Expert systems and land development expertise

Summary

Expert systems are a product of the new technology. They provide the means for computerizing human expertise. This necessitates a more explicit understanding of the latter, provides an additional source of it and presents the possibility of enhancing the competence of that expertise. The paper argues that in the face of increased competition for investment funds the development industry needs to adopt a more sophisticated approach to project assessment. Two examples, with respect to planning law and retail investment appraisal, are developed to indicate the potential of the expert system approach. Ultimately expert systems challenge appeals to ‘feel’, ‘experience’ and judgement’ in human decision‐making; if successful, however, they promise improved profitability.     

评审专家抽取中的时间距离约束分析

针对现有评审专家抽取中距离约束存在的不足,本文提出了一种新的时间距离约束。本文介绍了时间距离的含义及其提出的必要性,并给出了基于GIS技术的时间距离计算方法,具体包括相关假设、计算步骤、解决方案以及实现过程。时间距离约束的提出不仅可以保证所有被选专家都可按时到达评审地点,而且还能打破行政区域的限制,合理调配专家资源,具有重要的现实意义。     

Combining multiple probability predictions using a simple logit model

This paper begins by presenting a simple model of the way in which experts estimate probabilities. The model is then used to construct a likelihood-based aggregation formula for combining multiple probability forecasts. The resulting aggregator has a simple analytical form that depends on a single, easily-interpretable parameter. This makes it computationally simple, attractive for further development, and robust against overfitting. Based on a large-scale dataset in which over 1300 experts tried to predict 69 geopolitical events, our aggregator is found to be superior to several widely-used aggregation algorithms.     

完善岗位聘任制 加强企业人力资源管理

文章从科学地定岗定编,严格考核聘任程序,建立薪酬激励机制等方面,阐述了对人力资源开发与利用的一点看法,以飨读者。     

The UK technology foresight programme: An assessment of expert estimates

Since the early 1990s, ‘Technology Foresight’ exercises with special emphasis on the use of Delphi surveys have played an important role in science and technology (S + T) policy across Europe in an effort to focus resource allocation. Yet, none of the estimates made in the European Delphi surveys have been formally assessed in retrospect, while this process has been incorporated into the Japanese surveys since 1996. Taking the UK Technology Foresight Programme, this research sets out to assess the estimates of three of the fifteen panel Delphi surveys. Whilst on average 2/3 of Delphi statements were predicted to be realised by 2004, it will be shown that only a fraction of these statements had been realised by 2006. Based on the evidence collected from the published panel reports, the ‘Hindsight on Foresight’ survey conducted by OST in 1995 and interviews with panel members, it will be argued that the overwhelming majority of estimates were overly optimistic. While optimism and strategic gaming of experts is the most convincing explanation for these results, process factors were also explored, including the quality of expert panels used, the Delphi statements and the respondents of the Delphi questionnaire. It is argued that at least the issue of short-range optimism and strategic gaming of experts should be addressed in future Delphi exercises, as decision makers relying on expert advice cannot deal with this issue alone.     

一种新的超市门店需求预测方法与库存管理模型

探讨了VMI模式下如何确定连锁超市门店的订货点的问题。利用专家判定法改进了基于历史数据的零售商需求预测模型，并在此需求预测模型基础上提出一种具有时间和数量柔性的自动补货策略模型。最后通过实倒分析表明，研究结果有助于帮助企业在快速响应市场需求的同时。降低企业的成本，提高企业的竞争力。此模型将在某连锁百货的订货系统中得到应用。     

对中小国企经理人任用、业绩考核问题的思考

依目前情况看 ,中小国企的退出道路是漫长的 ,应适当重视对中小国企的监管 ,尤其是经理人的任用及业绩考核等。     

海南省高校聘任制人事改革的对策研究

当前,海南省的十几所高等院校都实行了聘任制的人事制度,这对我国高校的聘任制改革更具有指导作用。因此,完善海南省高校聘任制人事改革可以为高校人事改革积累、总结经验,同时也对海南省事业单位的人事改革的探索具有指导意义。     

The effects of bureaucracy on political accountability and electoral selection

This paper examines how bureaucracy affects political accountability and electoral selection, using a three-tier political agency model consisting of voters, politicians and bureaucrats. In the model’s hierarchy, politicians are constrained by elections while bureaucrats are controlled by budgets. If voters and bureaucrats prefer different types of politicians (i.e. they have a conflict of interests), incumbents pass oversized budgets to prevent bureaucrats from engaging in strategic behaviours that damage incumbents’ reputations. If, instead, voters and bureaucrats prefer the same type of politicians (i.e. they have an alignment of interests), bureaucrats cannot obtain a concession from politicians. In the latter case, however, bureaucrats send voters a credible signal regarding an incumbent’s type, which improves electoral selection. This paper also shows that political appointment systems improve political accountability in the conflict-of-interests case while they weaken electoral selection in the alignment-of-interests case.