具有网络效应的产品的价格竞争分析

具有网络效应的产品是指消费者在消费这种产品时所获得的效用会随着购买这种产品的其他消费者数量的增加而不断增加的产品。本文通过建立一个有两个厂商的离散动态决策模型,研究在分散决策的市场经济中生产具有网络效应的产品的厂商的价格决策对产品市场占有率的影响,价格决策影响产品市场占有率的动态演化的过程,以及市场均衡的务件和特征,包括产品不占有市场、占有部分市场以及上有今都市场的价格条件。     

Commercial versus open source software: the role of product heterogeneity in competition

The emergence and market success of Linux in recent years has been impressive. The paper investigates the question of why some producers of a proprietary software support the development of open source software (OSS) while others refuse any support. As an analytical framework, a simple Launhardt–Hotelling model is used to show that the emerging price pressure on the former monopolists depends on the extent of the current heterogeneity between OSS and the proprietary software of the incumbents. The paper argues that the product heterogeneity can explain the differing real-world behavior of commercial software producers.     

Care management to improve retail customers' and employees’ satisfaction

In retailing, ongoing management is needed to avoid compromising customer relationships and organizational performance because of consumers' or employees' dysfunctional behavior. This paper contributes to understanding how care management strategies can improve in-store experiences for customers and employees by adapting the Chronic Care Management (CCM) theory to retailing. Across two studies, one on customers (Study 1) and one on retail employees (Study 2) we show that empowerment reduces dysfunctional behavior, enhancing satisfaction. Furthermore, we demonstrate that customers' and employees’ emotional bond with the retailer (i.e., store attachment) moderates the relationship between dysfunctional behavior and satisfaction, buffering dissatisfaction from dysfunctional behavior.     

A theory of reciprocity

People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.     

Competition and physician-enabled demand: The role of managed care

Recent organizational changes in the health care sector promote greater patient participation in their treatment decisions. How physicians respond to patient-initiated requests for treatment is an issue of considerable policy interest. To study this phenomenon, we introduce the notion of physician-enabled demand and examine empirically whether this behavior responds to competitive pressures in the market and financial incentives associated with different physician payment mechanisms.We find that physician-enabled demand increases with more competition under fee-for-service reimbursement, but decreases with greater competition under managed care. This asymmetric response is quite consistent with our conceptual framework and at odds with alternative interpretations.     

财政分权、政府竞争与土地价格结构性偏离

财政分权背景下地方政府的财政约束和政府竞争是导致土地价格结构性偏离的根本原因。地方政府存在拉升商业用地和居住用地出让价格的倾向,金融宽松环境和投机行为盛行会使这两种土地出让价格存在正向偏离其理论地价的可能;而地方政府对流动性税基的争夺过程会导致工业用地出让价格低于其理论价格。工业用地价格与商业和居住用地价格正是在政府这两种反作用力量的作用下出现结构性偏离。     

Does increased credibility of elections lead to higher political competition? Evidence from India

A large amount of administrative effort is directed towards making elections credible and reducing electoral fraud in large democracies. However, it is not clear if such policy efforts have a feedback effect on political competition. In this paper, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in perceptions of electoral credibility following the introduction of a technology-induced voting reform in India and find significant impacts on political competition. Electronic voting machines in India were mandated to include an additional layer of transparency by the introduction of a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). We find that with the introduction of VVPAT, the winning margins and vote share of winners decline whereas the number of candidates in the average race increases. The results are robust to econometric concerns arising out of staggered implementation of the program providing support to our identification design. Our results also point to heterogeneous effects of the VVPAT roll-out in constituencies that received it only once relative to those that got the VVPAT in two successive elections. Interestingly, we note that much of the welfare improvement through increased political competition is reversed with more experience, suggesting the presence of important learning effects.