BANK PRIVATIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We trace the extent of performance deviation of privatized banks from established private banks in 30 countries from 1994 to 2005 and investigate the role of bank regulatory and supervisory norms, market competition, ownership structure, deposit insurance scheme, and governance structure affecting the deviation. Evidence shows that privatization does improve the performance of banks in the first year of being privatized, but performance gradually declines, which is consistent with the government restructuring argument before the privatization. Governance, foreign ownership, banking freedom (regulations), and the deposit insurance scheme in respective economies are found to affect performance deviation significantly.     

Testing for intraday interdependence and volatility spillover among the euro, the pound and the Swiss franc markets

To examine intraday interdependence and volatility spillover among the euro, the pound and the Swiss franc, we employ the varying-correlation model of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Our main findings are (1) return volatility in the euro spills into the pound and the Swiss franc; and (2) these markets are highly integrated with the euro, and the degree of interdependence is state-dependent: euro news has a simultaneous impact on the pound and the Swiss franc, and co-movements of these currencies and the euro become much higher in proportion to the arrival of news of the euro.     

Bounds on the autocorrelation of admissible stochastic discount factors

We show how to use asset market data to restrict the admissible region for the first-order autocorrelation of the stochastic discount factor (SDF). We interpret this statistic as a measure of a model’s economic time variation across two periods. Estimating bounds for nominal and real SDFs at monthly and quarterly frequencies, we find that the admissible autocorrelations are significantly negative, but greater than −0.02, implying that the bounds impose a strong restriction on candidate SDFs. We illustrate the relevancy of these findings by showing that some widely used consumption-based models are misspecified with respect to the autocorrelation bound. Finally, we examine the implications of our results for the admissibility of linear factor models and the appropriateness of empirical pricing factors.     

Asymmetrical return on equity mean reversion and catering

Using a momentum threshold autoregression model, we find evidence showing that there is an asymmetrical mean reversion behavior in return on equity (ROE). Results show that the speed of adjustment of ROE towards the long-term mean is slower in the ROE increasing regimes than in the ROE decreasing regimes. Additional results indicate that investor earnings optimism is significantly related to change in abnormal ROE. These results are consistent with predictions from catering theory.     

ANALYST REPUTATION,DEALER AFFILIATION,AND MARKET MAKING

We investigate the effects of analysts' affiliation and reputation on dealers' market making activities. We find that for a given stock, dealers who have affiliated analysts covering the stock quote and trade more aggressively than those who do not have any affiliated analysts. More important, the reputation of affiliated analysts plays an additional role in the affiliated dealer's quote and trade behavior. Dealers with affiliated star analysts post more aggressive quotes and have larger market shares than dealers with affiliated nonstar analysts. Although dealers who post more aggressive quotes also induce affiliated star analysts to cover the stocks, the positive effect of analyst reputation on the affiliated dealers' quote aggressiveness remains significant and robust after controlling for potential endogenous and simultaneous problems.     

The pernicious effects of contaminated data in risk management

Banks hold capital to guard against unexpected surges in losses and long freezes in financial markets. The minimum level of capital is set by banking regulators as a function of the banks’ own estimates of their risk exposures. As a result, a great challenge for both banks and regulators is to validate internal risk models. We show that a large fraction of US and international banks uses contaminated data when testing their models. In particular, most banks validate their market risk model using profit-and-loss (P/L) data that include fees and commissions and intraday trading revenues. This practice is inconsistent with the definition of the employed market risk measure. Using both bank data and simulations, we find that data contamination has dramatic implications for model validation and can lead to the acceptance of misspecified risk models. Moreover, our estimates suggest that the use of contaminated data can significantly reduce (market-risk induced) regulatory capital.     

Corporate asset purchases and sales: Theory and evidence

Purchases and sales of operating assets by firms generated $162 billion for shareholders over the past 20 years. This contrasts sharply with the evidence on mergers. This paper characterizes the behavior of value-maximizing firms, which could grow organically, purchase existing assets, or sell assets. The approach yields an endogenous selection model that links asset purchases and sales to fundamental properties of the firm. Empirical tests confirm the predictions of the model. In particular, return on assets and size strongly predict when firms purchase or sell assets, and the transaction size covaries with the value of capital employed by the firm. These findings indicate that corporate asset purchases and sales are consistent with efficient investment decisions.     

Dynamics and causality in industry-specific volatility

This paper presents comprehensive empirical evidence on the dynamics and causality within 30 US industry-specific volatilities during July 1963 and June 2008. We find that linear trends are present in 17 of the 30 industry volatilities. Granger-causality tests reveal that the industry of business supplies and the industry of finance are the most important lead indicators of industry volatilities. To uncover contemporaneous causal relationships in the market, we implement an emerging data-driven method of directed acyclic graphs. The results suggest that volatility shocks originating from business supplies, machinery, and consumer goods industries are sources of risks that affect most other industries. By contrast, volatilities in the two traditionally important industries, oil and autos, do not appear to have a substantial influence on other large industries in the contemporaneous time. Finally, business equipment and services, both containing information technology components, are the most important driving forces of the industry volatility surge in the late 1990s.     

SLIPPAGE AND THE CHOICE OF MARKET OR LIMIT ORDERS IN FUTURES TRADING

Retail futures traders face uncertainty regarding the price they will obtain when trading. This price surprise, known as slippage, can be substantial. Using unique data from an introducing brokerage for Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat, corn, and soybean futures contracts, we quantify time-to-clear and the magnitude of slippage. We then identify factors that affect these trade quality measures. Finally, we analyze individual trader choice between market and limit orders and find that the likelihood of placing limit orders, where regulations protect traders from slippage, is greater when order and market characteristic indicate that adverse slippage is likely.     

Managerial entrenchment, equity payout and capital structure

I develop a contingent claims model to examine the impacts of managerial entrenchment on capital structure and security valuation. The analysis shows that managers’ self-interested leverage choices deviate significantly from the optimal leverages that maximize firm values, partially explaining the suboptimal leverage ratios observed empirically (Graham, 2000). Both the extent and sensitivity of the deviations are affected by firm characteristics, debt features and default solutions. The shareholder-manager conflicts over risk level and cash payout vary dynamically with a firm’s financial health. Managerial entrenchment does not mitigate the agency problems of debt since managers’ discretionary decisions on milking properties or asset substitution could be driven by incentives to increase their own utility.