Earnings Virality

We examine the determinants and market consequences associated with earnings announcements going viral on social media, a phenomenon we label “earnings virality.” Using a comprehensive panel of historical Twitter data, we find that the typical earnings announcement receives relatively little social media coverage, but others go viral on social media, quickly reaching the feeds of millions of people. We find that viral earnings announcements generally have Twitter content that is more extreme in tone and contains less unique content. Further, earnings virality is positively associated with revenue surprises, investor recognition, retail investor ownership, and retail investor trading around the announcement. Earnings virality appears to be detrimental to markets, as it coincides with lower market liquidity and slower price formation. Overall, our evidence suggests that user-driven dissemination through social media platforms, when amplified and taken to extreme levels, may be harmful to markets.     

Keeping up with the Joneses? Evidence from Peer Performance in the Banking Industry

This paper traces the reaction of US banks to ROE underperformance on liquidity creation, equity capital, and loan loss provisions. We find that banks change their structures in the subsequent quarter after underperformance by increasing their on-balance and off-balance sheet liquidity creation to increase profitability. Banks tend to increase their equity capital and improve their loan quality by lowering non-discretionary loan loss provisions to become safer. Banks signal their ability to overcome underperformance by increasing their discretionary loan loss provisions. Our results reveal that large banks rely mainly on off-balance sheet liquidity creation as their primary tool to recover from underperformance while medium-size and small banks adjust their equity capital to increase their safety.     

Understanding income volatility in urban China

Higher income volatility is associated with a higher risk and a reduction in well-being. Income volatility is widely studied in many advanced economies, yet little is known about income volatility in China. In this paper we document trends in earnings volatility and household income volatility in urban China and examine what are the driving forces. Using the China Urban Household Survey, we find that male earnings volatility increased by 89% between 1992 and 2009. Earnings volatility is higher for older, less educated, and those who work in private service sector and non-SOEs. Decomposition analysis suggests that couple’s earnings shocks are positively correlated, while transfer income and other income help smooth out head earnings shocks. In addition, transfer income and other non-transfer income plays a larger role in smoothing out head earnings shocks for poorer households.     

Bank earnings management and performance reporting of comprehensive income

FASB’s ASU 2011-05 mandated that comprehensive income (CI) and other comprehensive income (OCI) be reported in performance statements (a single income statement or a separate statement of CI) rather than equity statements. Employing a difference-in-differences research design with ASU 2011-05 as the treatment, I find that presenting accounting information in different statements affects bank earnings management, specifically, presenting CI and OCI in performance statements (especially in single-statements with net income) reduces earnings management through selective sales of available-for-sale (AFS) securities in the banking industry. I also find that the influence of ASU 2011-05 is primarily on banks with high equity incentives in the CEO’s compensation package or less CEO job security. Additional analyses suggest that performance reporting of CI and OCI increases the predictive ability of realized gains and losses of AFS securities; however, banks may manage loan loss provision as a substitute strategy when they have to decrease selective sales of AFS securities.     

Institutional investors and earnings management associated with controlling shareholders' promises: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.     

GDP manipulation,political incentives,and earnings management

Political decisions often affect macroeconomic activity, which triggers effects on corporate decisions. Using satellite night light data to proxy for economic activity, we show that manipulation of GDP figures is associated with earnings management by local companies, especially when local politicians face more promotion pressure. We show that local politicians seeking career advancement exchange favors with local companies and pressure them to inflate earnings to increase local GDP numbers. Our findings illustrate how the macro-level political agenda and GDP manipulation can affect micro-level corporate earnings management.     

Tacit vigilance in an emerging economy: An institution-based perspective of passive blockholder monitoring

We argue that the relative effectiveness of active and passive blockholder monitoring is driven by the institutional context of the Korean financial market, characterized by the dominance of chaebols and the pressure sensitivity of institutional blockholders. We believe that the extensive business ties between chaebols and blockholders effectively increase the cost of shareholder activism in Korea, making passive monitoring a more applicable governance mechanism for blockholders. We test whether passive monitoring affects a firm’s earnings quality, represented by earnings persistence, value relevance, and timeliness. Furthermore, we decompose institutional shareholding by portfolio turnover and nationality and then determine the monitoring channel that influences earnings quality. We find that passive monitoring by domestic blockholders is most effective in improving earnings quality in Korea. In addition, our findings highlight that the difference between the institutional context of developed economies and that of Korea results in different outcomes related to blockholder monitoring.     

Influence of earnings management on forecasting corporate failure

This paper studies the relationship between corporate failure forecasting and earnings management variables. Using a new threshold model approach that separates samples into different regimes according to a threshold variable, the authors examine regimes to evaluate the prediction capacities of earnings management variables. By proposing this threshold model and applying it innovatively, this research reveals boundaries within which earnings management variables can yield superior corporate failure forecasting. The inclusion of earnings management variables in corporate failure models improves failure prediction capacities for firms that manipulate substantial earnings. Furthermore, an accruals-based variable improves predictions of failed firms, but the real activities-based variable improves predictions of non-failed firms. These findings highlight the importance of indicators of the magnitude of earnings management and the tools used to improve the performance of corporate failure models. The proposed model can determine the predictive power of particular explanatory variables to forecast corporate failure.     

The spillover effect of shareholder activism: Evidence on firm reporting

This study examines the spillover effect of shareholder activism against target firms on financial reporting by non-target firms in portfolios held by the same activist shareholders. We find that firms that are not the target of institutional shareholders’ activism campaigns report more positive abnormal accruals. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the effect is more pronounced i) for firms that have more opportunities to engage in upward earnings management, or for firms with less effective alternative monitoring forces, and ii) when investors are more sensitive to good news. We also find that the effect is stronger when activist shareholders are more experienced, are waging more confrontational campaigns against target firms, and have larger holdings in non-target firms. We further find that non-target firms tend to report lower magnitude of asset write-downs, are more likely to restate financial statements and meet or beat earnings benchmarks, and exhibit a more optimistic tone in their 10-K/10-Q filings. Overall, our findings suggest that firms tend to window-dress their mandatory reporting to preempt possible shareholder activism against them.     

Earnings management of target firms and deal premiums: The role of industry relatedness

This paper contributes to the merger and acquisitions (M&A) literature by providing evidence for the role of industry relatedness in the association between target firms' earnings management (EM) before the deal and the premium offered by the acquirer. We argue that familiarity with the industry's policies and practices is a crucial factor that helps acquirers to see through targets' EM. Our evidence supports this prediction in relation to accounting manipulation as we observe that the income increasing accrual manipulation of the target results in significantly higher premiums offered by acquirers in interindustry deals, which is not the case when targets and acquirers belong to the same industry.