productivity growth in the computer-using sectors. The relative wage of skilled workers, however, has risen sharply from the early days of the computer revolution onward. As skilled workers wages reflect their productivity, the two observations together pose a puzzle.This paper provides a micro-based explanation for the long diffusion period of the computer revolution. The general equilibrium model of growth zooms in on the research process and provides an explanation for sluggish growth with booming relative wages of the skilled. Technological progress in firms is driven by research aimed at improving the production technology (innovation) and by assimilation of ideas or principles present outside the firm (learning). A new General Purpose Technology (GPT) like the computer revolution generates an initial slowdown in economic growth and an increase in the skill premium.Acknowledgement I am indebted to Theo van de Klundert for suggestions and encouragement. Suggestions by Jan Boone, Bas Jacobs, Patrick Francois, Henri de Groot, Lex Meijdam, Niek Nahuis Sjak Smulders, Harald Uhlig and anonymous referees have contributed to the paper.