Information processing and innovative choice

In this paper we examine how the information processing of subjects who make an innovative choice (innovators) differs from that of subjects who make a noninnovative choice (noninnovators). The task involves selection of an alternative within a range of prerated product category innovativeness. We propose that subjects who seek 1) impersonal/uncontrollable sources, 2) higher levels of information, 3) more detailed (versus summary) data, and 4) noncomparative (versus comparative) data are more likely to make innovative choices. The research method is a computerized process tracing experiment utilizing Search Monitor (Brucks 1988).The authors wish to express their gratitude to Merrie Brucks for the use of and help with Search Monitor and to Eric Johnson, Dave Schmittlein, and Mita Sujan for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

行政垄断、寻租与腐败——转型经济的腐败机理分析

本文试图利用寻租经济学的方法，对中国渐进转型过程中所产生的特有的腐败形式——行政垄断的本质、成因、形式、特征进行了分析；基于现有对转型经济中腐败现象的研究，提出了转型经济中腐败现象的新的分类；并对行政垄断，主要是行业垄断的经济损失规模及租金的耗散等问题进行了初步的研究；最后，回顾了中国反垄断改革的进展，并提出了进一步改革的议程。     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

资本市场变迁及运行效率相关研究评析

资本市场变迁及运行效率是中外学者研究的重点，形成了许多理论流派，其中信息空间理论为资本市场制度变迁提供了新的分析框架。同时，中国资本市场正处在发展建设之中，亟需有效的理论指导其发展。然而，中国资本市场的不完备性和特殊性导致诸多理论的应用存在局限性。而信息是各理论流派研究的核心，只是角度和侧重点不同，故信息空间理论可为研究资本市场变迁和制度选择提供新的研究思路。     

When is it coevolution?

This paper evaluates the differences between Norgaard's and Winder et al.'s approach to socio-environmental coevolution. Winder et al. emphasize the evolutionary dynamics of coevolutionary change. These were omnipresent in Norgaard's work but they have not been adequately explored by other ecological economists. I argue that Winder et al.'s definition of coevolution is in essence the same as Norgaard's and that their real differences are, how they see coevolution applied and how far they are willing to draw a priori a line between evolutionary and non-evolutionary socio-environmental dynamics. My thesis is that at this stage a more open approach to evolutionary dynamics and coevolution a la Norgaard is a wiser strategy than Winder et al.'s narrower approach.     

Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions

Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information.     

Representation and Educational Background of European Economists in Top Journals of Economics

We assess the contribution of European authors to 10 topjournals of economics from 1980 to 1998. Despite efforts on the European Union and national levels topromote academic excellence, European authors still play a minor role in top journals. Examining the development overtime we find little evidence for an increasing share of European contributions. Particular attention has been paidto the educational background of European authors. There is still a segmentation of academic education alonglanguage barriers in continental Europe. However, a considerable proportion of European authors has received a PhD from the US.     

中国经济学研究与教学存在的基本问题与解决思路

当代中国经济学教学与研究面临的主要矛盾,是社会主义市场经济实践对经济理论提出的高要求与现有经济学研究与教学的相对低水平之间的矛盾。核心问题是应该如何在坚持马克思主义经济学指导地位的前提下,构建符合社会主义市场经济实践的经济理论;关键是要坚持用发展中的马克思主义经济学作为中国经济学的指导思想;重点是在辨证扬弃的基础上,大胆借鉴和充分利用西方市场经济经济学理论,将发展了的马克思主义经济学与辨证扬弃了的西方市场经济理论有机结合起来。     

不完全合同理论的新视角——基于演化经济学的分析

长期以来,主流不完全合同理论一直没有在理论逻辑上圆满解答"合同为什么不完全",其理论基础存在很大的争议,这也导致其研究范式存在内在的逻辑矛盾与冲突,大量有关不完全合同的研究本质上却是关注完全合同。本文尝试从演化经济学的视角重新审视不完全合同理论,强调必须从知识不完全性的视角来阐释合同的不完全性,认为个体的有限认知是合同不完全性的重要理论基础,在此视角下探讨了不完全合同的功能、生成及其演变,并重新考察了权威在不完全合同中的作用。