Do political factors influence banking crisis?

This paper investigates the impending political determinants of banking crisis in advanced economies. In particular, we consider the impact of domestic credit growth on the likelihood of banking crisis and analyse possible constraints on the part of the governments in curbing the unsustainable credit growth. The endogeneity corrected results reveal that the household credit growth has greater impact on the likelihood of banking crisis than the enterprise credit growth. The political channel shows that if governments are concerned about domestic approval rates, then there is a higher chance of credit boom, which in turn increases the prospect of banking crisis. Interestingly, the findings reveal that the presence of an independent and well-functioning central bank mitigates the crisis probability and reduces the opportunistic behaviour of governments.     

Predatory cells and puzzling financial crises: Are toxic products good for the financial markets?

We advance the idea that the predator-prey dynamics that take place among key market agents play an important role in explaining financial crises. As such, we posit that financial markets evolve through fault lines involving toxic behaviors (such as deceit), toxic products (such as predatory mortgages) and inefficient regulations. We provide data to show that the puzzle of the lack of congruence between the market behaviors and what some economic models predict at times of financial crises may be the result of predator-prey interplays, and of so-called “predatory cells”, which are under the influence of financial accelerators.     

重大保险风险测试及其对再保险定价的影响

2010年我国保险行业实施《企业会计准则解释第2号》后,在保费收入的会计确认上发生了重大变化,要求保险公司对签订的再保险保单进行重大保险风险测试。重大保险风险测试对再保险保单的影响重大,本文主要阐述重大保险风险测试问题的提出以及主要测试方法,并从实务角度出发,分析我国的重大保险风险测试规定对临时再保险、非比例合约再保险和比例合约再保险等再保险保单定价的影响。     

Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks' Demand for Government Bonds

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of preferential regulatory treatment on banks' demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction‐level data, our analysis suggests that preferential treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital regulation significantly increases banks' demand for government bonds. Liquidity and capital regulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds. We also find evidence that this “regulatory effect” leads banks to reduce lending to the real economy.     

Limits to arbitrage and hedging: Evidence from commodity markets

We build an equilibrium model of commodity markets in which speculators are capital constrained, and commodity producers have hedging demands for commodity futures. Increases in producers' hedging demand or speculators' capital constraints increase hedging costs via price-pressure on futures. These in turn affect producers' equilibrium hedging and supply decision inducing a link between a financial friction in the futures market and the commodity spot prices. Consistent with the model, measures of producers' propensity to hedge forecasts futures returns and spot prices in oil and gas market data from 1979 to 2010. The component of the commodity futures risk premium associated with producer hedging demand rises when speculative activity reduces. We conclude that limits to financial arbitrage generate limits to hedging by producers, and affect equilibrium commodity supply and prices.     

Comovement and investment banking networks

We test the hypothesis that investment banking networks affect stock prices and trading behavior. Consistent with the notion that investment banks serve as information hubs for segmented groups of investors, the stock prices of firms that use the same lead underwriter during their equity offerings tend to move together. We also find that when firms switch underwriters between their initial public offering (IPO) and a seasoned equity offering (SEO), they comove less with the stocks associated with the old bank and more with the stocks associated with the new bank. This change in comovement is greater for stocks completing their first SEO and for those experiencing large changes in institutional ownership.     

Value or Glamour? An empirical investigation of the effect of celebrity CEOs on financial reporting practices and firm performance

In this study, I investigate the impact of managerial reputation, as proxied by high‐profile awards to CEOs, on financial reporting practices and firm performance. Using a sample of 269 awards given to 189 celebrity CEOs (CEOs who win awards) from 1987 to 2003, I compare within‐firm changes in financial reporting practices and firm performance before and after each CEO wins their first award. I find that celebrity CEOs engage in more conservative accounting practices and are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management to meet short‐term earnings benchmarks. In addition, firm performance improves after celebrity CEOs win awards.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.