发达国家CFO发展趋势

随着企业经营环境的改变,CFO逐渐成为股东价值管理的中枢。CFO除进行会计核算和提供财务报告外,还逐步参与公司战略制订,并在领导财务变革、提供内部服务及降低财务运行成本等方面扮演重要角色。     

论中国CFO能力框架的实施

我们应采用目前大多数CFO认可的培训方式,即通过举办CFO论坛、鼓励CFO交流、短期培训等多种多样的的灵活方式进行后续教育培训,并以案例为导向开发核心培训课程,这是实施CFO能力框架的重要一步。     

CFO tenure,CFO board membership and accounting conservatism

We examine the influence of chief financial officer (CFO) tenure and CFO board membership on accounting conservatism among Australian listed companies. The study uses market-based (i.e., timeliness of earnings to news) and accounting-based (i.e., accrual-based loss recognition) measures of conservative accounting. The results show that while longer CFO tenure and CFO board membership increases accounting conservativism, this is not the case when CFOs become entrenched through long board-membership tenure. This entrenchment appears to lead to the use of aggressive accounting practices. Overall, the results indicate that CFO tenure and CFO board membership improve financial-reporting quality by increasing accounting conservatism in organizations, providing evidence of the importance of recognizing these two governance characteristics in policymaking and in regulation.     

中国上市公司CFO制度影响因素的实证分析

本文以我国A股上市公司披露的财务高管人员信息为基础，对上市公司CFO制度特征及其影响因素进行了实证分析。结果表明，我国上市公司CFO制度建设还处于比较初级的阶段，并且仅有的CFO制度特征与公司业绩的关系并不显著。在促进财务高管人员在公司治理中的地位和作用提高的过程中，主要不是基于提高业绩和改善公司治理机制，而是由财务高管人员在公司中的个人地位和资历决定的。从公司治理和企业制度建设角度看．迫切需要建立和完善CFO制度及其功能和机制。     

CFO兼任审计委员会委员影响财务重述吗？

审计委员会和CFO处于监督和被监督的地位，然而鲜有文献对CFO兼任审计委员会委员的影响进行深入研究。以2010—2020年全部A股上市公司为研究样本，探究CFO兼任审计委员会委员对财务重述的影响。研究发现，CFO兼任审计委员会委员导致了财务重述的增加，但是会计师事务所规模、审计委员会勤勉度以及内部控制可以削弱CFO兼任对财务重述的影响。进一步研究发现，CFO兼任审计委员会委员年限与财务重述正相关，CFO过度自信在这一正相关关系中发挥部分中介效应。     

How can firms repair their reputations when they discover information technology control material weaknesses?

We examine the effects of information technology material weaknesses on a firm’s reputation by examining how management’s actions before and after disclosure influence investors’ trust in management and perceptions of investment risk. Specifically, we look at the influence of: 1) management taking responsibility for an information technology material weakness, and 2) replacing the CFO with someone with technology expertise. We find that management taking responsibility for a material weakness does not lead to increased trust in management before or after remediation. However, investors perceive more favorable market reactions to remediation when management had previously taken responsibility for the control weakness. Further, we find that replacing the CFO with someone who has technology expertise results in increases in investor trust and improvements in perceptions of investment risk after control weakness remediation. This suggests the importance of sending clear signals to investors that the company is hiring managers with appropriate technology expertise.