新形势下中国企业对外投资的区位选择综合决策模型

对外直接投资的区位选择是跨国公司管理决策的关键点,在很大程度上决定着投资的成败,现有理论在解决了众多为何要对外投资的问题,但在向何处投资的问题上却没有理论和模型可以全面解释。本文建立了新的对外直接投资的区位选择决策二级系统模型,将影响因素按影响效果和属性分类,利用模糊优选方法解决了非量化因素的量化可比性问题。并将本国与外国因素融入同一模型,同时解决了是否要进行对外投资和向何处投资两个问题。     

制度缺陷、路径依赖对中国FDI的影响研究

市场机制的不完善,分配体制的不合理,法制的不健全,导致中国资源配置低效,企业缺乏竞争优势,产业缺乏比较优势,资本外流严重,形成巨额虚假FDI.在有限的真实FDI中,由于国有企业的绝对主导地位,使FDI的产业结构,投资决策和投资区位分布不合理,投资效率低下.只有从根本上进一步完善市场机制、分配体制,加强法制建设,才能纠正资源配置的扭曲,提高中国企业的竞争力和产业比较优势,减少虚假投资,改善中国FDI的投资主体结构、产业结构、区位结构、投资效率,最终提高中国在国际分工中的地位.     

外商投资与地区资本形成的东西部比较

本文的实证分析表明,外商在华投资的空间分布极不均衡,高度集中于东部地区,而这种不均衡直接导致对地 区资本形成的差异。缩小与东部发展的差距、促进西部地区资本形成的关键在于缩小东西部地区外资利用规模差异。     

美国银行业资本监管演变与新进展

文章旨在梳理美国银行业资本监管体系的演进过程,通过时序研究方法揭示美国银行业资本监管的发展动态与脉络。研究发现,美国银行业资本监管与其经济发展趋势密切相关,经济繁荣期监管当局倾向放松监管,这其中有着十分复杂的利益攸关方的激烈博弈,而在经济衰退期,在金融体系风险的压力下,监管当局会收紧监管标准。从中可以窥见,上世纪20年代前的宽松监管与1929年大萧条,二次世界大战后的经济繁荣与70年代经济滞涨,监管加强,80年代初的放松管制与80年代中后期银行大量倒闭,90年代金融服务现代化法案与2008年的全球金融危机,交替出现的银行业监管放松与收紧的变化有着内在的规律性。研究美国银行业资本监管历史、监管体系和监管措施,有助于我国加强银行体系的风险防范,完善银行业资本监管制度和机制。     

A study on risk retention regulation in asset securitization process

We study the impacts of the recently proposed risk retention regulation for asset securitization, i.e. the issuer has to retain a certain proportion of securitized assets. We also consider the frequently discussed measure to require the issuer disclose certain information of the securitized assets. In a dynamic model with asymmetric information between a risk-averse originating bank and a continuum of risk-averse investors, we find that it is impossible for a flat-rate retention requirement to be optimal for all asset types. Although both risk retention and information disclosure regulations are effective in reducing investors’ informational loss, neither can unconditionally enhance social welfare upon the unregulated case. For both measures, there are associated regulatory cost: risk retention regulation aggravates adverse selection problem because it undermines the channel of informational revelation by the choice of securitization intensity, and information disclosure requirement incurs a signalling cost by distorting banks’ securitization intensity in sending signals. Under an appropriate set of conditions we find that information disclosure requirement complements risk retention regulation when investors are sufficiently risk averse.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

严监管背景下农信社合规风险管理体系建设

2018年,银行业监管环境进一步趋严,不但强调对银行的监管,更提出了对监管人员职责的监管,这种严格的外部监管环境对农信社的合规风险管理带来了极大的挑战。农信社合规风险管理体系的建设和完善已势不容缓。论文提出了农信社合规风险管理体系建设要从战略定位、文化渗透、防线搭建、专业专职化、考核和追究六个维度入手,推进合规风险管理长效机制的建设。     

无拍频控制技术在新一代CRH380CL型高速动车组上的应用

高速动车组技术的迅猛发展对牵引变流器的性能提出了更高的要求。在动车组传动系统中,单相脉冲整流器工作时,会在中间直流环节产生2倍于电网频率的脉动分量,该脉动分量传递到逆变器输出侧会在电机上产生拍频现象,引起转矩脉动和电机过热。     

How to deal with real estate booms: Lessons from country experiences

The financial crisis showed, once again, that neglecting real estate booms can have disastrous consequences. In this paper, we spell out the circumstances under which a more active policy agenda on this front would be justified. Then, we offer insights on the pros and cons as well as implementation challenges of various policy tools that can be used to contain the damage to the financial system and the economy from real estate boom–bust episodes. These insights derive from econometric analysis, when possible, and case studies of country experiences. Broadly, booms financed through credit and involving leverage are more likely to warrant a policy response. In that context, macroprudential measures can be targeted more precisely to specific sources of risk, but they may prove ineffective because of circumvention. In that case, monetary policy may have to be used to lean against the wind.     

The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking

We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.