治理环境对自由现金流过度投资的影响--来自中国证券市场的经验证据

使用自由现金流进行过度投资是经理获取私利的重要手段。本文以我国2003-2007年的上市公司为样本,实证检验了了公司治理环境能否约束自由现金流的过度投资,以及控制人性质能否影响公司治理环境的这种约束作用。结果发现,上市公司的自由现金流,尤其是正的自由现金流时,将会导致企业过度投资行为的发生,好的公司治理环境有利于抑制自由现金流的过度投资,但这种抑制作用仅仅在民营上市公司才较为明显。我们的研究一方面为自由现金流的过度投资提供了直接证据,同时也表明,研究上市公司投资决策要高度重视公司所处的治理环境;另一方面治理环境的作用又与公司最终控制人性质有关,稳定有序地推进国有企业的民营化有利于降低自由现金流的过度投资。由此可见,只有同时改进外部治理环境和公司的微观治理机制,才能更有效地缓解经理人与股东的利益冲突,增进公司价值。     

生态视角下健全我国农村信用体系的探讨

农村信用体系缺失已成为我国农村金融生态改善的重要“瓶颈”。笔者从我国农村信用体系建设现状人手,阐明我国农村信用体系发展滞后的制约因素。基于生态视角探索构建我国特色农村信用体系的思路,提出搭建信息共享平台、完善激励惩戒机制、丰富农村信用品种、完善信用法律法规等对策建议。     

我国境外国有资产流失的防范机制

如何防范我国境外国有资产流失是当前急需解决的一个重要问题。我们要建立健全境外投资的法律法规,为“走出去”企业构建保障和服务机制;完善公司治理,形成权力制衡机制;规范会计制度,完善财务管理机制;强化企业风险管理,健全内部控制机制;构建境外企业审计机制。     

中小股东一致行动改善了公司治理水平吗?

在资本市场推行注册制改革的背景下,维护中小股东利益成为保障注册制改革效果,助力资本市场平稳运行的关键。本文实证考察了作为非实际控制人的中小股东如何利用一致行动参与公司治理。研究表明,中小股东通过一致行动形成投票表决权的集中配置,进而制衡大股东,从而改善公司绩效。在治理机制方面,中小股东一致行动对绩效的改善,一方面源于其帮助中小股东在股东大会上提出更多代表自身利益的议案,在董事会中委派更多董事,在决策过程中形成更大影响力;另一方面则源于其帮助中小股东实现对大股东的制衡和对经理人的监督,从而抑制实际控制人的“隧道挖掘”行为,缓解内部人控制问题。进一步研究发现,中小股东一致行动的作用效果受到一致行动人的持股比例、形成动机、上市公司的投票表决制度以及一致行动人类型的影响。     

Risk assessment of maintenance operations: the analysis of performing task and accident mechanism

Maintenance operations cover a great number of occupations. Most small and medium-sized enterprises lack the appropriate information to conduct risk assessments of maintenance operations. The objective of this research is to provide a method based on the concepts of task and accident mechanisms for an initial risk assessment by taking into consideration the prevalence and severity of the maintenance accidents reported. Data were gathered from 11,190 reported accidents in maintenance operations in the manufacturing sector of Andalusia from 2003 to 2012. By using a semi-quantitative methodology, likelihood and severity were evaluated based on the actual distribution of accident mechanisms in each of the tasks. Accident mechanisms and tasks were identified by using those variables included in the European Statistics of Accidents at Work methodology. As main results, the estimated risk of the most frequent accident mechanisms identified for each of the analysed tasks is low and the only accident mechanisms with medium risk are accidents when lifting or pushing with physical stress on the musculoskeletal system in tasks involving carrying, and impacts against objects after slipping or stumbling for tasks involving movements. The prioritisation of public preventive actions for the accident mechanisms with a higher estimated risk is highly recommended.     

Improving relationships between sales and marketing: the relative effectiveness of cross-functional coordination mechanisms

ABSTRACT

The importance of effective sales and marketing working relationships is well known and this article examines the effectiveness of various coordination mechanisms used to improve this cross-functional relationship. Six coordination mechanisms are measured to identify their effect on sales and marketing conflict and collaboration, which in turn influence business performance. The results reveal that not all coordination mechanisms are equally effective. Structuring sales and marketing as a single unit and creating cross-functional project teams improve the interface, as do providing opportunities for job rotation and establishing cross-functional meetings. However, employing cross-functional training and co-locating sales and marketing do not influence this working relationship. Finally, reducing conflict and increasing collaboration between sales and marketing is shown to independently, and positively, influence business performance.     

The Influence of Contractual Governance Mechanisms,Buyer–Supplier Trust,and Supplier Opportunistic Behavior on Supplier Performance

This article explores the influence of contractual governance mechanisms, buyer–supplier trust, and supplier opportunistic behavior on Uganda's public sector supplier performance. Many outsourced contracts are reported to frequently fail to deliver on time, budget, specifications, and quality and do not deliver value to the public. This could be attributed to poor contractual governance mechanisms, lack of buyer–supplier trust, and high levels of supplier opportunistic behavior. A cross-sectional data set collected from 632 staff of Uganda's public sector is used to validate the theoretical model and hypotheses developed from literature review. Findings reveal that contractual governance mechanisms, buyer–supplier trust, and supplier opportunistic behavior are significant predictors of public sector supplier performance. The results also suggest that supplier opportunistic behavior has a stronger influence toward supplier performance than others. The implications for these findings for future research and practice are also discussed.     

New Forms of Local Governance

Abstract

This article seeks to identify which factors lead local governments to use corporate public sector organizations, particularly municipal corporations, for service delivery. The authors argue that local officials trade off bureaucratic costs of in-house production with agency costs of external delegation to municipal corporations when deciding how to deliver local public services. Econometric models are employed to test this explanation for the adoption of municipal corporations by 278 Portuguese local governments. The results indicate that organizational size, financial independency and fiscal surplus, as well as ideological concerns and the activity of local interest groups, drive choices of local governance structures.     

Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds

The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound,   and k$k$-fairness. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate an object efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating a collectively owned indivisible good or bad when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information.     

伊斯兰银行业公司治理:理论与实践

伊斯兰银行业公司治理由于其自身不同的经营特点而与传统银行业治理存在较大的差异,其治理结构、代理关系较为复杂,成为英美、德日模式之外较具代表性的一种模式。本文从伊斯兰银行的治理结构及其复杂的委托代理关系出发,论述了其面临的代理问题,并就其代理问题介绍了伊斯兰银行业的公司治理实践,以期为我国的银行业治理提供一定的借鉴。