全文获取类型
收费全文 | 2361篇 |
免费 | 235篇 |
国内免费 | 1篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 513篇 |
工业经济 | 44篇 |
计划管理 | 217篇 |
经济学 | 1388篇 |
综合类 | 19篇 |
运输经济 | 1篇 |
旅游经济 | 5篇 |
贸易经济 | 92篇 |
农业经济 | 58篇 |
经济概况 | 259篇 |
信息产业经济 | 1篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 35篇 |
2022年 | 16篇 |
2021年 | 40篇 |
2020年 | 121篇 |
2019年 | 154篇 |
2018年 | 70篇 |
2017年 | 91篇 |
2016年 | 85篇 |
2015年 | 82篇 |
2014年 | 135篇 |
2013年 | 187篇 |
2012年 | 202篇 |
2011年 | 243篇 |
2010年 | 155篇 |
2009年 | 133篇 |
2008年 | 137篇 |
2007年 | 124篇 |
2006年 | 135篇 |
2005年 | 104篇 |
2004年 | 63篇 |
2003年 | 53篇 |
2002年 | 38篇 |
2001年 | 19篇 |
2000年 | 20篇 |
1999年 | 28篇 |
1998年 | 18篇 |
1997年 | 18篇 |
1996年 | 24篇 |
1995年 | 5篇 |
1994年 | 10篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 14篇 |
1984年 | 9篇 |
1983年 | 9篇 |
1982年 | 7篇 |
1981年 | 2篇 |
1980年 | 5篇 |
1979年 | 4篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有2597条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
81.
Manuchehr Shahrokhi 《Global Finance Journal》2011,22(3):193-210
This paper presents an analysis of the 2007-2010 Global Financial Crisis which started with the sub-prime crisis in the U.S. and became global very fast. It argues that the financial system in the United States is a complex interlocking structure of markets, institutions and regulators. The causes and culprits of the crisis, the misaligned incentives of participants and exogenous events such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitated failure in key markets: commodities, sub-prime housing, equities, and credit. One of the strategic consequences of this crisis is that the US will lose its dominance in world power, the frequent crises and vulnerabilities of the Neoliberalism and examines the future of capitalism. Of the alternatives to economic system, the capitalism is the most viable economic system. However, it must adopt real and efficient allocation of resources to maximize welfare of all parties and seriously address the income inequality. It must reject crony capitalism, enact true financial regulation of institutions and markets, end corporate socialism and address the system’s structural deficiencies. 相似文献
82.
Sergey V. Popov 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2015,117(1):108-125
I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decision‐making. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft, even though the size of an individual bribe might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. Anticorruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation, if they lower the bribe levels demanded and thus encourage small businesses to participate. 相似文献
83.
Rune Jansen Hagen 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2015,117(1):126-163
Current aid rhetoric emphasizes the selective allocation of otherwise unconditional funds in support of the recipients' own plans, in contrast to the old donor practice of bundling money and policies. I show that when recipients have private information, policies reflecting their preferences and knowledge might result in such a regime. However, generous transfers can also induce them to conform to the outcome‐oriented expectations of donors at the expense of lower aid impact. Such behaviour is consistent with an abundance of case‐study evidence. Moderate disagreements over what the optimal policy is could actually produce better results. Certain forms of both donor competition and coordination might also eliminate this distortion, while a donor concern for need only removes incentives for aid‐seeking in the least needy countries. In summary, optimal aid policies are highly context‐specific, and donors should thus concentrate their efforts to practise more informed selectivity. 相似文献
84.
Dimitrios Soudis 《Bulletin of economic research》2017,69(2):164-177
Several studies have attempted to deduce the determinants of sovereign bond ratings. In this study, Extreme Bounds Analysis is applied to approximately 30 factors proposed by the literature in order to assess their robustness with a focus on the relative importance that economic and political variables receive in the shaping of the ratings. We find that policies that constrain the public sector are among the most robust. Variables such as rule of law, openness to economic flows, central bank independence, and market friendly policies are found to be more robustly correlated with the ratings than foreign reserves, fiscal deficit, sovereign bond yields, and economic growth. 相似文献
85.
Regional corruptness in China has a positive effect on the profitability of private firms, but not that of state-owned firms. A natural experiment of exogenous trade policy change suggests that corruption may help private firms circumvent government regulation. 相似文献
86.
We introduce location choice for the public good in the property rights framework. We find that it can be optimal to separate location from ownership. 相似文献
87.
Zareh Asatryan Thushyanthan Baskaran Theocharis Grigoriadis Friedrich Heinemann 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2017,119(3):801-820
In this paper, we exploit the introduction of the right of local initiatives in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 in order to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. Our identification strategy combines difference‐in‐differences and regression discontinuity methods: we compare municipal expenditure and revenue between pre‐ and post‐reform periods at population thresholds where the signatures needed to launch initiatives and minimum quorum requirements decrease discontinuously (difference‐in‐discontinuities design). The results suggest that stronger direct democratic institutions lead to an expansion of local government size. 相似文献
88.
Business tax evasion is an important issue for governments. Yet the factors that determine business tax evasion have not been sufficiently examined in the literature in general, and in transition contexts in particular. To address this gap, this study uses the WB/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) database with a sample of over 12,692 firms from 26 transition economies. Applying various modelling strategies, we argue that tax evasion is a function of firm-level and institutional-level variables. We contribute to the literature by providing robust evidence showing that the perceived tax burden has a positive impact on tax evasion. We also find that the tax evasive behaviour of firms is positively influenced by low trust in government and in the judicial system as well as by higher perceptions of corruption and higher compliance costs. We find that smaller firms, individual businesses and firms in sectors that are less visible to the tax administration are more likely to get involved in evasive behaviour. Overall, institutional factors play an important role in determining firms’ tax evasion behaviour in transition economies. This finding has important policy implications. 相似文献
89.
In this study, we analyze the regulation of markets for the provision of services whose costs are subsidized for paternalistic reasons. We model the choice of a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize consumer welfare in a setting where quality cannot be verified and the good provided is fully subsidized. The choice is thus made between two types of providers (profit maximizers and altruistic providers) and two frameworks (monopoly franchise and quality competition). Our analysis shows that in this environment the performance of mixed markets is always dominated by pure forms. Moreover, although making efficient providers compete for the market minimizes cost, the choice of quality competition with altruistic providers may be preferable from a welfare point of view whenever service quality is relevant and the productivity differential is not substantial. 相似文献
90.
Hikmet Gunay 《Southern economic journal》2014,81(2):364-386
When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying until the next period, with the hope of learning the unknown quality. I analyze the monopolist's pricing and waiting strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. I show when the monopolist offers introductory low prices in pooling equilibria. I also find two types of separating equilibria: one where the high‐type monopolist signals its quality by choosing a different price than the low‐type monopolist in the first period and another where the high‐type monopolist announces the product in the first period and waits to sell only in the second period. Waiting creates a credible cost for signaling; hence, the monopolist uses it as a signaling device. 相似文献