财政体制与区际利益补偿:联结、影响与协调

区际利益补偿,是近年来中央积极推进的治理机制,其建立在区域外部性理论基础之上.通过考察外部性的治理方式可知,"庇古税"模式和"科斯模型"均具有理论可行性.而选择何种模型,往往与一国之财政体制密切相关.我国基于现行财政体制所选择的"纵向转移支付",是一种不完整的"庇古税"模式.这一现实决定了目前所试点的区际利益补偿,只是对既有责任逻辑的另一种加持,导致区际利益补偿存在着补偿动力不足、补偿标准低下、补偿范围狭小等问题,应当回归到权利思维逻辑中.而要构建权利逻辑下的区际利益补偿,需要对财政体制进行改革,包括事权的细化以明确补偿范围;财权(力)的差异化配置以增强补偿能力;转移支付制度的多维度完善以规范补偿体系,最终构建起"中央与地方"之间的三角财政关系.在这一基础之上,区际利益补偿才能调整适应理论界所设计的权利化补偿机制.     

Sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures in all-equity firms

We investigate the relation between chief executive officer compensation and accounting performance measures as a function of the firm's capital structure. We specifically analyse pay–performance relationships for all‐equity firms relative to high‐levered firms. We find a significant positive association between return on equity and the level of compensation for all‐equity firms. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we cannot discern any such relationship for high‐levered firms. Because of agency costs of debt, managerial compensation in high‐levered firms plays the role of a precommitment mechanism in addition to its conventional role of aligning management incentives with shareholder interest.     

Investor risk evaluation in the determination of management incentives in the mutual fund industry

This paper examines the way in which investors evaluate risk in deciding which mutual funds to invest. New fund investment is found to be positively related to a distributed lag of past fund performance with a strong degree of inertia. The relationship is mostly linear with significant nonlinearities at the upper (and possibly the lower) end of the performance spectrum. Investors appear to use publicly available data in a way that is consistent with the theory, giving equal weight in their decisions to the return and market risk components of the performance measure, while ignoring diversifiable risk. Finally, it is shown that improved performance in any year has a significant impact on the earnings of the management company. Because managers are rewarded on the basis of risk adjusted returns, risk neutral managers have no incentive to manipulate risk, except at very high performance levels.     

我国保险业赔付率研究

保险作为集合同质风险单位以分摊损失的一种经济制度,其目的是补偿风险事故所造成的损失,以确保经济生活的安定.因此,保险产品质量主要体现在当保险事故发生时被保险人能够及时获得足额的赔付.合理的赔付率既是保险产品公平定价的要求,又是提高保险产品核心竞争力的重要因素.因此,关注和研究我国当前保险业赔付率有着重要意义.总的来看,保险产品赔付整体趋势较平稳,波动幅度小.影响我国保险赔付率的主要因素有:实际平均保额损失率和理论平均保额损失率;方差附加系数和历年损失率的均方差;附加费用等.提高保险产品的质量,制定好改善赔付率的措施.     

Executive shareholding,compensation, and analyst forecast of Chinese firms

We examine the impact of executive and leadership shareholding and cash compensation on analyst forecast error and dispersion as proxies for information asymmetry. We find that firms pay higher compensation (or excess compensation) to executives and directors are associated with higher information asymmetry. The positive association is stronger where executives’ and directors’ shareholdings are higher. Shareholding appears to facilitate managerial entrenchment and gives highly paid executives/leadership stronger structural power which adversely affects information disclosure leading to larger forecast error and dispersion. These results are robust to different measures of compensation and alternative models controlling for the predictability of firm-level earnings. Our findings indicate that executive/director shareholding and compensation do not provide sufficient incentives for information disclosure by Chinese firms.     

南水北调工程各参与方利益补偿机制影响因素探析———公平与效率的观点

从公平与效率角度出发,在博弈论的理论框架下分析南水北调调水工程中受水方、水源区及调供水管理单位之间的博弈行为,研究其不同决策对利益补偿机制设置的影响。本文创新性地提出将信息成本纳入补偿机制影响因素,并强调补偿机制的设立不仅要考虑水源地的利益,还必须考虑受水地的社会公平效应,激发其主动参与南水北调补偿机制的积极性,更好地促进工程的有效实施。     

Conflicting Objectives within the Board: Evidence from Overlapping Audit and Compensation Committee Members

The board of directors is an elite group that faces multifaceted tasks. The board needs to implement decisions on a wide variety of subject matter. These decisions are often delegated to specialized sub-committees within the board. The different objectives of each sub-committee can result in conflicting interests leading to decisions that are sub-optimal. For example, at times, the objectives of the compensation and the audit committee are not aligned. The objective of compensation committees is to grant CEOs compensation packages reflective of their performance. Yet, these compensation packages might contain incentives that could motivate CEOs to influence the financial reporting process in order to reflect better performance, increasing the risk of poor quality financials. In contrast, the objective of audit committees is to oversee the quality of the financial reports and the process that leads to them. Therefore, they would favor compensation packages that reduce the risk of earnings manipulation. We examine public companies that have overlapping compensation and audit committee members and find a higher proportion of CEO incentive compensation in companies with less overlap among audit and compensation committee members. These results suggest that separating the members within these committees might contribute to the effectiveness of board decisions. Data availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in this paper.     

小流域生态补偿标准实证研究

流域生态补偿标准是流域生态补偿研究的核心内容,国内外对此观点不一。以秋浦河为例,以2007年为基准,采用国家林业局发布的"LY/T1721—2008森林生态系统服务功能评估规范",评估其上游生态服务价值为48556.77万元。基于"外部性理论"提出:流域生态补偿标准应本着因地制宜原则,视生态服务的空间差异而定。补偿的上限为外部经济性行为的全部,即生态服务价值的全部(48556.77万元),补偿的下限为生态系统服务功能中主导效应因子的价值,即直接使下游受益的水源涵养及土壤形成与保护价值(22192.31万元)。     

Analyst following and pay-performance sensitivity: evidence from China

We examine whether analyst following is associated with pay-performance sensitivity in China. Based on our analyses of 17,020 Chinese firm-years from 2007 to 2015, we find that pay-performance sensitivity is higher when companies are followed by financial analysts. We also find that the analyst following/pay-performance sensitivity relationship is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than for SOEs. Overall, our results indicate that companies followed by financial analysts exhibit more pay-performance-sensitivity, which is consistent the notion that financial analysts can serve an external monitoring role.     

Country matters: Executives weigh in on the causes and counter measures of counterfeit trade

In this article, we present the findings of a study examining the exploding problem of counterfeit trade via the opinions of U.S. executives as compared to their counterparts from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Tahiti. Their responses provide insight as to how companies in different countries are attacking piracy and consumer complicity with counterfeit products. Per our study, executives in Australia, Tahiti, and the U.S. had similar perspectives: they viewed the seller as the main driver of counterfeit trade for reasons of profit. These executives perceived the demand for counterfeits as being driven by desirable product attributes and the ease of obtaining them. Likewise, they cited two anti-counterfeiting actions—site licenses and reduced price/rebates—as being able to reduce the demand for illicit products. In contrast, South African executives observed the main reason for piracy as weak enforcement of intellectual property (IP) and the lure of exorbitant profits, with little value in any anti-counterfeiting actions other than special packaging. These executives put forth that South African consumers are complicit due to limited education and low disposable income, and the ready availability of counterfeits. Executives from New Zealand were the most optimistic, believing that piracy and complicity can be reduced by many anti-counterfeiting actions, including special packaging, reducing price, emphasizing product benefits/warranties, stressing the harmful effects of using fake products, offering site licenses, and listing of authorized sellers.