New debt issues and earnings management

We empirically examine the influence and effects of real earnings management (REM) procedures on the debt market by investigating the bond rating and actual market price of a firm's new debt offerings. Extant research provides conflicting representations concerning the effects of REM techniques on equity shareholders and debt market participants. Our results indicate a negative association between all three REM manipulation methods and perceived credit risk resulting in a lower bond rating, and higher market yield of the firm's debt at issuance. Additional analyses exploring the use of REM techniques to achieve analyst's earnings forecasts indicates that this negative effect is particularly significant for firms who only achieve the earnings forecast by utilizing REM methods. Our research adds to the literature by empirically describing the effects of REM techniques on new debt issuances, and contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the efficacy of engaging in real earnings management to achieve known targets.     

Opaque financial reports and R2: Revisited

In this study, we revisit the link between R² (synchronicity) and earnings management (opacity) because of the importance of the ongoing debate on the relation between idiosyncratic risk and earnings management in the finance and accounting literatures. Hutton et al. (J. Financial Economics, 2009) provide evidence of a positive link between opacity and R². They interpret their finding to imply that firms with high R² (high synchronicity) have less firm-specific information impounded in their stock price. Our results for this relationship fail to unequivocally support the results reported in Hutton et al. (2009). We show that their results are not only time variant but also not robust to the alternative empirical technique recommended for panel data by Petersen (2009) and alternative estimation of discretionary accruals adjusted for firm performance prescribed by Kothari et al. (2005). We also find no support for a convex relation between idiosyncratic risk and opacity. The findings documented in this study substantially revise some of Hutton et al.'s findings in this important and growing area of research.     

基于复杂网络的同业拆借市场特性研究——以金融危机时期（2007~2009年）数据为例

运用复杂网络的系统科学方法,选用2007~2009年金融危机期间我国同业拆借市场相关数据,构建相应的同业拆借网络对我国同业拆借市场进行实证研究。结果表明：我国同业拆借市场具有典型的小世界和无标度特性,同时,在应对金融危机过程中,同业拆借利率表现出基准利率所具有的市场性和稳定性特点。     

Institutional incentives and earnings quality: The influence of government ownership in China

We examine the effect of government ownership and its associated institutional incentives on firms’ earnings quality using a sample of Chinese firms during the transitional economy between 1998 and 2005 when state-owned and non-state-owned firms were traded in the stock exchanges. We find that, in China, state-owned firms exhibit a lower earnings quality property than non-state-owned firms. Particularly, state-owned firms have more earnings smoothing, more frequently managed earnings toward target, less frequent timely recognition of losses, and less value relevance, relative to non-state-owned firms. We also find that state-owned firms have significantly higher discretionary current accruals than non-state-owned firms. We conclude that the Chinese government, through its controlling ownership of state-owned firms, creates incentives and regulatory backing for self-serving purposes that negatively influence these listed firms’ financial reporting.     

信息披露质量对分析师预测的影响

作为连接上市公司与外部投资者的重要信息中介,分析师预测质量的高低对降低信息不对称,提高资本市场效率具有重要作用,而所获公司信息的质量是影响其正确分析判断的因素之一。文章利用2009-2013年我国上市公司数据,以深交所信息披露考评结果作为信息披露质量的代理变量,考察了信息披露质量提升对分析师预测误差、预测分歧度的影响。实证结果发现:信息披露质量较高的公司及信息披露质量水平提升的公司,分析师预测分歧度和预测误差也较低。这意味着,作为一个公开的重要信息来源,上市公司的信息披露质量显著影响了分析师预测。此研究结论不仅有助于监管者了解信息披露政策对资本市场参与者的现实影响,也为其合理引导公司信息披露,完善相关规范政策提供新的决策参考。     

Are earnings announced early of higher quality?

This study examines whether the timing of annual earnings announcements is related to how promptly earnings incorporate value‐relevant information (timeliness in recognition), the extent to which earnings are managed (income smoothing) and the extent to which earnings are realized into operating cash flow (accruals quality). Based on Trueman ( 1990 ), we hypothesize that early announcers will have higher quality earnings. Our results, however, do not support these hypotheses. We find, instead, that late announcers have higher quality earnings and that earnings of late announcers recognize bad news on a more timelier basis than do earnings of early announcers.     

社交媒体上“用嘴投票”对管理层自愿性业绩预告的影响

本文研究了投资者 “股吧”讨论这种“用嘴投票”机制能否发挥治理作用进而促进管理层进行自愿性业绩预告。用上市公司股吧中的发帖量、阅读量和评论量来衡量投资者“用嘴投票”的参与程度,研究发现投资者“用嘴投票”参与度越高,管理层进行盈余预测自愿性披露的概率越大,且更愿意及时披露业绩下滑等坏消息。进一步研究发现,投资者“用嘴投票”是通过对股价产生影响、引发监管层关注和招致媒体报道这三个渠道对管理层产生预警进而发挥治理作用。且这一治理机制在管理层受到互联网信息影响可能性越大、公司中小股东户数越多以及论坛的讨论内容越负面时更为显著。     

Ownership concentration,modified audit opinion,and auditor switch: New evidence and method

This study investigates: 1) how does the ownership structure of listed firms influence the relation between their earnings management behavior and auditor opinion; 2) how does the ownership structure influence the relation between the auditor opinion and auditor switch. We find that the level of listed firms’ earnings management is positively associated with the propensity of being issued modified audit opinions (MAOs) by auditors when their ownership structure is highly concentrated. However, the issuance of MAOs is not associated with the auditor switch under such condition. On the contrary, a high level of earnings management is not associated with the propensity of being issued MAOs when firms’ ownership structure is less concentrated. Further, the issuance of MAOs may increase the likelihood of auditor switch. The empirical findings suggest that auditors may cater for the preferences of the real controller of listed firms when issuing audit opinions. Moreover, the “auditor opinion shopping” behavior by listed firms is also affected by listed firms’ ownership structure.     

Central supervision and earnings management: Quasi-experimental evidence from China

Earnings management is costly to society because it decreases the informativeness of earnings and hence distorts capital market efficiency. Drawing upon a natural experiment generated by the staggered random on-site inspection programme initiated by China's central government between 2013 and 2017, this paper finds that highly intensive central supervision significantly decreases local firms' earnings management behaviours. Moreover, the effect of central supervision is found to be more pronounced in provinces with severe GDP exaggeration, provinces with local governors facing impending promotion, and firms controlled by the government. These findings suggest that on-site inspections by the central government may alleviate local officials' political incentives and ability to pressure local firms to engage in earnings management. However, the estimation results of timing tests indicate that this monitoring effect is short-lived, calling for a more comprehensive strategy to enhance the supervision of local officials and consequently improve the reliability of firms' financial reporting quality. These findings highlight the importance of addressing the agency problem between central and local governments in curbing firms' earnings manipulation to improve the capital market efficiency of economies characterized by strong government intervention.