Evolution of harvesting strategies: replicator and resource dynamics

Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual harvesters face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits are demanded more than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic paths to the equilibrium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of the paper is that under certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run. Correspondence to: J. Noailly     

军民融合技术协同创新行为分析

以军工企业和民用企业为研究对象,利用演化博弈模型研究军民融合协同行为的动态演化过程,分析双方在有限理性条件下的互动机理与策略选择,探寻支配双方协同创新的制约因素及影响机理。在此基础上,通过政府激励与契约惩处情景的设定,引入约束体系,构建奖惩机制下军民融合协同博弈理论模型,确定最优发展策略（协同创新,协同创新）状态稳定时奖励金与惩罚金的范围,对于构建军民融合协同创新体系具有一定参考价值和现实指导意义。     

低碳背景下我国制造业绿色创新系统演化过程:创新系统功能视角

在低碳发展要求下,我国制造业绿色创新系统快速发展,呈现出不同演化特征。应用动态创新系统功能分析框架,对低碳背景下我国制造业绿色创新系统的演化过程进行分析。研究发现,在低碳背景下,我国制造业绿色创新系统的演化包含3个阶段:初创阶段、形成与成长阶段、成熟与转移阶段。一般来说,在创新系统演化的不同阶段存在若干不同的系统功能作用模式,其中,只有一种模式发挥主导作用。最后,基于以上分析,针对我国制造业绿色创新系统的不同演化阶段提出政策建议。     

Competitive selection, self-organisation and Joseph A. Schumpeter

Post-Schumpeterians have tended to use biological analogies to understand economic evolution, in contrast to Schumpeter himself. In this paper it is argued that the biological analogies used tend to be outdated and that Schumpeter espoused an intuitive understanding of the evolutionary economic process that is closely related to modern conceptions of self-organisation, suitably adapted for application in socioeconomic systems. Using a self-organisation approach, competition can be understood without recourse to biological analogy, in terms of general systemic principles that operate in the presence of variety. Viewing economic evolution in terms of complex adaptation in self-organising systems yields nonequilibrium and nonlinear perspectives that parallel Schumpeter's own intuitions, reinvigorating them as the basis of evolutionary economic thinking in the new Millennium.     

A close eye on the invisible hand

The paper shows how, and under what minimal information supply conditions, a market finds its competitive equilibrium price and thus solves the so-called tatonnement process, without sellers and buyers knowing the equilibrium price in advance. The information premises must be understood as a basic first approach, and do not necessarily mimic the real market process. Demonstration of a discovery process under these information handling conditions is an important finding for an evolutionary market theory. Additional information-processing elements should augment the efficiency of the discovery process. The results of the simulated market process set out above raise new questions. The role of institutional elements (such as the relevance of demand flexibility or “certainty” of knowledge in the learning process, etc.) is discussed further outside the context of the simulation model, providing new insight into the market process.     

Negotiation processes,Evolutionary Systems Design,and NEGOTIATOR

A negotiation accord is often the result of an intense, laborious, and evolutionary negotiation process. During this process, disputing parties are confronted with goal, judgment, and outcome conflict. This article demonstrates the utility of a conflict resolution framework—Evolutionary Systems Design (ESD)—by using a Negotiation Support System. ESD seeks to guide negotiators to move their individual goals and judgments in such a way as to enhance the chance of achieving a common solution. As illustrated by the use of NEGOTIATOR, a multiattribute utility negotiation support system, we argue that computer mediation can prove to be an effective means to implement the ESD framework.     

Modeling and supporting task-oriented group processes: Purposeful complex adaptive systems and Evolutionary Systems Design

Evolutionary Systems Design (ESD) is a universal general problem solving, formal modeling, design framework for purposeful complex adaptive systems (PCAS) and processes, i.e., task-oriented group processes. These processes constitute policy making, group decision, negotiation, and multiagent problem solving with human and/or artificial agents. ESD is also a framework for computer group support systems (GSS) that support these processes. The ESD general framework can be applied to define and solve specific problems. In this article the ESD framework is presented and illustrated by example. The article provides background for ESD computer implementations discussed in two other related articles (Lewis and Shakun 1996; Bui and Shakun 1996).     

内外资零售企业合作竞争关系的演化分析

本文通过建立演化博弈模型,对内外资零售企业合作竞争关系进行了分析。结果表明,影响该系统演化方向的因素主要包括：双方合作所投入的初始成本、合作产生的超额利润以及其贴现因子。     

Mitigating panic buying behavior in the epidemic: An evolutionary game perspective

The panic buying behavior under public health emergencies will lead to many adverse consequences, such as material waste, price fluctuation and uneven distribution of epidemic prevention materials, which will pose a threat to the social stability and economic development. In this paper, we construct a tripartite game model to explore the strategic choices of the public, merchants and the government in order to effectively respond to the panic buying behavior in the epidemic. The results demonstrate that: (1) Eight evolutionary stable strategies emerge in the panic buying events. The worst scenario can be improved by adjusting some relevant parameters. (2) The probability of the public choosing the strategy of “not involving in panic buying” depends on the potential benefits and losses of snapping up, rather than the extent of price rising. (3) The probability of merchants choosing the strategy of “not bid up price” depends on the intangible benefits. (4) The probability of the government choosing the strategy of “active supervision” depends on the supervision costs and government credibility, rather than the amount of fines. In addition, strategic suggestions to mitigate panic buying behavior are put forward from the perspective of each stakeholder.